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Germany's Kohl Addresses CSCE Conference

LD0512102394 Berlin DDP/ADN in German 0925 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Budapest (DDP/ADN)—According to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the CSCE (CSCE) must "from now on have priority for peacekeeping in the whole of Europe." As a "regional accord" the CSCE should use to the full extent the UN Charter, Kohl said in Budapest today in his statement at the summit meeting of heads of state and government of the 52 CSCE member countries. Altogether it remains a priority for NATO, the European Union [EU] and the CSCE to combine their forces still more than hitherto.

The Atlantic alliance is the cornerstone of security and stability, not only for its own members but beyond that for the whole of Europe. Building on the principles and obligations of the CSCE, the EU has launched negotiations on the conclusion of a stability pact in Europe. The aim is to promote good neighborly relations, to improve the situation of minorities, and make frontiers more permeable. This successful start to the dialogue should be continued under the auspices of the CSCE. Cross-border cooperation, which in the past decades has become an important cornerstone of European unification, is the model for this.

Together with the CSCE, the, EU and the Atlantic alliance, above all, are the foundations for a lasting and just peace for the whole of Europe, the chancellor emphasized. In this way they make a considerable contribution, through integration and cooperation, with the fledgling democracies in Central and East Europe. In this respect the gradual expansion of NATO and the EU is also a part of a pan-European security plan. At the same time this requires an "intensive partnership on a broad basis with the countries of East Europe, in particular with Russia and Ukraine."

Helmut Kohl made an urgent appeal to the Bosnian Serb leadership to end the war, to allow in humanitarian aid without hindrance, and to endorse the Bosnia Contact Group's peace plan. War and violence, oppression, and brutal violations of human rights are offenses against the Paris CSCE Charter and threaten peaceful development on the continent.

Urges End to Bosnian War

AU0512104094 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1000 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl has called on the Bosnian Serbs to end the war in the Balkans. The use of force, suppression, and brutal human rights violations are threatening developments in Europe, Kohl said at the CSCE summit meeting in Budapest.

Before Kohl, U.S. President Clinton had pleaded for a peaceful solution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, calling for—as he put—ending the Serbian aggression. Clinton pointed out that nobody outside NATO had a right to veto the eastward enlargement of the Western alliance.

Russian President Yeltsin, however, repeated his criticism of the planned integration of the reformist countries of Central and East Europe. NATO is sowing mistrust and not paying sufficient heed to Russia's interests, Yeltsin said.

'Mediterranean Mini-Summit' During CSCE Summit

LD0412122094 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian minister of foreign affairs [Laszlo Kovacs] held talks with Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres this morning. It transpired that there will be a Mediterranean summit during the Budapest winter [at the CSCE summit]. Gabor Nemes reports:

[Nemes] At the initiative of the Hungarian diplomacy and with the participation of the Hungarian foreign minister, the foreign ministers of the Mediterranean countries—that is Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco—who are taking part in the Budapest CSCE summit as observers, will hold a Mediterranean mini-summit. This was announced by Shimon Peres, Israeli minister of foreign affairs, following talks with his Hungarian counterpart.

Laszlo Kovacs said that the security of the Mediterranean region was connected to the security of Europe. Therefore, Hungary and the troika [of the European Union], which is currently leading the European (?summit), urges the integration of the Mediterranean countries into the work of European institutions. [passage omitted]

Claes Denies NATO Bosnian Flights Reduced

AU0212212694 Paris AFP in English 2045 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Brussels, December 2 (AFP)—NATO chief Willy Claes late Friday [2 December] denied reports that the United Nations had asked NATO to scale down its Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia to avoid provoking further missile attacks from Serb ground forces.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation "continues to fulfill its mandate" over Bosnia, Claes told a press conference after a NATO foreign ministers' meeting. Claes, however, refused to give "military details" about the operation which it has run since April 1993 when the UN Security Council called on it to close Bosnia's airspace to warring parties on the ground. A decision to reduce or suspend the operation could be taken only by NATO ambassadors, he added.

NATO and UN sources contradicted each other earlier in the day over the exact status of the operation.

In New York, United Nations spokesman Fred Eckhard said the UN had made no "formal" request to suspend the no-fly zone. "There is some confusion this morning resulting from a press briefing in Sarajevo that left the impression that UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia) had requested NATO to suspend no-fly patrolling," he said. In fact, he said, "UNPROFOR and NATO regularly discuss operational details but there is no formal request to suspend the no-fly zone enforcement and no intention of requesting such suspension," Eckhart said. [passage omitted]

Britain's Independent Television News (ITN) reported that it had obtained footage from NATO's closed circuit internal television showing Claes receiving a telegram from military commanders seeming to indicate the operation had indeed been curtailed. In the footage an aide was seen handing Claes a telegram and said: "Joulwan, Smith and de Lapresle have reached an agreement to slow down the no-fly zone." [passage omitted]

According to a high-ranking military official, NATO had very likely eased aerial patrols over Bosnia, because of the UN's refusal to authorise strikes on Serb anti-aircraft batteries to avoid damaging delicate peace negotiations.

Another NATO official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that the United Nations had indeed asked the organisation to halt its flights over the former Yugoslav republic. NATO, being a "supplier" of air power, had complied with the request, but continued to send its aircraft on missions outside Bosnia, he said.

Captain James Mitchell, the official spokesman of NATO's southern command in Naples, Italy, told AFP he could "neither confirm nor deny" reports that flights over Bosnia had been halted Wednesday. "If you want to know if we are flying, check the sky in Bosnia," he added.

Nine Ministers Replaced in Cabinet Reshuffle

AU0412211294 Paris AFP in English 2044 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, Dec 4 (AFP)—Albanian President Sali Berisha ordered a major cabinet reshuffle Sunday, a month after losing a constitutional reform referendum and blaming the loss on corruption and ineptitude among government officials.

Nine ministers were replaced in the cabinet of Prime Minister Aleksandr Meksi, in office since April 1992. They included the ministers of justice, transport, construction, and trade and industry. [passage omitted]

Berisha Receives, Thanks Forza Italia Delegation

AU0312153794 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At noon today Dr. Sali Berisha, president of the Republic of Albania, received a delegation of Forza Italia leaders and an accompanying group of Italian businessmen.

We were among the first to greet your victory, President Berisha told those present. The new forces that won under the leadership of Forza Italia will give a new dimension to Italy's role in Europe and in the world. Albania, like the other Balkan countries, sees in Italy great possibilities for integration into European structures.

President Berisha then thanked the Italian people, government, and institutions for the valuable aid given Albania during the transition period and stressed that for its part, Albania can offer Italy numerous possibilities, such as its great energy potential, etc.

I am certain that Italian investments and technology are and will remain important and welcomed by us.

After thanking President Berisha for the reception, Mr. Meluxi, the delegation's leader, stressed that Albania is undoubtedly at the top of Italy's interests as regards foreign policy. He assessed the cooperation to be cooperation in dignity, and emphasized that this is to the benefit not only of our two countries but of the region in general.

Court Gives Former President Five-Year Sentence

AU0212205694 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 30 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Ndue Lazri, spokesman for the Supreme Court of Appeals, reports that the hearing in the trial of defendants Ramiz Alia, Simon Stefani, Rita Marko, Hekuran Isai, Aranit Cela, Zylyftar Ramizi, Veiz Haderi, and Rrapi Mino was held at the Supreme Court of Appeals today. These defendants had filed appeals before this court against the verdicts of the Appeals Court and the Tirana District Court, which sentenced them to terms ranging from four to eight years. They are charged with conspiring to abuse their position, resulting in the violation of the freedoms and basic rights of citizens—as well as with conspiring to violate the equality of citizenry.

The hearing was held in the presence of reporters and the defendants' defense attorneys. The court was presided over by Zef Brozi, chairman of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and Gani Dizdari, prosecutor for the hearing.

The relator of the case, Zef Nika, presented a summary of the complaints put forward by the defendants and their claims. The attorneys then took the floor.

Kleanthi Koci, the defense attorney for defendant Ramiz Alia, spoke first. He called the trial against Ramiz Alia "political" and spoke about violations of procedure during the entire investigation process and the trial in its first two stages. Koci asked that the case be forwarded to the Constitutional Court before a decision be taken by the Supreme Court of Appeals.

The other attorneys also considered unfounded and illegal the decisions and verdicts handed down to the other defendants and asked that the defendants be proclaimed innocent.

Prosecutor Gani Dizdari asked that verdicts of the Court of Appeals and of the Tirana District Court remain in effect, suggesting a milder verdict for Rrapi Mino.

At the end, the court announced the verdict, stating that decision No. 378, dated 17 September 1994, of the Court of Appeals in Tirana regarding the guilt and the acts for which the defendants have been declared guilty, remains in effect. The court also changed the verdicts for the following defendants:

—Ramiz Alia is sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

—Rita Marko to five years.

—Simon Stefani to six years.

—Hekuran Isai to four years.

—Aranit Cela to four years.

—Rrapi Mino to three years.

—Zylyftar Ramizi to five years.

—Veiz Haderi to two years.

The court agreed that the Court of Appeals decision regarding the measure of punishment given to defendants Adil Carcani and Manush Myftiu remains effective, as well as the civil obligation for all defendants to pay back the embezzled amounts.

Supreme Court Judge Said Fighting State 'Mafia'

AU0512101594 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 22 Nov 94 p 1

[Commentary by Agim Zela: "The 'Brozi Affair' Is More Than a Scandal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past few days, the media have justifiably been giving broad coverage to the "Brozi Affair," which started quite by chance with an incident between the attendants and bodyguards of Mr. Brozi and those of the deputy general prosecutor. The incident appeared to be trivial, unworthy of mention, but the backlash from it, and Mr. Brozi's statements in an interview and, later, at news conference, show that the episode was the pretext for a row—for, as the saying goes: "Large rabbits sometimes jump out of small bushes."

Even a few months ago, Mr. Brozi showed signs of rebellion, when after the presidential decree pardoning two convicted KOHA JONE journalists, in his capacity as Supreme Court chairman Brozi pronounced them not guilty. Some people thought this was a trick by the state to create the image of an independent judiciary. Yet today, Mr. Brozi's conduct, if not indicating his discontent with the top echelons of the state, certainly shows that in his position as Albania's highest judge, his judicial conscience is troubling him, so it is unlikely to allow him to get enmeshed in ignoble acts perpetrated by others.

Naturally, Mr. Brozi knows a lot not only about things relevant to his profession but also about the lives of politicians, their legal and illegal acts, and the relationships between various state structures. Thus, he wants to speak up and decry the improprieties he has witnessed. His statements constitute more than a scandal.

Particularly stunning are the facts given in his interview to KOHA JONE, because this was the first time a high-ranking state official has said that the top echelons of the Democratic Party and its segments are organized in mafia style. Many people in Albania do not perhaps know what the mafia is, but when there is a murder and the perpetrator goes unpunished, when corruption sweeps government offices and nobody is brought to justice, and when several kinds of police forces patrol the streets yet the citizens live in fear, it is called "mafia." Brozi, on the other hand, knows full well what the mafia is when he says ominously: "The black mafia has gotten its hands on several segments of the present state bodies." One cannot but be shocked when such a statement comes not from an ordinary person but from the highest authority in the Albanian judiciary. After an admission like this, the regrettable conclusion is that the judiciary is incapable of bringing mafia activity to a halt. This means that there are large cracks in the hull of the ship of state, and that it could sink pretty soon. "What I would like is to bring all the mafia bosses to book," Mr. Brozi exclaims. For the sake of the democracy we are building, we wish him every possible success in his mission. However, the fact is that the mafia that has installed itself in Albania—and despite Mr. Brozi's efforts, continues to do so without hindrance. In this respect, the Republic's supreme judge seems to be influenced more by Damiano Damiani movies than by having anything in his power with which to restore justice and punish the culprits. He can therefore never succeed in taking his mission to the end if he reveals the truth only in undertones.

Another quite alarming assertion by Mr. Brozi was that "What I am telling you now is that if something happens to Zef Brozi, the perpetrators of the crime will certainly be [Minister of Public Order] Justafaraj and his followers." In this statement Mr. Brozi openly gave vent to his fear. When the Supreme Court chairman fears for his own life, when certain segments of the state make the highest representative of justice go weak at the knees, how can the ordinary citizen feel at ease when confronted by state power?

Mr. Brozi has just begun to speak up. If he now says no more, however, that will mean that the state has not only hamstrung him personally but has also paralyzed the system he represents.

Price, Employment, Trade Statistics Examined

AU0412215794 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian
1 Dec 94 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Main Economic Indicators"]

[Text] On the basis of data from the Statistics Institute, there was a noticeable increase in the volume of imports of consumer goods in the first, second, and third quarters of 1994, in comparison with an average quarter in 1993. Tables show fluctuations in the consumption of different goods from one quarter to the next, but with a generally upward trend. Thus, we have higher imports of motor vehicles and television sets and an increase in fuel consumption in the third quarter of 1994, compared to the second quarter, besides a decline in the import of washing machines and a significant fall in electricity consumption.

Investments

Imports of machinery and equipment were lower in the third quarter of 1994 than in any quarter of 1993, continuing the downward trend of the first two quarters of 1994. There was the same downward trend in the consumption of cement and its by-products. Thus, from 71,000 and 74,000 tonnes in the first and second quarters of 1994, production in the third quarter fell to 56,000 tonnes. This significant fall, alongside declining machinery imports, suggests an unfavorable state of affairs in investments.

Prices

Compared to the previous quarter, the consumer price index in the third quarter of 1994 declined by 3.1 percent. There was a pronounced fall in July and August caused by the lower prices of seasonal fruit and vegetables.

Prices in the construction industry have stabilized during 1994. The average rate of price increases was 9.8 percent in 1993, but 3.5 percent for the first three quarters of 1994.

There was an increase in the total number of people employed by the private sector in 1994. While there was gradual and stable growth in employment in the private sector in the towns, there was more noticeable growth in employment in private agriculture as a result of the increase in the number of private farms and the expansion of the activities of existing farms.

On the other hand, the continuing process of privatization has led to a slight decline in the number of people employed by the state sector of the economy.

Foreign Trade

The index of the volume of exports in the third quarter of 1994 was 96.5 percent, compared with an average quarter of 1993, showing a decline of 10.9 percent compared to the second quarter of this year and an increase of 3.7 percent in comparison with the same quarter of last year.

During this quarter, compared with the second quarter of 1994, there has been a considerable decline in the export of such products as ferrochrome, liquid gas, rugs, shoes, fish, cheese, beans, etc., and an increase in the export of such products as chrome ore and concentrate, natural and liquid bitumen, cooking oil, brandy, tobacco, watermelons, etc.

The index of the volume of imports for the third quarter of 1994 is 112.5 percent, compared to an average quarter in 1993, showing an increase of 1.8 percent compared to the second quarter of 1994 and remaining at virtually the same level as the same quarter last year.

During the third quarter, compared to the second, there have been increased imports of such items as flour, cooking oil, sugar, macaroni, tobacco, cigarettes, gasoline, liquid gas, soap, and television and radio sets, while imports of such items as beef, chickens, cheese, butter, coffee, rice, washing machines, tape recorders, etc., have declined.

Mineral, Industrial Production Decline Continues

AU0412220494 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Dec 94 p 8

[Article by "E.B.": "When Will the Decline in Industrial Production End!"]

[Text] Our economy has traditionally relied on earnings from production. Agriculture, livestock-raising, and the mining and ore-processing industry have been its traditional strengths. The privatization of agriculture has meant that the decline in production between 1980 and 1990 has been halted completely, and all figures show an increase. Meanwhile, the situation is quite different in the state sector. Of the 25 products studied by the Statistics Institute, 16 have seen a significant decline.

Domestic cigarette production has declined by 12 percent. One contributing factor may be the low quality of our cigarettes, which despite their low price do not succeed in challenging the competition of foreign, and especially Greek, cigarettes. Even at almost twice the price, these have taken first place in our cigarette consumption. Shoe production declined by 81 percent in 1994, in comparison to 1993. Although there has been a strong tradition of both quality and variety in this sector, here too foreign shoes have elbowed out the domestic products, and the latter are heading for bankruptcy. Perhaps this industry is suffering from the "beer syndrome." Beer production was entirely suspended for several years, leaving the field entirely clear for imported beers. The production of phosphate fertilizers has declined by 62 percent, at a time when international organizations are auctioning off these and other fertilizers.

However, the largest declines are in the mining industry, which is not threatened by any competition at home. In the first quarter of 1994 alone, the copper industry showed the following drops, compared with the previous year: copper ore, 26,660 tonnes; copper concentrate, 2,898 tonnes; blister copper, 927 tonnes; wire and cable, 166 tonnes. High extraction costs and unfavorable prices on the world market have influenced this drastic decline, but so has the ineffective pricing policy this industry has pursued on the world market. Continuing with the extraction industries, we have the following further figures: oil, 12,419 tonnes; coal, 8,590 tonnes; chrome ore, 25,260 tonnes; chrome concentrate, 8,611 tonnes, etc. Much has been said in recent years about making tourism a priority branch of our economy. However, we completely lack all infrastructure. What we have, in its present wretched state, would require colossal investments. The government's efforts to build this infrastructure with aid and loans are merely stop-gap solutions. If this aid and credit had been used to reactivate and modernize traditional industries, a number of problems, such as growth in national products, would have been solved. This would also increase our ability to invest, ease the problem of unemployment, and reliably and systematically increase the population's earnings. Although there is no data for private sector production, we notice from the export figures that exports, and therefore also production, doubled in April-June 1994. Since then, both production and exports in the private sector have been declining.

Why is it that whatever depends on the state is, in general, in decline? There are many factors, but the principal one is management's mentality. However, there are also good examples in this area, which we will describe in forthcoming issues.

Commentary Critizes IMF Salary Recommendations

AU0512095394 Tirana BALLI I KOMBIT in Albanian 10 Nov 94 p 5

[Commentary by "D.M.": "The Position of the IMF Experts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has now become clear that the experts of the IMF are making the rules for the Albanian economy. In addition to the IMF permanent mission, there is a large number of experts who come to Albania several times a year to assess its development and make suggestions. The other day, a group of such IMF experts came to discuss the 1995 state budget and analyze the 1994 budget deficit. So far so good, because world experience in these unexplored areas is indispensable for the Albanian economy. However, it is absurd to accept their suggestions and remarks without question. This is what has happened and is still happening with these experts, who after staying a couple of days in Albania and highly praising the success of reform, leave the country satisfied. Word has reached us that their pay, and that of the permanent staff, runs into stupefying sums of money. While they are being paid up to $800 a day, they warn against raising salary levels for Albanian state employees. Meanwhile, the Albanian experts keep quiet about the fact that while a foreigner working for the World Bank, the IMF, or some other foreign organization in Albania receives such high pay, that of Albanian employees is ridiculously low. The average Albanian would need to work a whole year in order to receive what these magic experts from abroad earn. Albania is a special case for them, so they get extra pay due to the difficulties of performing their work. They could never get the same income in their own countries, or wherever they live abroad. Achievements in Albania are rapid, but the Albanians' pay is rock-bottom. Herein lies the weak point of their suggestions, which is why they must never be taken seriously. Before this happens, and now that budget figures for the next year are being discussed, the Albanian experts should not accept blindly whatever the foreign experts put forward. According to experts, the budget deficit for this year should fall to 8 percent, and the following year it should fall even further. This, of course, is a good thing, but it must not be achieved by keeping the pay of Albanian employees at the lowest possible levels. The main thing is to cut excessive spending aimed at creating luxury for the administration, and to avoid unnecessary trips abroad or the purchasing of expensive fancy cars.

DPA Expert Critiques 'Biased' ATSH

AU0512101394 Tirana ALTERNATIVA SD in Albanian 15 Nov 94 p 3

[Report by C. Loloci: "Lack of Objectivity Means Foreign News Agencies are Favored"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few months ago, a foreign expert from DPA who had worked a long time for such well-known institutions as REUTER and the BBC said regretfully that ATSH [Albanian Telegraph Agency] bore very little resemblance to a news agency. After perusing its news bulletins of January-April 1994, he remarked that its reporting did not comply with classical principles, its news was biased, its style long-winded, and its journalistic ethics lacking.

To illustrate the point, he put several ATSH news items on the table before journalists in the ATSH offices. As I recall, one item dealt with the second anniversary of the Meksi government. In it, only the good aspects of the government—how the government saw itself—were mentioned. "Is there any opposition in Albania? If so, what do they say?" the German expert asked. After a pause he added: "What about the Social Democratic Party or the Republican Party? What do they think about the government? What about the intellectuals and associations? What is their opinion?" The ATSH journalists and staff had to answer these questions.

The German expert said it was unlikely that foreign agencies would use this type of news because it was incomplete, partial, and lacked objectivity.

So Has ATSH Changed?

It has naturally undergone certain changes. The domestic news section, for example, has made considerable progress, particularly in gathering and processing the news. It follows events and reports them in timely fashion. Its news, however, is biased. When it comes to reporting on the activities of political parties, for instance, little mention is made of parties other than the ruling party, whether they are inside or ourside the legislature.

To Whom Does ATSH Answer?

It is rather difficult to tell within whose purview ATSH falls. Occasionally its chiefs have been summoned to report to the legislature's media commission. Perhaps that is where they get their instructions. Nevertheless, it can be stated that our news agency does not have any special status approved by the legislature that might give it a fuller and better profile. The RTSH [Albanian Boadcasting Corporation]—an institution of national importance—still has no status. Under the circumstances, people cannot but prefer foreign agencies, which have greater acceptance by Albanians and have become closer to them in their daily lives. A poll has shown that the BBC is the most favored, Albanians finding it the most reliable source of information. This is due to its charter, its reputation, its objectivity, and the skills of its journalists. The same could be said of REUTER, AFP, DPA, and so on.

Radicalization Feared If Turkish Party Isolated

AU0512112894 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 30 Nov 94 pp 9, 10

[Article by Nevena Gyurova: "Coalition With DPS is Better Alternative Than Bosnian One"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Against the background of the lackluster election campaign, it is likely that the next National Assembly will be a rerun of the last one, i.e. that only the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] will enter parliament, without any having an absolute majority. This probability is based on the forecasts of politicians and observers, according to whom the next National Assembly will be deadlocked because it will not be able to produce a government. This will happen because the BSP and the SDS refuse to form a coalition with the DPS. Thus, after two or three months of a mandate merry-go- round, the president will call new elections. Analyzing developments in this way, most observers fear that this would strengthen the actual power of the president and that a crisis of the parliamentary system is possible.

It appears, however, that no one has noticed another, much more serious crisis that might emerge: destabilization of the country on an ethnic basis. If the caretaker cabinet is prolonged, the socioeconomic situation will certainly get worse, because regardless of that cabinet's good intentions it simply cannot replace a full-fledged cabinet. (The fact that no laws can be enacted without a functioning parliament is less important in this particular case. The caretaker cabinet has demonstrated that it can skillfully sidestep this restriction by using sublaw acts to do things that should have been based on laws. The fact that there will be no foreign aid as long as the political crisis continues is a more serious danger). The constituency that will suffer most from an aggravation of the socioeconomic crisis is the DPS's. The wave of emigration will grow. Dogan's voters will continue to vote with their feet, heading toward Turkey regardless of the attempt to restrict such emigration. They will be encouraged in that direction by the nationalistic mood that has become a fixed element in our public life. Anti-Turkish sentiments can be sensed in practically all the media and in the election campaigns of the main political parties. The further deterioration of the DPS's prestige will also play a role. This is inevitable because the DPS' chances of influencing the government sharply deteriorated after the demise of Berov's cabinet, and they will continue to deteriorate in the future. Against this background it is possible that if new elections are held next year the DPS will not be able to cross the 4-percent threshold and will thus remain outside parliament: in other words, outside political life.

This is where the problems will begin. If the Turkish population has no political channels for expressing its interests, a process of radicalization within its political elite is possible, which would be accompanied by a search for new nonpolitical ways of resolving problems. There is no need to describe what a nonpolitical way of resolving problems means in the Balkans. It is precisely in such a situation that fundamentalism could emerge strongly, with all the ensuing consequences.

To a degree, such a development is logical. It is as if rights had been given to, say, blacks or small children, and then suddenly taken away. The reaction of those who suffer as a result would be stronger than if no rights had been given at all. The DPS is in precisely this situation—regardless of whether it is closer to the rights of the blacks or the children of our example.

A situation in which the DPS participates in the political life of the BSP and the SDS as an equal partner for four years and then finds itself shunned by both of them—which could prevent it from participating in big politics—is an impossible script. The problem has nothing to do with the legality of the DPS as a political party, because the whole thing is a matter of logic rather than law. The basic parties have twice acted against their own consciences and violated the law in the name of their own interests. In 1990 the DPS was registered by the BSP as a political party, and in 1991 the SDS (to which President Zhelev then belonged) allowed the DPS to participate in the elections. It would have been better not to form an ethnic party at all, but since it has been done and confirmed, it is better to accept that party as it is. The presence of the DPS in political life is the lesser evil, if only because now it is in the spotlight and has to abide by democratic rules and norms—something which in the final analysis represents a system of control.

Possible interference from outside could also contribute to the development of radicalism among the Turkish population. Relations between the United States and Russia have sharply deteriorated recently, and this is causing destabilization in various parts of the world, including the Balkans. The recent fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina is clear evidence. The surest way to destabilize Bulgaria through the ethnic factor is to exclude the DPS from our political life. This will facilitate the radicalization process. The United States and Russia have long been using the DPS to interfere in our domestic affairs. It suffices to recall Moscow's role in the ethnic disturbances in 1989 or Washington's direct intervention to allow the DPS to participate in the second elections. The consecutive visits of the U.S. and Russian ambassadors to Dogan's room at the National Assembly during the spring cabinet crisis were the most striking and recent example of this interference. It would be better if Zhan Videnov and Filip Dimitrov were to establish normal relations with Dogan, rather than leave him in the company of Montgomery and Avdeyev. This combination is unhealthy for Bulgaria.

'New Development' in Russian Relations Expected

AU0512104694 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 Nov 94 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Genov, member of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, by Tanya Koleva; place and date not given: "Bulgarian-Russian Relations Could Undergo New Development"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Koleva] Mr. Genov, you accompanied Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], on his recent visit to Moscow. Did you have more success than you expected?

[Genov] Zhan Videnov's quickly prepared visit to Moscow went far beyond the diplomatic level usual for such visits. Being familiar with the history of Bulgarian-Russian relations, I can say that no Bulgarian political leader without an official position and traveling on a regular passport has been given so much attention in the past. In Russia the BSP Supreme Council chairman showed that it is the fate of the Socialists to win.

In Moscow Zhan Videnov emphasized the nonpartisan nature of Bulgarian-Russian relations. Governments might come and go in our countries, but friendly relations between the Bulgarian and Russian peoples must be based on a mutually beneficial and equal foundation. Every nationally responsible political force in our country has the green light in this respect. The BSP does not claim a monopoly over relations with Russia.

[Koleva] It seems that there were more than 20 official meetings at various levels. What prompted all this activity?

[Genov] It is well-known that, because of certain political forces and institutions in Bulgaria, bilateral relations with Russia have not been at a satisfactory level in recent years, and they do not correspond to objective needs. It was necessary to clarify the possibilities for embarking upon a new stage in Bulgarian-Russian relations that corresponds to the new realities.

That is why there were so many meetings. They all pointed in the same direction, however. This includes the meetings with the prime minister, deputy prime minister, chairman and deputy chairman of the Duma, chief of the General Staff, Patriarch Aleksiy II, and leaders of influential political forces.

The conclusion was that after the elections, Bulgarian-Russian relations could undergo a new development. This is a serious prospect and one of the real ways of overcoming Bulgaria's crisis.

[Koleva] Do you think this visit to the East could give rise to speculation on the part of certain political forces in our country, which could claim that the balance has been violated and that a change in the European character of the new Bulgarian foreign policy has been introduced?

[Genov] Such speculat[illegible] will not help its authors. Preserving the balance [illegible]nues to be the basic task of Bulgarian foreign policy, but no result has been achieved. Only a balance that facilitates the progress of the democratic reforms in Bulgaria is a positive factor. In modern international relations, ideologies are doomed. Interests, and especially economic interests, are the determining factors.

Furthermore, Russia is an integral part of Europe, and by creating prerequisites for developing Bulgarian-Russian relations, we practically confirm rather than deny the European character of Bulgaria's new foreign policy, which is a matter of national consensus.

[Kolev] At whose invitation did the visit take place, and how does it fit in with the BSP's election platform?

[Genov] We were guests of the Third Congress of the Agrarian Party of Russia. This is one of the basic leftist-centrist parties and has 50 deputies in the Duma. Our coalition partner Svetoslav Shivarov, leader of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, was also an official guest, and read our joint greetings message to the congress.

The foreign policy part of the BSP election platform has really begun to be implemented. In that part, we stressed that it is in Bulgaria's basic interest to have equal and more active relations with the world powers. I hope that Zhan Videnov will also visit the other superpower soon. Bulgaria should follow a respectful and pragmatic international course that can produce various dividends rather than make us the enemies of others.

Havel Supports 'Threat of Force' in B-H

BR0212135894 Paris LIBERATION in French 2 Dec 94 p 7

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Veronique Soule in Prague; date not given: "Evil Must Be Opposed From the Start"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Vaclav Havel, who has always condemned nationalist extremes, explains why he thinks the threat of force alone can now stop the Bosnian conflict. Receiving LIBERATION in his office in Prague Castle, the playwright president also tried to understand the reasons for the international fiasco.*

[Soule] While the Western countries powerlessly watch the continuation of the Serb offensive against Bihac, what do you think the international community could have done?

[Havel] I think that the Europeans could have done more from the start. Bosnia was a model of civic coexistence, in which ethnic and religious communities were cohabiting. But this principle on which Europe was built and which is a foundation of Western civilization was abandoned. It strikes me as suicidal that the Europeans should draw maps on which Bosnia is dismembered to satisfy ethnic fanatics. I have always thought that more energetic action should have been taken, if necessary by resorting to force.

This is undoubtedly a weakness on the part of the democratic world but not the result of bad intentions. I could put forward other explanations for the international impotence—for instance, the fact that NATO was created to deal with a bipolar conflict. There is also a very marked political issue: The Contact Group (Germany, France, Britain, the United States, and Russia) must find an agreement with the Russians on this subject. But none of this alters my conviction that the Europeans ought to have taken a firmer line.

[Soule] What do you think of the attitude of the United States, which is supporting the Bosnians verbally but refusing to become involved on the ground?

[Havel] In my view, lifting the arms embargo would not be a solution. Withdrawing from Bosnia and lifting the embargo ultimately amounts to the same thing: shirking responsibility. It amounts to saying: If they want to kill each other, well, let them do so! In such a closely interdependent world, that is very dangerous: The conflict could spread and eventually involve everybody. Our historical experience with the policy of appeasement (reference to the 1938 Munich agreements in which France and Britain abandoned Czechoslovakia to Hitler—LIBERATION editor's note) supports us in this view.

[Soule] You are opposed to the lifting of the embargo and to the withdrawal of the Blue Helmets. So what solutions do you advocate?

[Havel] I am afraid that the only solution is the threat of force or even the use of force. But I am not commanding a regiment, and I could not say in practical terms what should be done. I have read many conflicting analyses by generals. I do not claim to have the ability to decide.

[Soule] What conclusion do you draw from this international failure?

[Havel] A very simple conclusion: Evil must be opposed from the start.

[Soule] And for East Europe, are you not afraid that the Serbs' impunity will encourage the nationalists and extremists of all kinds?

[Havel] First, extremism is not a speciality of the post-communist world; it is a shared phenomenon. It is impossible to start from a black-and-white view that the West is stable and the East is not. Second, there would be more stability in the East if the West opened its arms wider (to welcome the East European countries that want to integrate) because the best protection against the destabilizing effects of nationalism is the consolidation of democracy. By integrating the new democracies, the West would strengthen them.

[Soule] You condemned the "Munich" spirit that is reigning in the West. Can you explain that?

[Havel] There are analogies (with the prewar period). For instance, people are heard to say that it would be irresponsible to risk lives for a distant country in which the people are massacring each other. We have already heard that from our allies, who then went on to pay a price 1,000 times higher for failing to tackle the evil at the beginning.

[Soule] Immediately after the collapse of the Wall, Europe was presented in East Europe as a solution to all ills. Since then there has been great disappointment. What do you now expect from Europe?

[Havel] Central Europe's aspiration to join the Western structures remains unchanged because it is deeply rooted. It is the desire to join a world whose values we share and that we have helped to build over the course of history. This is so deeply rooted in us that the whims of the day do not change it. But the world is different from what it was five years ago. Many then had an ideal picture of the future. In reality, we noted that individual interests often prevailed; we have become more realistic. But our aspiration cannot be denied. Quite the reverse. In the world today, the need for integration is more urgent than ever. What do we expect from this Europe? We expect to finally have a stable situation. By joining the European architecture, we want to stop gliding in a kind of void.

[Soule] After some hesitation, Chancellor Kohl has finally invited the former East European countries to the Essen European summit (scheduled for 9 and 10 December). Are you pleased?

[Havel] It is an excellent idea for the German presidency of the European Union to end with a summit to which the East European leaders are invited. Germany has always supported the EU's expansion to East Europe, and this is a logical culmination of its presidency.

[Soule] On 1 January, France will replace it as head of the EU. Do you expect comparable support?

[Havel] According to what we know, France is in favor of such an expansion. We will see what proposals it makes when it is president of the Union. For the time being, we have no reason to worry.

[Soule] You said recently that it would be better for the Czech Republic to start by joining NATO before the EU. What did you mean?

[Havel] NATO membership requires a number of preparations (especially the adaptation of the former armed forces of the Warsaw Pact). But these preparations are very much less complicated than those required to join the EU. As for NATO, it has to make a political decision and choose which countries can join. For these practical reasons, I think it is simpler to join NATO first, provided, of course, the Alliance is prepared to accept us.

[Soule] Fearing isolation, Russia is hostile to a rapid expansion of NATO to East Europe. What do you think of that?

[Havel] NATO, like the Czech Republic, must maintain the best possible relations with Russia. Without that, there cannot be any peace in Europe. I even think that relations with Russia and with the whole CIS (Community of Independent States) should be institutionalized—for instance, through the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is holding a summit in Budapest on 5 and 6 December). Moreover, it is clear that nobody in Europe wants Russia's isolation. Quite the reverse. But this does not mean that Russia should dictate which body we can join. We are a sovereign state that does not need anybody to decide our affinities and our choices.

President Havel on Future of CSCE

LD0412173094 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 4 Dec 94

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Robert Tamchyna at Lany presidential residence; date not given; "Conversations at Lany"—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tamchyna] Mr. President, on 4 December you leave for Budapest to attend the CSCE summit. With respect to the historical situation surrounding the summit, we can expect an interesting and perhaps turbulent course of events. In your view, what is most important about this summit in today's situation?

[Havel] [Passage omitted] I believe there are some new tasks that, even at this time, can be dealt with by the CSCE better than by anyone else. These tasks include some concrete issues of great long-term importance.

One of them is preventative diplomacy, which the CSCE has done a lot, even though it has not been very apparent. It is work that is rather inconspicuous, but the CSCE has done a great deal of it in several sensitive points, especially dealing with the former Soviet Union's attitude toward the prevention of conflicts or appeasement in crisis situations and so on. This work should be supported politically, materially, and regarding personnel because this is something the UN cannot do and that can hardly be done by any other institution.

Another important issue concerns peacekeeping forces, which, according to the CSCE statute, can be deployed, though this has not been done yet. This possibility has not yet been taken up; only the UN does that. It seems that it would be very beneficial if the overloaded UN could receive some help from the CSCE taking up this duty.

This is also important because it would emphasize and confirm the principle of shared responsibility, so that none of the superpowers could, in its area, play the role of a local policeman, of a hegemonic and dominant ruler appointed by the international community to take care of the area. However excellent the care might be, its principle is inadequate because it might be the first seed of some new division of the world into areas of interest or spheres of influence and so on. [passage omitted]

In my view, the CSCE can play an even more important role. The CSCE could be some kind of institution of permanent dialogue between the European West, including the Euro-American West, and the East, by which I mean Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States. Such permanent and, to some degree, institutionalized dialogue, such cooperation is immensely important because it creates a climate suitable for developing the natural architecture of the European security structure.

We, for instance, want to join NATO. We identify our civilization with it. To us it is an essential and natural need. It is our business where we feel we belong, and it should be in Russia's interest that these structures are as natural as possible so that nothing is imposed on anybody, and everybody is where he feels he belongs. The more Russia is brought into the grand dialogue, into the space embraced by the CSCE, the bigger the chance of developing relations on the grounds of a genuine new trust, a new type of trust, thus eliminating the worries about expanding this or that while threatening somebody else and so on.

All of these issues are becoming immensely topical nowadays, proof being the recent meeting of NATO and Minister Kozyrev's speech. All this is an increasingly pressing matter. As it looks, many politicians are coming to realize that, if the new security system in Europe is not developed more quickly, more forcibly, and more open-mindedly by the democrats, someone else could start developing it, and we would be surprised by the results. [passage omitted]

Finnish Prime Minister Wants East Europe in EU

LD0212171394 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1530 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Esko Aho has stressed Finnish support for East European countries' efforts to join the EU. Aho said in Prague, during a visit to the Czech Republic, that bringing the Central and East European and Baltic countries into the EU constitutes an important part of Finnish policy on Europe.

In Prague, Aho met President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. Aho also gave a lecture on the Finnish economy to Czech businessmen.

Minister Speaks on Prevention of Laundering Money

AU0212123594 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 30 Nov 94 p 14

[Unattributed report: "Minister Novak at International Conference on Dirty Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Strasbourg—In Strasbourg, Czech Justice Minister Jiri Novak described broad international cooperation based on real strategy as the most effective preventative measure aimed at breaking the economic power of criminal organizations and thwarting the legalization of proceeds from criminal activities.

At the international conference on laundering money in the newly emerged democracies in Central and East Europe, organized by the Council of Europe, Novak emphasized that "it is precisely the European states in the transition stage that may be and apparently are sought out as a propitious environment for covering up the origin of illegal gains."

Although the Czech Republic has not yet signed the European Convention of 1990 on Laundering, Locating, Seizing, and Confiscating Proceeds From Crime, it has, according to its minister, taken some steps toward a legal code to facilitate the fulfillment of the obligations resulting from this convention in both the area of international cooperation of the police and judicial bodies and that of the punishment by law of various forms of laundering money.

Certain measures have already been taken also in the banking sphere, particularly with respect to the identification of a customer, which undoubtedly is the fundamental condition for any successful control. At this time, Jiri Novak said, it is almost symbolic that just next week the Government of the Czech Republic is to discuss the actual bill against laundering money in its full extent.

The Czech minister described the coordination of the legislation in the sphere of laundering money, with the Western norms as of vital interest to all postcommunist countries. Most countries in Central and West Europe, according to him, have demonstrated their intention to join in international cooperation, both in the detection of crime crossing the border of a state and in the recognition and execution of foreign decisions, particularly in the confiscation of property obtained from criminal activity. The degree to which the laundering of money can be prevented will also indirectly affect the frequency of other crime, be it international drug trafficking or other forms of organized crime, Novak said.

President Responds to EU Demarche on Minorities

LD0212212794 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Statement by President Michal Kovac concerning the CSCE summit to be held in Budapest; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Dear fellow countrymen: You have naturally noticed that recently I, together with other constitutional officials, received a demarche from the European Union [EU]. I understand this act as an expression of sincere interest of the EU member states in a country that aspires to become a full member of the Union. The signatories of the demarche declare their readiness for constructive cooperation with the new Slovak Government and hope that relations with Slovakia will deepen. The demarche also states a concern with some aspects of political developments since the elections and the hope and expectation that Slovakia, weighing its interests carefully, will consistently follow the path of economic reforms.

In other words, it indicates that some political steps undertaken after the elections are not in line with the understanding of pluralistic democracy shared by the EU. I do not share any offended feelings or views that the demarche intervenes with our internal situation. These views result from the lack of understanding of the nature of the EU, its internal principles and regulations. It is logical that, when one decides to become a member of a particular community, one has decided, at the same time, to respect its rules. On the other hand, it is understandable that those who have decided to take on a new member should watch carefully whether he follows the generally applicable international rules.

I, however, identify with the opinions seeing the demarche as containing international political aspects that, in our view, do not belong there. It is the passage of the demarche that says that, apart from continuing political efforts to consolidate democracy and creating a stable market economy, Slovakia should strive for, let me quote: "establishing regional cooperation, particularly with Hungary, to remove the possibility of tension concerning the Hungarian minority."

I consider this comment addressed to us to be inadequate. Otherwise, the EU demarche is, for me and, I hope, other political representatives, an inspiration for thinking about how to coordinate our political situation in a better and more harmonious way, how to improve democracy, etc.

The Association Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the EU presumes an intense political dialogue that we, by all means, want to continue. The message of the demarche should not be dramatized, nor should its well-meaning intent be disparaged.

Commentary by HZDS Deputy

AU0212214694 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 29 Nov 94 p 3

[Commentary by Jan Smolec, SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA chief editor and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia deputy: "Will They Oust Meciar With the Demarche, or Will Slovakia Be Okay?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Union's demarche has sparked great optimism in the circles of the parliamentary opposition. Politicians like Knazko are rubbing their hands with glee: "It is the first important step toward the ouster of Meciar, Luptak, and Slot from the political scene." Politicians who failed in the last elections are grabbing at the demarche like a drowning man at a straw.

Realistic politicians such as Augustin Marian Huska and Ivan Laluha consider the demarche a legitimate expression of certain views. Ivan Gasparovic chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan have declared that the contents of the demarche are basically friendly.

What does the much-touted demarche contain, in fact? Although its authors asked that it not be published, it has been leaked that concern is being expressed in it over the course of the constituent and second meetings of the National Council of the Slovak Republic as well as over the election of the new radio and television councils.

It would surely be interesting to find out from where and from whom the authors of the demarche were drawing their information. Everything suggests that it came from those who do not want to yield to the basic principle of democracy, that the minority subordinates itself to the majority!

Foreign diplomats stationed in Slovakia in the same friendly and candid manner voice fears lest further developments in our country deflect from the democratic path. In the past couple of days, I had the opportunity to speak to a number of diplomats. They inquired, in particular, whether freedom of the press and plurality were not under threat in our country. I replied to them with a question: Is there a daily, besides SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, that supports the parliamentary majority? So why do you worry....

The new Slovak Television and Slovak Radio councils were elected because their predecessors did not safeguard the aforementioned plurality. After the 1992 elections, a total mass media blockade of the election winner started with the aim of his liquidation. This intention came off perfectly in March 1994, with the president's assistance. After the 1994 elections, the situation started to repeat itself. Mr. Ludovit Cernak, for example, the chairman of a miniparty with some 2,000 members, started promenading on television screens and on radio waves as though he were, at the very least, the unsurpassed election winner. In Austria, such a politician appears on television once or twice a year. By replacing the television and radio councils, we did not pursue any other aim but safeguarding objective and balanced information. Once again, the mass media ceased respecting election results. Those who lost the elections were getting more space than the election winners.

I, too, understood the diplomats' personal reservations about some problems in Slovakia as a friendly intimation. The diplomats did not have the least interest in interfering in our internal political affairs. According to their words, as long as we proceed by legitimate parliamentary means, everything will be all right. In bidding farewell, a representative of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission kindly told me: "I assure you that our administration does not draw conclusions on the basis of articles written by your or our journalists." In that case, everything really is all right.

Commission Members Demand Apology From Meciar

AU0512113094 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "(ml)": "They Are Demanding an Apology"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—A group of citizens, members of the Regional Electoral Commission in Bratislava, gave a briefing yesterday to inform the public that they had exercised their legal right and had duly scrutinized the petition sheets of the Democratic Union [DU]. Following their examination, DU's list of candidates complied with all of the conditions contained in the Election Law.

According to E. Kovacova, F. Klusko, B. Borovsky, and other members of the Regional Electoral Commission, they scrutinized the DU's petition sheets in two rounds. In the first one, they were reviewed only by the members of the commission nominated by the Slovak National Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, who declared that "half of the sheets are invalid." At their suggestion, the members of the commission then proceeded to make a detailed examination. The sheets were divided among the 20 members of the commission, and, after scrutinizing them, each declared publicly the number of invalid signatures. When they counted them, they ascertained that, of the 14,929 signatures, 2,428 were invalid. Because the minimum number of signatures required is 10,000, DU had complied with the requirement stipulated by law, and, on the basis of a vote taken by the members of the Regional Electoral Commission, DU's list of candidates was legally recognized for registration for the elections.

On the basis of these facts, the members of the Regional Electoral Commission reject as unfounded the statement made by V. Meciar that "the electoral commission knowingly gave false information to the public." E. Kovacova commented that the members of the electoral commissions had fulfilled the oath that bound them to exercise their posts conscientiously and impartially. Because they did this to the best of their knowledge and consciences, they consider the statements made by Mr. Meciar to be a gross disparagement of their work and an insult to their personal honor. In their statement, which was signed by 15 members of the 21-member group that examined the petition sheets, they demand that Mr. Meciar "make a public apology to the members of the Regional Electoral Commission for insulting their honor." They also called upon him to abandon the practices of defaming, scandal-mongering, and making unfounded accusations against people who unselfishly gave up their free time in the interest of serving their fellow citizens.

Members of the Slovak Electoral Commission were also present at the briefing. They described how they studied the minutes of the Regional Electoral Commission, which, after an extensive discussion, they approved. Thus, the Democratic Union, along with the other entities, was duly registered for the fall parliamentary elections.

Moravcik Rejects Possibility of Factions in DU

AU0512072894 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Nov 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "I. Gasparovic and M. Kocnar Assured the Prime Minister That a Notary Was Present When the DU's Petition Sheets Were Unsealed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Jozef Moravcik, chairman of the Democratic Union of Slovakia [DU] and provisional prime minister, has ruled out the possibility of factions being formed within his party. He said that DU is a united political entity and that he considers any predictions about its possible partition to be meaningless.

He also responded to the comment by Deputy K. Tothova, of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], who said, among other things, that it would not be in Slovakia's interest to reject cooperation with those DU members who had already shown an interest in such cooperation and who had not been HZDS members. According to Moravcik, this is not a serious offer but a strategy to break up DU. He said it was unacceptable.

In connection with the alleged absence of a notary during the unsealing of DU's petition sheets, Moravcik said he considers this very surprising because he had requested a personal meeting with the chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the chairman of the Mandate and Immunity Committee, and they had assured him that a notary had participated in opening the sealed petition sheets and in verifying the copies. "It has emerged that this was not true. I do not know how to explain it because this would mean that the two men were not telling the truth, which is an extremely negative thing in relations between constitutional officials," he added.

Meciar Responds to Outgoing Prime Minister

LD0212224294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS, and prime minister-designate, by editor Nora Parikova; date and place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Meciar] [Passage omitted] There have been some mishaps. The government cannot determine when the plenum of the National Council will hold its session. As far as I know, it will be held in the first half of December. Further, the draft budget has to be approved by the National Council. Our talks are, in fact, an extra element that would only disturb the whole decisionmaking process. Actually, it would mean that the draft would be submitted late. I can make my comments from my post of National Council deputy in the Constitutional Committee, of which I am a member.

The government has passed the budget as a complex document. The changes of the particular details have no sense because I have a completely different view of its structure. [passage omitted]

If we followed the scheme the current government proposes, in eight months we would, in fact, arrive at a situation where there would be zero in the state budget. That means that there would be no financial means for the following four months. That is why our work during the preparations of a new government, ever since I was appointed to form a new government, also involves preparations of the new concept of the economic policy for the year 1995. This work is likely to come to light should the budget need to be presented in case this government is superseded by a new one in quick succession. [passage omitted]

[Parikova] If you do not accept the proposals incorporated in Moravcik's letter, what do you propose instead?

[Meciar] The gentlemen might have taken over in March, but they forget that a budget needs to be prepared a year in advance. When we form a government, we will have a duty to prepare the 1995 budget, but a week later we will have to start work on the 1996 budget, which should be optimistic, including the sections about development and state expenditures in various areas. [passage omitted]

[Parikova] Is it possible that, when the new government takes office, we will soon get a new version of the budget?

[Meciar] I assume that, if there is not such a version of the budget, in January we will present a new government program as well as a draft budget for 1995. [passage omitted]

Moravcik Concerned Over Draft Budget Deadlock

LD0212183694 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Acting Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik today sent a letter to Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], in which he reacts to yesterday's response by the prime minister-designate, rejecting joint talks on the draft state budget.

In his letter, Moravcik points out the dangers of a provisional budget, which would be detrimental to both the future government and Slovakia. Moravcik is calling for immediate talks about the budget, and he is putting forward the following schedule:

Between 5 and 9 December to discuss the draft budget with Prime Minister-designate Vladimir Meciar or perhaps with other experts and to amend the draft so that it corresponds to the policy the HZDS chairman intends to follow. In this way, the political conditions for the adoption of the budget would have been created.

The draft budget could then be presented to parliament on 12 December and discussed by a plenum between 19 and 22 December.

Meciar, Moravcik Continue To Differ on Budget

LD0312182294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Meciar's statements on how the next year's state budget should be submitted are controversial. This was stated by acting Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik in an interview with TASR in Kosice today.

Moravcik responded thus to yesterday's interview with Prime Minister-designate Vladimir Meciar, in which the latter refused to hold talks with Moravcik because he considered the draft budget as lacking any clear concept. However, according to Moravcik, if the government's work on the budget is to have any sense, all doubts related to it must be clarified, the shortcomings eradicated, and only then should the budget be submitted to parliament. Otherwise, all this is an irresponsible game that may end in a provisional budget.

Moravcik described as nonsense the claims made by Meciar that he should have held talks with him before the budget was approved by the government. Moravcik said it would have been absurd to hold talks before the government had gained an overall picture of the basic data on revenue and expenditure.

ZRS To Support Budget If Restrictions Fair

AU0212181394 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 29 Nov 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Association of Workers of Slovakia Will Support Budget if Budgetary Restrictions Are Evenly Distributed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The people of this country want to work, they want to get to know the new government and its goals, Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], told the

TASR in an interview. He added that, if the coalition talks between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the Party of the Democratic Left and individual members of the Democratic Union fail, "we shall have to go aboard because we cannot abandon society!"

The ZRS is interested in occupying the post of minister of construction in the new cabinet because it insists on the reestablishment of this ministry. He said that the ZRS will support the draft budget in parliament, provided the restrictions are evenly distributed among all sections of society and not inflicted on just the workers. In his words, the ZRS does support privatization, but it demands that privatization be transparent and that it be known how privatized property is used. As to the second wave of coupon privatization, Jan Luptak said that the volume of property on offer "probably will not be revised."

Hungarian Civic Party To Work With Coexistence

LD0312224594 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 2000 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In the Bratislava parliament, the Hungarian Coalition, with its 17 deputies of Hungarian nationality, counts as the third-strongest political factor. At the beginning of November, a decision was reached whereby the 17 deputies would form two separate parliamentary groups.

[Correspondent Alfred Somogyi from Bratislava] Late yesterday afternoon, the consultation of the presidium of the Hungarian Civic Party, which has just one deputy, ended with a surprising decision. Their deputy, Laszlo A. Nagy, is going to work in the Coexistence group of deputies. The decision is surprising because, during the course of the triple coalition discussions, it was precisely Coexistence that set the toughest conditions for the Civic Party. The presidium explained its decision by saying that the 1 November statement by the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, to the effect that it would set up a separate parliamentary group, was in contradiction to the agreement on the triple Hungarian coalition signed on 21 July, which states that, if they were to get into parliament, the deputies of the three parties would set up a joint group.

After the infringement of the coalition agreement, at present nine of the 17 deputies are representing the Hungarian voters of Slovakia in the Bratislava parliament on the benches of the Christian Democrats, and the remaining eight, now including Laszlo A. Nagy as well, on the benches of Coexistence.

SDL on Decision To Invite HZDS to Talks

LD0412224194 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 4 Dec 94

[Interview with SDL Deputy Chairman Milan Ftacnik by correspondent Beliznakov in Bratislava on 4 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] A two-day session of the Executive Committee of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] ended today in Bratislava. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent Beliznakova] The statement by the SDL Executive Committee says that, considering the internal political situation, you are prepared to hold talks with all political partie, which means including the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. Can you be more specific about which issues you plan to discuss with the HZDS?

[Ftacnik] We turned to the HZDS because we think it is important to meet and discuss some serious issues, economic and social issues, in particular, that are related to the 1995 budget; some laws that are to be presented to the National Council—for instance, a law on conflict of interests; and the program of the next session of the National Council.

In our letter, in which we turned to the HZDS, we made clear that we were not going to talk about the formation of a new coalition government. In our view, the stand adopted by the SDL Republic Council on 12 November, that the political practices applied by the HZDS are not acceptable to the SDL, remains valid, and the HZDS does not give the impression that it intends to change its political conduct.

So, we think it is important to hold talks, but we narrowed the agenda down to the issues we consider important. If the HZDS wants to propose any other topics for the talks, we are ready. Yet, as we clearly stated, we will not discuss any concrete issues concerning the formation of the government. [passage omitted]

[Beliznakova] Can we presume that you will discuss with the HZDS possible support for the government formed by the HZDS?

[Ftacnik] I do not think this question will be dealt with because, according to the HZDS decision, its objective is the formation of a majority government. It has an 83-vote majority in the parliament. This is sufficient for the government to rely on these deputies in the parliament, so they will not need any additional support.

Naturally, we are prepared to debate support for the concrete economic and social intentions of this government because, quite simply, this is our duty. In cases when the government presents measures identical or similar to our program intentions, we will support them. [passage omitted]

HZDS, Allies Control Privatization Commission

AU0212181994 Bratislava SME in Slovak 29 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Article by "asa": "Parliamentary Privatization Committee Set Up Commission To Oversee Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Committee for Economy, Privatization, and Enterprise established on 4 November a commission to oversee the privatization process. Its members are S. Husar, from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia/Farmers Party of Slovakia [HZDS/RSS] coalition; M. Pacola, from the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]; V. Moric, from the Slovak National Party [SNS]; J. Michelko (HZDS/RSS); and T. Cingel (HZDS/RSS). This was announced by Roman Hofbauer, chairman of the NRSR committee, yesterday. As we learned from V. Vaskovic (Democratic Union), who is a member of the NRSR committee, he found out about the establishment of the commission only subsequently and, until yesterday, despite repeated entreaties, had not received minutes from the committee meeting at which the commission was set up. The commission is investigating "contradictions of principle in the privatization of 35 companies, with respect to which two different privatization methods have been listed. In October, they were submitted to the government for approval for privatization by means of direct sale, upon which they were included in the second wave of coupon privatization, with 97 percent of shares intended for coupon holders. These documents have been predated; dates assigned to them range from 20 to 28 September." Asked by SME in how many cases two such contradictory decisions have been issued, Hofbauer replied that, for the time being, such a case is not known to him, but the commission's inquiry continues. In his opinion, however, citizens "have definitely been misled."

We asked Juraj Plesnik, state secretary at the Ministry of Privatization, for his opinion about Hofbauer's assertions. According to Plesnik, "Decisions on privatization issued as changes to previous privatization decisions are legally unequivocal and pure. The minister was authorized to do this." In this context, Juraj Plesnik admitted that the founding ministries have a different expert opinion on the use of privatization methods, which, however, is a political problem.

Regarding the state of preparations for the second wave of coupon privatization, Hofbauer said that, out of 90 state enterprises whose property or part of property is earmarked for the second wave of coupon privatization, 46 have been transformed into joint-stock companies, of which 35 have also been entered in the company register. When we asked how many state enterprises were transformed before and how many after the replacement of members of National Property Fund [FNM] bodies, Hofbauer replied that he does not avail himself of such a quantification but that, in his opinion, the changes in the FNM have had no impact on the progress of transformation. He spoke critically about the preliminary list of enterprises included in coupon privatization that has been published. He admitted that the final list must be published no later than two weeks before the termination of the preliminary round. The announcement that the preliminary round of coupon privatization would start on 15 December is, according to Hofbauer, at variance with the "request and recommendation to postpone the preliminary round," which the NRSR Committee for Economy, Privatization, and Enterprise sent to the president of the FNM Presidium and the minister of finance on 18 November. According to Hofbauer, a solution to this situation will have to wait until the formation of a new government, which should resolve these problems. As he said, the preliminary round should not start until the first quarter of 1995.

Chairman Explains Aim of Privatization Commission

AU0512112994 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 30 Nov 94 p 2

[TA SR report: "Specific Targeting and Transparency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The aim of the newly established commission to oversee the privatization process is to focus on its specific targeting and transparency. From this point of view, the dominant role given to the coupon form of privatizing enterprises is inappropriate. This statement was made in a report handed to the TA SR by Roman Hofbauer, chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Committee for the Economy, Privatization, and Enterprise. According to it, from the point of view of the Slovak Republic's economic interests, it is not desirable to include economically strategic enterprises such as, for example, energy, the gas industry, telecommunications, special production, and so on in coupon privatization. The current quality of the legislation in the sphere of privatization transparency is inadequate, and it is necessary to finalize it. The Slovak Government's social partners also have grave reservations about the ongoing privatization process.

Moravcik Pledges No Halt to Privatization Process

LD0212210894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by correspondent Ludmila Bulakova; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bulakova] [Passage omitted] Stefan Gavornik, chairman of the presidium of the National Property Fund, said after yesterday's talks that the sale of strategic companies was the only solution to the problem of how to meet the demands of the 1995 budget. In his opinion, only the new government can decide on this.

Prime Minister, is it possible for any government that takes office after your government to deal with the debt servicing in a different way from that envisaged by you?

[Moravcik] The debt servicing can be dealt with through an increased state budget deficit. However, that would have very unfavorable, detrimental consequences for the state economy. [passage omitted]

I assume that no government that comes into office after us will adopt this approach. This means, then, that we have to find resources to meet the needs of debt servicing. [passage omitted]

[Bulakova] [passage omitted] Some people believe that these dates have their hidden logic in that the new government wants to stop the second wave of coupon privatization, which is to begin on 15 December. What would be the practical consequences of such a step?

[Moravcik] [passage omitted] I exclude the possibility of a halt to privatization. Some postponement is possible, but that is a matter for the future government. We have decided that the preliminary round will begin on 15 December. This does not mean that all technical matters related to the transfer of companies earmarked for coupon privatization must be completed by then. The preliminary round is there for the citizens intending to take part in the coupon privatization to choose the investment funds with which they will cooperate. [passage omitted] It would be very risky to stop the coupon privatization now or to start thinking about doing so. [passage omitted]

[Bulakova] [passage omitted] Several parliamentary committees have made rather critical statements concerning the government or some of its members. Do you see these as part of their controlling role, or do you consider them as steps aimed at making your work in the office more difficult?

[Moravcik] The area in which we are operating is clearly defined by the Constitution. We are waiting for the new government to be appointed. This means that, if the deputies are critical, they should first of all be critical of the prime minister-designate, in that he should form the new government as soon as possible. That is the most appropriate target of their criticism. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Objects to 'Pace' of NATO Expansion

LD0412221294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2100 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Boris Yeltsin has told the Hungarian president that Russia does not oppose the extension of NATO, it only objects to the pace of certain countries' joining. The Russian president also had talks with Prime Minister Gyula Horn.

During his talks with Boris Yeltsin in the evening Prime Minister Horn stated that there were no unsolved problems in the political relations between Hungary and Russia, although there were still some open issues. The Hungarian head of government pointed out that we regarded the extension of NATO as a factor serving the stability of the region. It was the sovereign right of every country to decide what kind of an alliance system it should join.

Boris Yeltsin said that he would consider NATO's sudden expansion to be worrying, it would disquiet Russia if it took place in this sudden manner.

It was Foreign Minister Kovacs who informed the journalists about the hour-long discussion of the two statesmen. The Hungarian foreign minister said the meeting had taken place in a good atmosphere.

Then he went on to report on his talks with his Russian counterpart, Andrey Kozyrev. It is Hungary's strategic goal to fully fit into the Euro-Atlantic integration, the Hungarian foreign minister said about the meeting. Kozyrev mentioned his worries relating to the extension of NATO and its domestic political impacts.

Answering journalists' questions on whether the Russian side categorically pointed out that it would not welcome Hungary's NATO entry, Kovacs said there had not even been mention of it. [passage omitted]

Goncz Tells Yeltsin Russia Is 'Strategic' Partner

LD0412204994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian President Goncz has met Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Goncz pointed out that Hungary considered the Russian Federation an important strategic and economic partner, and that Hungary is always ready for dialogue based on equality of rights and mutual interests. Goncz said that Hungary intended to discuss every issue with Russia and to make decisions taking into consideration its own interests.

Kovacs Reiterates Desire To Join EU, NATO

LD0412195994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Two hours before the arrival of Boris Yeltsin, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher landed at Ferihegy Airport in Budapest. He said that Russia could not get a right of veto at the admission of the central-eastern European countries to NATO, although it would not be good either if Moscow felt isolated or threatened.

Christopher, scheduled to attend the CSCE summit beginning tomorrow, said this to Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs. Kovac's confirmed that it was Hungary's strategic aim to be admitted to the EU, NATO, and the Partnership for Peace program provided a good preparation for this.

Kovacs Statement on NATO

LD0212210994 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 2000 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs statement for DUNA TV "Newsreel" program, in Brussels on the occasion of the NATO foreign ministers meeting on 2 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The starting point of my address was that expanding integration from the West in an eastward direction is necessary for the creation of a united and secure Europe; thus, expanding the EU, the WEU [Western European Union], and NATO is equally important. [passage omitted]

I use this opportunity to confirm the position of the Hungarian Government, and its commitment to joining NATO. The fact that we recently handed in our individual partnership program is a further step in our participation in the Partnership for Peace program.

State Secretary Views Foreign Affairs Issues

AU0512121694 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Dec 94 pp 1, 11

[Interview with Ferenc Somogyi, administrative state secretary at the Foreign Ministry, by Pal Lederer and Gyula L. Ortutay; place and date not given: "The Europe Summit in Budapest Answers the Challenges"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [NEPSZABADSAG] To what extent can the principle be seen as final that says that three groups can be identified in regards to NATO's eastern extension: Countries that can expect membership within the foreseeable future, countries that can only join later, and those that will be excluded forever?

[Somogyi] Let us forget about complete exclusion because the new European security structure has to be constructed in such a way that no country should feel itself excluded from it, as this in itself could be a source of danger. At the same time, in the current situation or in the near future, it cannot be expected that NATO—or the European Union [EU]—precisely define which countries they will have. It is no accident that when we request that the timetable be defined, the response always says that a timetable would actually name the group of countries that can be considered. For this reason, NATO usually mentions a "road map," which I actually find better. A timetable suggests that all countries will start and arrive together, at the same time. However, on the basis of a map, the goal can be achieved on various roads and at different speeds. In my view, the most important point for us is to become members as soon as possible. This does not necessarily mean that we should gain membership before others, in fact, in a certain sense, it is decidedly in our interest that other countries in our region also reach the level of readiness for integration.

[NEPSZABADSAG] Looking at the international press, increasingly, it is our impression that Hungary's image is deteriorating. What is the reason for this?

[Somogyi] All in all, I cannot confirm that Hungary's international image has become worse. I meet with explicitly positive assessments in the areas that I have close contact with. The fact that this government expressed its willingness to build and normalize relations with those of our neighbors with whom we have problems is assessed in such a way that we launched a process that might lead to the improvement of relations and stronger cooperation. It is also favorably assessed that the current government acknowledged without reservation or hesitation that it does not intend to change the borders. It is also positively received that the cabinet clearly adopts European norms on the delicate issues of Hungarian minorities living beyond the border and generally of the national and ethnic minorities. However, I can see problems in the evaluation of our economic situation and the consistency of our measures that are to lead us out of this. At the same time, even in this area, it is seen to be positive that it has not even been suggested that the new Hungarian government would retreat in any way on the road of market-oriented development or in the area of privatization.

[NEPSZABADSAG] I would like to go back to the issue of neighbors. After the inauguration of the new government, the expectation could be observed that it would reach quick and spectacular results, especially in signing the basic agreements. Then it slowly became clear that, rather than this, the main direction of action was the pragmatic road of small steps. Was this a case of distorted expectations, humble desires, or did politics actually correct its direction?

[Somogyi] I feel that the lack of results in the past years created justified expectations against the new government. We could clearly perceive the public's expectation of a positive change in relations with our neighbors. This government promised that it would try to apply a new, result-oriented, and more pragmatic approach that truly serves its often mentioned principles and interests, instead of the former politics and rhetoric, not forgetting that it takes two to do this. I believe that the government has so far adhered to its promises. It has made gestures to renew relations, taken steps to restart or continue talks, and it tried to express its political intentions for agreement and for launching the processes in this direction in every possible way. Through actual deeds, it has proved that it is ready to take small steps. No one could realistically expect—and no one had promised—that far-reaching changes would be achieved within a very short time. However, the small steps can lead to qualitative changes. In other words, it is the government's goal to create conditions through normalizing or further developing bilateral relations under which we can in some way hope for an improvement in the minorities' situation. In these endeavors, the government has consistently taken a stance based on the European norms. One reason why this is difficult is the fact that this assumes that the Hungarians living beyond the border can be convinced, and that the domestic opposition parties will cooperate. I am convinced that this is the only possible and feasible way because this is the only way our efforts can expect international support. In addition to this, the government recognized the reality that relations with the neighbors and the cause of the national minorities are closely related to European integration. Many people identify the improvement of relations with the issue of the basic agreement. The basic agreement in itself is not a precondition for normal relations and, on the other hand, its signing is not a guarantee for normalizing or improving relations. Therefore, although the issue of the basic agreements cannot be avoided because of past events, it would be a mistake to narrow down the issue solely to them. [passage omitted]

Customs Service Denies Arms Sent to Bosnia

LD0212142294 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The national headquarters of the Hungarian Customs and Excise service denied news circulated by TANJUG that arms were transported to Bosnia through Hungary and Croatia.

The Customs and Excise Service considers the news published by the TANJUG news agency to be unfounded and it confirms that Hungary continues to observe the UN embargo.

HSP Deputy Discusses Possible Reshuffle

LD0312213994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Imre Szekeres, leader of the parliamentary group of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP], is our guest tonight.

[Unidentified correspondent] Good evening. Mr. Deputy, do debates of this kind [referring to prime minister's plans to reshuffle government and the reaction of the junior coalition party, the Alliance of Free Democrats] not mean that the coalition partners' faith in one another has been shaken?

[Szekeres] I think it does not mean that, although here it is not even a question of a debate. This is because there is no alternative to the coalition—the voting citizens took this decision four months ago, that these two governments [as heard] should govern together. But naturally, these are two independent parties and there is a political contest going on between them in the same way as between other political parties.

[Correspondent] Do you, as the leader of the parliamentary group of the larger coalition party, know about the planned government reshuffle? How many ministers will go, and who are they?

[Szekeres] I would like to correct what you said, and that is why I said there was no debate: The prime minister—and naturally there have been discussions about this among ourselves as well—thinks that after six months the government's activity must be placed on the scales, and this has to be done first and foremost by the government itself. We as deputies are also preparing for this in order to discuss—at the end of January, at a weekend session of the group of deputies—the experiences of the first six months. As I say, this is timely as well. If there are experiences whose consequences are that this or that politician is unable to fulfill his task in a way that would be necessary, then—and I would like to stress, after the weighing in the balance—he will have to take these steps, naturally in the way that we have laid down in the coalition agreement, because both parties have a say in the ministers delegated by the other party. [passage omitted]

SZDSZ Chairman Comments on Reshuffle

LD0312202394 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Peto, the chairman of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], does not consider it justified to dismiss any of the three SZDSZ ministers. Peto was responding to yesterday's statement by Prime Minister Gyula Horn that some time in the beginning of next year there could be a government reshuffle.

SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto said that Gyula Horn had already indicated at the time of the coalition coordination discussions that he considered personnel changes necessary in the government. On the other hand Peto disapproves of the prime minister making public the possibility of personnel changes because, according to the SZDSZ chairman, this gives rise to unnecessary speculation. According to Peto, the foreseen changes would not affect the SZDSZ members of the government.

[Begin Peto recording] The prime minister can act in a sovereign manner in the matter of the dismissal of government members belonging to his own party [HSP—Hungarian Socialist Party]. In the matter of government members delegated by the SZDSZ, however, there are strict restrictions and in the SZDSZ's judgment there cannot even be any question of a need for any kind of personnel changes in the sphere of ministers and state secretaries delegated by us. [end recording]

Peto denied the part of the prime minister's statement that said that the SZDSZ had not played a part in the government's unpopular decisions.

[Begin Peto recording] When one of the SZDSZ ministers tries to negotiate and represent the government policy in the matter of the teachers' strike declared by an HSP deputy, and another SZDSZ minister is trying to represent the government's standpoint in the matter of the railway workers' strike, while the third SZDSZ minister turns up from one minute to the next at the scene of the tragic railway accident, then I do not think that such a statement is a very fortunate one. [end recording]

Horn on Socialists Building Capitalism in Hungary

LD0212134494 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The presidency of the Socialist International [SI] proposes that the Hungarian Socialist Party be elected full member of the organization, SI President Pierre Mauroy announced at the opening ceremony of the plenary session in Budapest.

Gabor Bankuti reports: Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, asked the European socialist democratic parties to help Hungary in its endeavors regarding accession to the European Union, when he opened the plenary session of the SI this morning in the Budapest Hilton Hotel. [passage omitted]

Chairman Horn emphasized that the Hungarian Socialist Party was the first in the region to be formed by the reform forces on the ruins of the party state. [passage omitted]

[Begin Horn recording] There is no example in history for the market economy to be built from the top. There is also no example in history for the dismantling of state property en mass, in the way being done in East and Central Europe.

It is true that in Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Party is building capitalism, a capitalism that has to combine the effects of market forces and economic productivity with social justice, solidarity, and guarantees for the equality of opportunities. [end recording] [passage omitted]

President Interviewed About National Mood

LD0312105894 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 2010 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Interview with President Arpad Goncz by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Reporter] To what extent has the mood and atmosphere of the country changed? In a radio interview a year ago the question was raised whether there will be elections at all, what will happen to the country. A kind of tension was reflected in that interview. To what extent has this mood changed since?

[Goncz] (?It is clear that) the tensions dissipated after the elections. Currently, we are again living in a rather tense period—which I feel, to some extent, to be unjustifiable but certainly understandable. This is partly because we are facing another election. This election is very important because local governments are the frontline of democracy. [passage omitted]

I hope from the bottom of my heart that they will vote for individuals. I have always recommended that Hungarian voters look at the person for whom they are casting their vote. It is perfectly possible to do this in a local context, among those who manage their affairs, directly. Division along party lines will be restricted to the large towns only, I think. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Six months after the general elections a kind of resignation, a calm, or a disappointment is prevailing in the country. Perhaps it is a sense of realism. How do you register this, what is this shift in the public mood?

[Goncz] [Passage omitted] After the elections the international press also started repeating that people voted for the restoration of the price of bread to 3.80 forints per kilo and for goulash communism. I did not meet people waiting for a miracle. The often-mentioned promise was also within the limits of realism, because there are two absolute priorities which a government must fulfill. One is to provide social justice—after all, the living standard of the bottom third of the population can hardly decline further—while the other one is that it should stabilize the economy. Regarding the latter, its room for maneuver is very limited.

I dare say that everybody is clear in his mind about the country's economic situation because everybody registers its impact on himself. The citizen also feels that, in contrast to the past, he is forced to help himself. In other words, a strategy and tactics for survival develop within the family, and on an individual level too, out of which the survival strategy and tactics of the whole society develops. I can sum this up in one sentence: The Lord helps those who help themselves.

[Reporter] Things are very difficult for a great number of people. Social tolerance can be exhausted to some extent; people or families have no reserves, nothing to fall back on. To what extent do you see a real possibility of the country breaking into two, either in a social or a geographical sense? [passage omitted]

[Goncz] The country's breaking into two, into an east and a west Hungary, must be avoided at all costs. I am speaking from a social and not a political point of view. The possibility of the country breaking into rich and poor, in an irreversible way, must also be avoided. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] An agreement was reached in the Interest Coordination Council last weekend and many believe that it envisages the possibility of a so-called social and economic contract. Mr. President, what alternative does this process have?

[Goncz] It has no alternative, none. We may choose to start going down the road of corrupt regimes or down the road of interest coordination—the path chosen by Austria and Finland—and I think that this is the only path we can take instead of separate bargains. [passage omitted]

In this regard, two views vie with each other within the government coalition and within the country. One holds that the social standard of people should at least be maintained. The other holds that the priority is economic stabilization: That view is expressed in terms of austerity. [passage omitted] I understand the finance minister perfectly and he has all my sympathy, but I also understand the trade unions which want to protect their rights and their workers, and they too have all my sympathy. [passage omitted] But I have to say that they must come to an agreement at the eleventh hour. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] What is your opinion about the debates between the coalition parties? The question arises whether it is a process of refinement or a split test?

[Goncz] It appears to be a split test, but I think it really is a process of refinement. It is absolutely clear that at the moment this coalition has no alternative. [passage omitted] Parliament has been operating smoothly despite the disputes.

The process of coordination probably has to develop further. I would prefer if clashes of opinions would happen between themselves instead of airing them to the public. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Soon all the European heads of state and government will be here in Budapest. Mr. President will be meeting them.

[Goncz] It will not be possible to talk with all of them. By all means, we have to talk with the leaders of the neighboring countries and with the great powers. [passage omitted]

The schedule at the moment looks like I am going to meet President Clinton together with Prime Minister Gyula Horn. I am glad about it, because the meeting will be brief and the fact that the two of us will meet him clearly reflects that there is not even a marginal difference of views between the government and the president regarding foreign policy issues. [passage omitted]

Increased Tax Breaks for Entrepreneurs Planned

95CH0037B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 1 Oct 94 p 11

[Article by Ibolya Veres: "Proposals for Changes in the Laws on Business Associations and Personal Income Taxes—Increased Benefits for Entrepreneurs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is planned that 25 percent of retirement and health insurance contributions, 20 percent of employee contributions, child benefits of 400 and 600 forints, 20 percent of home improvement savings (to a maximum of 7,200 forints), and a 600-forint cost allowance for the employed would be deductible from gross incomes. Reducing taxes by 35 percent of the membership fee for voluntary mutual insurance cashier's office (to a maximum of 175,000 forints) and by 20 percent of sums allotted for home improvement loan payments would also be allowed. The benefits for white-collar workers and small-farm producers are also planned to be significantly decreased. In the case of the former, taxes would be allowed to be reduced by 25 percent of the intellectual activity (to a maximum of 25,000 forints). With regard to small-farm producers, the present regulation that incomes under one million forints originating from farming are tax exempt would be rescinded. In the future, 25 percent of small-farm producers' incomes (to a maximum of 37,500 forints) would be tax deductible. These benefits could be used up to the entire amount of tax due on gross incomes. In addition, 20 percent of contributions to foundations, 20 percent of local taxes, 20 percent of union membership fees, 20 percent of long-term life insurance premiums, and 30 percent of the increase in the value of personal bonds would be deductible, but only up to 50 percent of the tax due. In the case of long-term life insurance, an annual maximum of 50,000 forints would be tax deductible.

A two-tier tax system is among the modification proposals for the corporate tax law. Incomes that are not taken out of a company would be taxed on the basis of a 32-percent to 33-percent tax rate, while incomes taken out would not only be taxed at a higher rate but would also be subject to a dividend tax.

In order to encourage savings and investments, profitable businesses would be allowed to deduct a specified portion (10 percent) of their taxable incomes as investment reserves if it is used for savings, development, or investment. Investment would also be encouraged by the introduction of investment tax writeoffs. Regulations on amortization would also be changed, and further benefits would probably be available for investments in the crisis regions. At the same time, individual benefits and dividend reinvestment benefits would be discontinued. In the event that all these modifications will be legislated, the entrepreneur sector would gain 20 billion forints at the expense of the national budget.

Poll on Distribution of Central Powers

WS0212154794 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 1 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by "R.W.": "OBOP Poll: Majority of Power for the Sejm"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *None of the three institutions of state rule in Poland—the Sejm, the president, and the government—is viewed by citizens as the one that should distinctively be endowed with the greatest powers. The majority (41 percent) claim that the Sejm should dominate, the least (23 percent) say it should be the government. According to every third respondent in a poll conducted by OBOP [Center for Research on Public Opinion], the president should be given the greatest powers.*

Over the past month, the belief that presidential powers should be extended has slightly gained support (an increase of 4 percent), and the number of respondents who claim that the greatest powers should rest with the Sejm and the government (2 percent in both cases) fell slightly.

Advocates of the supremacy of the Sejm over the president and the government include mainly respondents with secondary and higher education, from older age groups, who voted for the Democratic Left Alliance and the Democratic Union in last year's elections.

Supporters of strong presidential powers are relatively often people who declare rightist attitudes (this opinion is becoming increasingly popular with the group), with poorer education, senior citizens, students, housewives, farmers, inhabitants of major cities, and respondents who think highly of Lech Walesa. OBOP researchers claim, however, that supporters of strong presidential rule outnumber those who are satisfied with the current president by one-half.

Intellectuals, the unemployed, farmers, housewives, and youth most often advocate strengthening the government by curbing the powers of the parliament and the president.

Who should hold the greatest powers in Poland: the president, the government, or the Sejm?

	Percent
The Sejm	41
The president	31
The government	23
Difficult to say	5

* * *

The OBOP poll was carried out on 18-22 November on a sampling group of 1,031 Polish citizens over age 16.

Polls: Prime Minister, President Harm Business

WS0512093794 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 1 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by "J.K.K.": "The Prime Minister and the President Harm Business Most—Differing Opinions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Negative opinions on the activities of the government and the president prevail among businessmen," said Professor Wieslawa Kozek, when announcing results of a second opinion poll conducted in September and October by the Business Foundation and RUN (formerly Demoskop) under the heading "Business Opinions."*

"The obtained results cannot be treated as representative of the entire business sector in Poland, but they are reliable in the sense that they reflect opinions and attitudes of a select and stable community of managers of medium-sized enterprises," stressed Prof. Kozek. Representatives of 12 percent of companies (570 people) who were invited to take part in the poll answered questionnaires distributed through the mail.

The entrepreneurs have shown themselves to be very diversified as far as voting preferences are concerned, although two parties, the Freedom Union [UW] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], enjoy the support of two-thirds of those polled. UW would receive the votes of 38.4 percent of businessmen, the SLD of 28.3 percent, and the right wing (Union for Real Politics, Christian-National Union, Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, Confederation for an Independent Poland, Center Accord, Party of Christian Democrats, Democratic Party) of 2.3 percent. There were 11.1 percent of those undecided, who would not vote.

The prime minister and the president headed the list of politicians who harm business the most. In comparison with the first poll, the results of which were published in June, ill feelings for trade union leaders and leftist politicians declined. According to 43 percent of polled entrepreneurs, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak is doing the most to harm business; according to 17.4 percent it is Lech Walesa, according to 10.9 percent Marian Krzaklewski, according to 6.2 percent Bogdan Pek, and according to 3.9 percent Leszek Miller.

Opinions split on the evaluation of the domestic situation. Despite negative opinions on the top authorities, 1994 was evaluated as a good year for business. Respondents demonstrated a calm attitude toward the government's activities, not viewing them as a direct threat.

The polls show that spirits in cooperative and state firms have risen. Managers of private enterprises criticize the activities of top authorities with more criticism and look to the future with greater fear.

Weimar Triangle Cooperation Progresses

95EP0012A Warsaw PRZEGLAD RZADOWY in Polish No 9, Sep 94 pp 43-44

[Information from Ministry of Defense (MON) on military and political cooperation between Poland, France, and Germany]

[FBIS Translated Text] Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk recently hosted a meeting of the defense ministers of the countries forming the Weimar Triangle. The politicians are in accord that trilateral cooperation will help Poland in its aspiration to membership in NATO and the Western European Union [WEU]. Francois Leotard and Volker Ruhe viewed very positively the shared military exercises. The next maneuvers will be held in October in France.

* * *

The creator of the idea of Weimar cooperation is thought to be former Foreign Minister of Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher. On his initiative, the foreign ministers of Poland, France, and Germany held a meeting in Weimar in 1991. That meeting bore fruit in a the form of a joint declaration in which France and Germany acknowledged Poland to be the main partner in pursuing a common policy on Central-East Europe. At the next meeting, in 1992 in Bergerac, France, these countries pledged themselves to support Poland's efforts to gain full membership in the EC. Also planned was trilateral cooperation on behalf of European unity within the framework of NATO, the WEU, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Council of Europe.

The idea of cooperation among the three countries ensued from their central location in Europe: Geographically, France, Germany, and Poland form an axis around which are located the other European countries. This idea also reflected continued French-German cooperation. The reconciliation of countries that had thrice, in the 19th and 20th centuries, waged harrowing wars with each other made it possible to begin creating a unified Europe. This has been a long process, initiated as far back as in the 1950's by the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and successive French prime ministers. The growth of French-German relations was particularly rapid during the administration of General de Gaulle, in the years 1958-1969. Then contacts between the armed forces of Germany and France also developed, which led to the formation of a French-German brigade in the 1980's and subsequently the Eurocorps. It can thus be seen that the pioneering French-German cooperation produced important effects in that field. Poland's inclusion in that cooperation reinforces our country's political and economic standing.

One reason for establishing Weimar cooperation has been the desire to improve Polish-German relations. France already had considerable experience in overcoming warranted fears of its powerful neighbor. France, a traditional ally of Poland, is perceived as assuring that Germany would not hold a dominant position vis-a-vis our country, such as might happen in the event of bilateral cooperation.

Cooperation under the Weimar Triangle had for the first two years remained within the scope established during bilateral Polish-German, Polish-French, and German-French meetings. It exceeded that scope at a meeting in Warsaw in November 1993. Poland was represented by Minister Andrzej Olechowski, France by Alain Juppe, and Germany by Klaus Kinkiel. There was one important replacement: Foreign Minister Genscher, the author of the German eastern policy in the 1980's, was replaced by Klaus Kinkiel, who found that, in relations with Poland, the next stage of cooperation, including the establishment of military contacts, was possible.

At the meeting in Warsaw, Alain Juppe and Klaus Kinkiel pledged themselves on behalf of their governments to support "the striving of Poland and other Central European countries for membership in European and transatlantic security structures." This resulted in granting the status of associate member of the WEU to the countries associated with the European Union [EU]. The ministers also favored further expansion of contacts among the armed forces of France, Poland, and Germany. At the same time, the Polish side expressed the wish to establish contacts with the Eurocorps. In addition, the EU's readiness to admit Central European countries once the final conditions are met was confirmed.

France and Germany reached agreement on the issue of their eastern policy. Germany wants to expand the EU by including Poland and other countries of the Visegrad Group, so that it may no longer be located at the border of the EU, and its national security may be enhanced. France views the expansion of the EU and its military arm, the WEU, as a way of reducing U.S. influence in Europe. Therefore, contacts among the Polish, German, and French military became markedly intensified as of November 1993.

This year a Bundeswehr corps commander, Lieutenant General Werner von Scheven, paid a visit to the Pomeranian Military District, and the chief of staff of the French Armed Forces, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, toured the Polish Navy and the 7th Fighter-Bomber Regiment. In April 1994, the first joint Polish-French exercises were held in the Baltic, with the participation of the French frigate Jean Moulin, the Polish frigate Kaszub, and three motor torpedo boats from the 9th Coastal Defense Flotilla. Between 13 and 19 June, French alpine troops exercised in the Krakow and Silesian military districts. At the same time, a group of Polish mountain troops exercised in the French Alps. Such cooperation will be expanded in the next few years. Other Western military are also taking part in these extremely practical contacts, as happened, for example, last June, during the BALTOPS '94 naval maneuvers.

In addition to the contacts of a purely training-oriented nature, meetings of officers from various services (logistic, press, educational, cultural) also are important, serving to establish cooperation at various levels as well as to exchange experience. At present, a growing number of Polish officers are attending military schools in France and Germany.

Right Wing Realigns Over Support for Walesa

WS0212143094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 2 Dec 94 p 2

[Article by Marcin Dominik Zdort: "Potential Supporters Versus Decided Adversaries: Walesa Divides the Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa is ostentatiously slighting and insulting the right, calling its politicians "botchers" and claiming he could secure more votes within his own family. Despite this, politicians from many rightist parties (the Christian National Union [ZChN), among others) look toward the Belweder ever more frequently and do not rule out the possibility of supporting Walesa in the coming presidential election. The Center Accord [PC] still counts on creating an anti-Walesa bloc.

New divisions that have taken place over the past few weeks on the right are undoubtedly the result of Lech Walesa's doings. The bloc tediously constructed for the purpose of opposing the president—the Alliance for Poland (PC, ZChN, Movement for the Republic [RdR], Peasant Agreement, and Conservative Coalition [KK])—began falling apart from the moment it became clear Walesa could run for a second presidential term with a strong chance of winning.

The hitherto political setup among extraparliamentarian parties may be supplanted by a...

Bipolar Division

...claim Walesa's opponents. On one side will be groups that "do not rule out support for Walesa" and, on the other, those that "will not support Lech Walesa under any circumstances."

The first camp could be built on an axis formed by the Union for Real Politics (UPR) and the ZChN, as Janusz Korwin-Mikke recently wrote in NAJWYZSZY CZAS. Both parties continue to claim that they are looking for a different candidate, better than Lech Walesa, but make the stipulation that, if they fail to do so, they will have to support the current president. Both parties have the support of huge groups of voters ready to vote for Walesa. To not lose them, they might have to support Walesa in the final round of elections. "Lech Walesa has the chance of presenting himself as the lesser evil, and that is what the president is doing right now. If, however, he wants to shine, it would have to be against a completely black backdrop," says Stanislaw Michalkiewicz, of UPR, who still hopes the "rightist groups can find one candidate who...

"Will Guarantee Credibility"

On the other hand, however, it is known that supporters of Walesa within the ZChN (focused around Henryk Goryszewski) will go to great lengths to ensure that Walesa shines against a completely black backdrop and to make it difficult to find a candidate more suitable than the current president. The camp that "does not Walesa out," currently being formed, includes Szeremietiew's RdR and Gabriel Janowski's Polish Peasant Party-Peasant Agreement.

Potential supporters of Lech Walesa do not hide the fact that they are expecting the president to convince them they should support him with his deeds. "It is not the constituency, of which we are a part, that should seek the president's support, but the other way around," Romuald Szeremietiew recently said. The president is, for now, unlikely to seek the support of that part of the constituency that is made up of party structures but will rather appeal for the support of rightist parties' nonmember voters. Walesa demonstrates he is the only power with real ability to counteract "the communists," veto the budget bill, and present the leftist parliament with a...

Threat of Dissolution

...while defending Christian values at the same time.

One of the effects of such tactics seems to be a top position on lists of politicians with the greatest chances of winning the presidential election. In a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center in November, Walesa was already ranked third, with 10 percent support, and 12 percent (the second-largest group) claimed he would win the election.

Some of the rightist party leaders are convinced that these results cannot be ignored. Even if Walesa does reject them for the time being, emphasizing his distrust in politicians, they do not want to burn bridges because they might cooperate with the Belweder in the future, in a couple of months, when the current president will need far more colleagues than he now has in the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms.

Only the PC and the small but robust KK may soon remain on the opposite side. The politicians of those parties...

Rule Out Cooperation With the President

...not only because Walesa has already disappointed them once and they want to be consequent, but also because they are convinced there is a huge rightist and anticommunist constituency in Poland, which is disenchanted with Walesa and would not support him under any conditions. This constituency has thus far been dispersed among supporters of various parties. The rightist moment supports the current president; these voters will focus around the PC and the KK. The PC, however, is not giving up its search for allies among politicians. "We have extended an invitation to all of the rightist parties to talks on establishing a rightist bloc," says PC President Ludwik Dorn, and announces that talks are to be initiated soon with the Secretariat of Center-Right Groups [SUC], until recently ignored by Jaroslaw Kaczynski. It is worth remembering that the PC was one of the founders of SUC, established after last year's elections. It backed out, however, before forming a coalition with the ZChN.

Democratic Forum Likely To Leave Freedom Union

WS0212154494 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 2 Dec 94 p 3

[Article by Dominika Wielowieyska: "Will the Conflict Over the Democratic Forum Cause UW To Split?—The Union Left and Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The president of the Freedom Union [UW] refuses to recognize the statute of the Democratic Forum [FD] established by Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Zofia Kuratowska.*

During a meeting of the UW presidium late Wednesday night, there was a fiery debate between politicians from the social-liberal FD and the center-right wing of UW.

The presidium decided to appeal to the UW Council not to acknowledge the FD because it is a faction, and the UW statute prohibits the forming of such. "Against that motion were only Jan Litynski and Wladyslaw Geremek; Wladyslaw Frasyniuk did not take part in the vote," Deputy Ludwik Turko, an FD member present at the meeting, told us.

The presidium also passed the most restrictive version of the motion to exclude Barbara Labuda from the party. It has already been dispatched to the arbitration panel in Wroclaw. The motion, as Jan Maria Rokita tells us, is 30 pages long and includes controversial statements made by Labuda, demonstrating her disloyalty to UW.

"The problem is not whether the FD is to exist or not. The issue at hand is that two extreme wings of UW are aiming at confrontation, and the UW center is too weak to prevent it," an anonymous UW politician told us. "With just a little goodwill, the FD politicians could lay down rules of procedures that would not violate the party statute," he added.

The atmosphere within UW was further fueled by recent statements issued by Wladyslaw Frasyniuk and Zofia Kuratowska, who fiercely criticized their party leaders.

After the Wednesday presidium meeting, some of the FD founders said: "All right, let them throw us out of the Union."

"No one wants to throw them out," protest remaining UW members. Jan Maria Rokita believes nothing that terrible happened. "On Thursday, the presidium meeting was much calmer. We worked out tactics for talks on presidential candidates. There is a chance that the post-Solidarity camp will be able to put forth just one candidate to compete with Lech Walesa," says Rokita. He thinks this is the type of problem UW should focus on.

Off the record, however, UW deputies do not rule out that, during a party meeting scheduled for next week, friction may arise and eventually the FD activists might leave UW.

Dispute Over Funding, Direction of Minorities

LD0412200694 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 4 Dec 94

[From the "Wiadomosci" program relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer Jolanta Pienkowska] The leaders of national minorities in Poland are demanding the creation of a government plenipotentiary who would concern himself with the problems of the minorities. They feel that the state is not continuing any consistent policy in this sphere. Similar accusations are being made by the employees of the National Minorities Office of the Ministry of Culture and Art. Almost half of them have recently tendered their resignations.

[Correspondent Ewa Pocztar] The deputies in the Sejm National Minorities Commission also claim that the crisis in nationalities policy is caused by a lack of consistent state policy in relation to the national minorities.

[Jacek Kuron, chairman of Sejm National Minorities Commission] "There is a lack of a center, at governmental level, that would coordinate policy in relation to the national minorities."

[Pocztar] Since 1989, national minority problems have been the concern of an office at the Ministry of Culture. A few months ago, the ministry came forward with a proposal for the creation of a plenipotentiary for minority affairs who would be attached to the prime minister. Nonetheless, the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] did not agree to this. Former employees of the National Minorities Office claim that the present government does not understand the problems of Polish citizens who are not of Polish origin.

[Bogumila Berdychowska-Szostakowska, former director of the National Minorities Office] "In my view, [words indistinct] associated with, on the one hand, the limitation of the prerogatives of the office, in reality with the paralysis of the National Minorities Office, and on the other, with a very serious limitation of the budgetary subsidies for nationality associations."

[Pocztar] Ministry of Culture representatives feel that the complaints of their former employees are unjustified.

[Michal Jagiello, deputy minister of culture and art] "There are no changes in state policy here. This policy is unchanged and is what was delineated in the fall of 1989."

[Pocztar] Jerzy (Bisiak), the new director of the National Minorities Office, did not agree to speak before the cameras. The leaders of the Polish national minorities treat his nomination with reserve because hitherto he has been concerned with the stage and with phonographic concessions. Before 1989, he was also the secretary of the Basic Party Organization [POP] at the Ministry of Culture.

[Henryk Kroll, chairman of the Sociocultural Association of Germans] "Well, I think he will have some learning to do."

[Pocztar] Out of the 1995 budget, it is planned to allocate 15 trillion zlotys for the promotion of the culture of the national minorities—that is, as much as the budget of a House of Culture in a town of several tens of thousands of people.

Religious Clauses in Constitution Opppsed

LD0512105294 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0700 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Adam Strzembosz, first president of the Supreme Court, chairman of the State Tribunal, and chairman of the National Judicial Council, is opposed to adding a preamble to the new constitution that says that Poland is a Christian and catholic country. In the professor's opinion, a section of the Polish Episcopate shares the view that such an entry is not necessary.

In a lecture delivered in Kielce, Strzembosz stated that adding clauses to the constitution about religious beliefs could hamper the legislative process and create the impression that some citizens find themselves on the fringe of the state.

Editorial Predicts Privatization Will Be Slow

WS0212143994 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 2 Dec 94 p 5

[Editorial by Piotr Aleksandrowicz: "Poland Is No Longer the Leader"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime minister has signed lists of candidates for the supervisory councils of National Investment Funds [NFI]. That is very well, but it only means that the implementation of the so-called Mass Privatization Program has become more probable.

The NFI project does not solve problems facing the privatization of the Polish economy. It pertains to a limited number of industrial enterprises, its full implementation is doubtful, and it is bound to take many years to complete.

Statistical data, which we quoted a few days ago, prove that the increasing role of the private sector in the Polish economy is due to its own tremendous growth dynamics and not to the privatization of state enterprises, which is still too slow.

Considering the current ownership structure, where the state sector continues to dominate industry, transportation, banking, and insurance, not only the competitiveness of the economy on international markets but also our very access to the European Union is questionable. Also problematic is the influx of huge amounts of foreign capital to Poland, which is a prerequisite for stable and speedy development. Meanwhile, competition on the capital market is growing, and investment opportunities for huge capital disposers around the world are expanding.

Sale offers for state enterprises are part of that market—in East Europe, as well, where the progress of privatization in East Germany, the Czech Republic, and Hungary over the past two years lead one to conclude that Poland has removed itself from the group of leaders in ownership transformations.

"Directions for Privatization in 1995," from which, as the Privatization Council observed, specific details were removed, do not show that a breakthrough is likely to occur within the next 12 months. Current needs of the budget seem to be the only instrument necessitating the privatization of larger enterprises. This is not the type of incentive that would guarantee stable growth, acceleration, or broadening the scope of privatization.

Overcoming the political and mental barriers that hamper ownership transformations is deemed by skeptics as highly improbable. Optimists may, at most, claim that it will be a lengthy process.

Ministry Officials Meet With Iraqi Visitor

JN0212125394 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 1130 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] During his current visit to Romania, [Iraqi] Foreign Ministry Under Secretary 'Abd-al-Jabbar 'Umar al-Duri has met with Teodor Melescanu, Romanian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs [title as heard], and Cristian Ionescu, Romanian minister of trade. Al-Duri also held intensive official talks with (Martin Leno), Romanian state secretary for foreign affairs.

During these meetings, which were attended by the Iraqi ambassador to Romania, talks addressed the negative impact of the unfair embargo on the overall aspects of life in Iraq, particularly with regard to health, medicine shortages, and basic services. The talks also centered on bilateral ties. The under secretary and the Romanian officials have underscored the eagerness of the two friendly states to promote and cement these ties through meetings of officials of the two countries at the official, parliamentary, popular, and party levels.

The two sides agreed on the need to activate the work of joint committees and encourage visits by economic and technical delegations in order to pave the way for rehabilitating bilateral ties.

For his part, Teodor Melescanu, Romanian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, commended the positive moves Iraq has recently made to lay the grounds for a revocation of the sanctions. He announced Romania's definite desire to promote its ties with Iraq.

For his part, Romanian Minister of Trade Cristian Ionescu said the visit of the Iraqi delegation is a harbinger of good news for Iraqi-Romanian ties. He expressed the hope that the bilateral trade and economic ties will be normalized as soon as possible.

Iraqi Denies Oil Sold on World Black Market

AU0312204294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today in Bucharest, 'Abd-al-Jabbar 'Umar al-Duri, the deputy foreign affairs minister of Iraq [name and title as heard], held a news conference before concluding his visit to our country. [passage omitted]

On other issues, the Iraqi dignitary denied that his country is selling crude oil on the international black market, reasoning that Iraq is under a land and air embargo. Iraq is bordered by Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, countries with which it does not have relations; therefore, no exports are possible via those countries. The Iraqi official added that at present, Iraq is exporting only 50,000 barrels per day to Jordan. Half of that quantity is sold at a low price; the other half is free because of the favorable stance adopted by Jordan with respect to Iraq.

Senator Claims SRI 'Falsifying History'

AU0212152894 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 29 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, chairman of the Association of Former Political Detainees and National Peasant Christian Democratic Party senator: "The 'Faces' of Mr. Virgil Magureanu"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The name of this gentleman [Virgil Magureanu, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, SRI], closely intertwined with that of Mr. Ion Iliescu in goals and interests—a connection probably dating back to 1985—has imposed itself on the period following December 1989 thanks to the position entrusted to him.

I was the only member of the Provisional National Unity Council [CPUN] who contested him at the time. Today, I am among the few parliamentarians who refuse to allow themselves to be taken in by appearances. Consequently, I criticized him but also congratulated him for the priceless support—for which a general's stripes would be too small a reward—that he is giving to the "president's" party.

I would like to say from the very beginning that I have absolutely nothing personal against Mr. Virgil Magureanu, who as an individual may have many qualities.

By Suddenly Tackling the Securitate-SRI Problem, I Provoked the SRI Director's Anger

I would like to refer to Mr. Magureanu only in his capacity as SRI director, because I know more about the activities of the former Securitate than the SRI thinks. I also know that by suddenly tackling the Securitate-SRI problem, I provoked the anger of the SRI director: that is, of that all-powerful party force that can squash me like an ant (not so much physically, but through many other methods, too; mind you, this does not have to happen tomorrow, but when I least expect it!).

But then, I have made so many enemies, sometimes even among my so-called "brothers in the struggle," that it really no longer makes any difference! Likewise, I have reached an age where I need not be so afraid of anything and anyone.

But let us return to the subject: It is true, as the director said before the parliament, that he answered the questions I asked him in my capacity as chairman of the senatorial commission, even though those answers were somewhat ambiguous or vague.

However, I do not think that I should now feel obliged to him for his kindness; it was, after all, his duty to answer my questions. I did not even thank him for his proposal to make it up with Radu Ciuceanu [head of the National

Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism under the Romanian Academy], one of Mr. Iliescu's most faithful men, "designated" by the latter to deal with the Association of Former Political Detainees of Romania, AFDPR (something that is actually operating "covertly" even now).

Is It Possible for an Executioner or Interrogator To Honestly Talk About the Way in Which He Tortured or Killed His Victims?

The director displayed his most interesting face on 23 November 1994, during the presentation of his SRI report. Although he was summoned by the parliament to present his report, he reversed the roles and allowed himself to be the judge of the parliamentarians who dared to criticize him.

In an arrogant and caustically ironic tone, Mr. Magureanu gave himself away by losing his cool, despite [Senate] Speaker Gherman's laudable attempts to curb him.

My speech before the joint chambers of parliament, even through it might have angered the SRI director, did not give him the right to such an outburst (which unfortunately went almost unnoticed by the mass media).

What angered me most, however, was Virgil Magureanu's announcement that the SRI will issue a White Book on the Securitate.

Does that mean that the Securitate (because most of the SRI people are former Securitate members) can present its own crimes and illegal deeds?

Is is possible for an executioner or interrogator to talk honestly and fully about the way in which he tortured, arrested, or killed his victims?

No, definitely not! We are again faced with a huge mystification and diversion.

The Parliamentary Control Commission for SRI Activity Will Never Be in a Position To Know or Check Anything Other Than What the SRI Director Deems Fit...

Therefore, I will not content myself with what I said in the respective parliamentary debates about Mr. Magureanu's role in defending the Securitate.

My accusation is stronger: Namely that the director was given the task of falsifying history and hiding the truth in order to change the beastly face of the former Securitate for a humanized one, one even gentle and necessary, without which the country (God forbid!) would have collapsed!

We will find out that only a few hundred people died, either of natural causes or by execution, and the number of those arrested will not exceed the 35,000. In other words, they will not only continue to rehabilitate the Securitate but will also come to extol it!

However, I am obliged to note that some of my well-meaning parliamentary colleagues do not realize why the SRI has actually written its own White Book. Another question arises now: How did they manage to come into possession of so much data all of a sudden—when until not too long ago, they kept telling us that the secret archives had been largely destroyed? Or how can they write this history when Mr. Magureanu himself says that kilometers of archives have not yet been studied?

As far as I am concerned—I said it in the CPUN and I repeat it now—the Securitate cannot be accused as an institution, in its entirety, because not all the Securitate people were beasts. Therefore, the SRI is also absolutely necessary, as long as it does not turn itself into a political police. After all, reactivating the networks of informers in order to snitch on various political activities; monitoring the activity of democratic political parties or associations and introducing "viruses" of disunity inside them; maintaining the same old state of confusion and fear; and employing today's most efficient weapon, namely denigration (in an attempt to compromise those who do not love Iliescu), is nothing other than acting as a political police.

As regards the Parliamentary Control Commission on the SRI, its activity will never be in a position to know or check anything except what the director of this institution deems fit.

I have presented only several of Mr. Magureanu's "faces." It remains to be seen whether a nearer or more-distant future will bring up some other facets of his personality.

SRI Denies Planning To Murder Ethnic Hungarian

AU0212220494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Peter Blumauer, director of the Austrian Counterespionage Service, has declared to AFP that the Austrian Police have taken under protection a Viennese lawyer whom the Romanian secret services are trying to kill. According to Blumauer's story, lawyer Eva Maria Barky is in serious danger because she has militated over several years for the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

Blumauer said the Romanian Secret Services intend to get rid of this person by provoking a car accident, a method used by the old Romanian political police: namely, the Securitate.

According to Blumauer, three people of Hungarian origin are also in danger of being killed. Blumauer said that this is the first time the Austrian Counterespionage Service has made public reference to such an operation of a foreign secret service, adding that this affair must be taken seriously. The Austrian Police have therefore warned lawyer Eva Maria Barky of the intentions of the Romanian secret services, asking her to change her habits. Blumauer said that the Reform Bishop of Oradea, Laszlo Tokes, is among the three Romanians of Hungarian origin threatened by the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] and that the respective peoples defend the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania, which amounts to 2 million people. This minority is complaining about measures of forced assimilation adopted by the Romanian authorities.

The transfer of Timisoara priest Laszlo Tokes by the Romanian authorities in December 1989 provoked demonstrations in that town and later in Bucharest, and those actions finally ended with the fall of Ceausescu's communist regime. Blumauer said that Mrs. Barky is being persecuted by the SRI for her work for the Hungarian minority in Romania, especially since the end of September, when she claimed this monority's autonomous rights in a series of conferences that took place in Transylvania

Blumauer also said that Mrs. Barky this year submitted to the European Court in Strasbourg complaints about acts of torture in prison committed against five members of the Hungarian minority, who were pardoned in April 1994 while serving a three-year sentence. The five ethnic Hungarians had been sentenced in 1991 for murdering two members of the former Communist secret service, the Securitate, during the Romanian revolution of December 1989.

Nicolae Ulieru, head of the SRI's press office, contacted us on the telephone a short while ago and stated that this news is a complete travesty of the truth. SRI tactics do not include any method of physical elimination of certain people. Similarly, according to the rules for its functioning and organization, the SRI does not have any competence outside the national territory. On the basis of documentation compiled in accordance with the law on national security, Mrs. Eva Maria Barky was declared persona non grata in Romania for her activities that are at variance with the laws of the Romanian state, said Mr. Nicolae Ulieuru in conclusion.

More on Alleged Plans Against Hungarian Activists

LD0312224994 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 2000 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the director of the Austrian counterintelligence organization, the Romanian intelligence service is planning an attack against Eva Maria Barky, leader of the International Transylvanian Commission, headquartered in Vienna; Laszlo Tokes, Reformed Church bishop and honorary chairman of the HDUR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania]; and against two other ethnic Hungarians of Romania who are likewise consistent defenders of the rights of Hungarians.

[Correspondent Tibor Bogdan in Bucharest] Romanian intelligence also wants, on this occasion, to use its favourite method—namely, the staging of a car accident—to get rid of its political opponents. This was reported by Bucharest Radio, quoting also the statement by the chief of Austrian counterintelligence to the effect that they are taking the threat seriously and providing protection for Eva Maria Barky. Incidentally, the Austrian lawyer [Barky], in the recent past forwarded to Strasbourg the complaints of the five Hungarian prisoners who were freed in the spring by an act of clemency by the president [Ion Iliescu] in connection with the tortures they suffered while in prison. Bucharest Radio had obviously carried the report only so that it might straightaway give the spokesman for Romanian intelligence the opportunity to speak. Nicolae Urieru denied everything, pointing out that the institution he represents is not in the habit of employing the method of physical annihilation. He admitted, however, that Eva Maria Barky had been pronounced persona non grata in Romania on account of the violation of Romanian laws, so to speak—for reasons of national security.

[Begin Barky recording] The Austrian counterintelligence department obtained the information that on 22 November the SRI, the former Securitate, decided that I had to be done away with. The justification was that I am the initiator of the slogan "Autonomy Now," as well as my Transylvanian lecture tour. I will carry on, working as before, and (?I don't feel myself any more threatened than before). I will continue my work just as before, and the people of Transylvania can count on me just as before. [end recording]

Iliescu Attending CSCE Summit in Budapest

AU0512104294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement made to the press at Otopeni Airport before his departure for the CSCE meeting in Budapest, Ion Iliescu said that the Budapest meeting represents an important event for this end of year and marks the efforts made to define the role and functions of various European institutions in seeking ways to ensure equal stability and security on the European continent and in promoting integration processes and economic cooperation among all countries in Europe. In this context Mr. Iliescu stressed that the CSCE represents a forum with a universal character, in which all European countries participate on an equal footing—and the Budapest discussions will attempt to better define the role of the CSCE among European institutions.

Yesterday, immediately after his arrival in Budapest, President Iliescu had successive bilateral meetings with Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova; Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev; and Hungarian Premier Gyula Horn.

In the interview granted to our correspondent Sorin Aman, President Iliescu said that the first meeting he held with President Snegur stressed the need to overcome aspects of reticence that have appeared in our relations in the past years. He also stressed the need to treat with realism the prospects for deepening normal relations, which must exist between the two countries.

During the meeting with Bulgarian President Zhelev, the sides broached economic cooperation issues, among them the finalization of consultations at the expert level regarding the plans to build a bridge over the Danube, regional developments from a European perspective, and aspects of the CSCE conference, as well as the joint interest in working in all areas to develop cooperation at the regional level and to ensure cooperation with the European Union.

President Iliescu assessed the talks held with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn as an open and realistic discussion during which both sides emphasized the interest in approaching bilateral political issues in a realistic manner.

The parties agreed that relations between Romania and Hungary are not relations of conflict. From this viewpoint, the image that is reflected at the international level is not always in keeping with reality because, in fact, we have normal relations, both at the diplomatic and government levels, as well as at the economic level.

However, President Iliescu emphasized that there are certain problems, mainly as far as the drafting of a basic treaty is concerned. Iliescu stated that he hailed the open and realistic manner in which the new Hungarian Government approached the issue of historical reconciliation and revealed the need to promote contacts at the summit level.

President Iliescu also said it would be natural for these contacts not to be preconditioned by the achievement of certain understandings, stating that he and Premier Horn reached a common viewpoint and discussions held yesterday attested to a good start.

Democratic Party Elects New Executive Bureau

AU0512113194 Bucharest COTIDIANUL in Romanian 29 Nov 94 p 2

[Article signed "C.Z.": "The Executive Bureau of the Democratic Party Has Been Elected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with the Democratic Party statutes, during the first meeting of the Steering Collegium after the National Convention, held on Sunday 27 November 1994, the Party's Executive Bureau was elected on the basis of the previously proposed candidacies. Some changes can be noticed: Namely, Emil Cojocariu has become executive vice president; Radu Berceanu has become vice president in charge of organization; Adrian Severin has become vice president in charge of political issues, analysis, and political planning; Teodor Luputiu has become vice president in charge of economic and social policy; Victor Babiuc has become vice president in charge of public relations; Alexandru Sassu has become vice president in charge of human resources; and Victor Bostinaru has become vice president in charge of international relations. The party leaders affirmed that they do not wish to create a pyramid-type structure, in which one single person supervises everything. Apart from this, they are basing themselves on the model of the French socialists and the British Labor Party (the "pyramid-frustum" model), in which the fall of a leader does not affect the entire structure.

The members of the new Executive Bureau said that the statutes of the Democratic Party underwent both doctrinary and organizational modifications. Hence, they took care to ensure that the person who puts forward the proposal will not be the one who approves itm and they determined who has to take urgent decisions and in what way disputes within the party can be settled .

It is worth mentioning that Traian Basescu failed to run for a position in the Executive Bureau. Nevertheless, he was elected member of the Executive Bureau of the Democratic Party on behalf of the Bucharest branch of the party.

Another fact worth mentioning is that one of the positions of secretary of the organization department was taken by George Serban, leader of the former Democratic Party of Labor, which has recently merged with the Democratic Party.

'Heavy' Tank, Infantry Clashes on Bihac Front

AU0512114994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 5 Dec 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] The joint aggressors have continued today the fierce offensive on all parts of the Bihac front, particularly along the border with Croatia from the UN Protected Areas [UNPA] from the so-called Serb Krajina.

Heavy tank and infantry clashes, with the support of artillery, are under way around Debeljaca Hill, Zegar, Vedro Polje, Klokot, and Bugari, all the way to Velika Kladusa. The attacks on that part of the Bihac region are directed from the UNPA in the occupied parts of Croatia.

Fierce clashes are also under way on the Bosanska Krupa part of the front, on the Grmusko-Srbljanski Plateau, and Grabez Heights, while the outskirts of Bihac and Cazin are exposed to heavy shelling.

The fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps are successfully resisting the chetnik onslaughts on the free parts of the Bihac region, repulsing all the enemy attempts to break through the defense lines.

The hospital in Bihac is still without medicine and food, and the convoy with medicine and food for the hospital that set off from Zagreb three days ago is waiting at the border for passage through the so-called Serb Krajina. All the efforts to provide the Bihac hospital with medicine and food have been futile so far, and have not even been addressed by the so-called Knin authorities. There is no more need to discuss the humanitarian catastrophe in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the international community has done nothing to alleviate the conditions for the suffering and exhausted population of Bihac.

Intensified Artillery Attacks

AU0512094194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 5 Dec 94

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Karadzic's [word indistinct] have continued with their bestial attacks on the Bihac region throughout the night, and this morning they even intensified their artillery and tank attacks. Several hundred missiles have landed on the city [words indistinct] attempts at infantry breakthroughs. [Words indistinct] burning and destroying houses and other facilities. [Words indistinct] on the Velika Kladusa part of the front, where Martic's chetniks wearing insignia of the so-called people's defense have been trying either to enter the town or raze it completely to the ground. Velika Kladusa itself resembles Vukovar, with the difference that life is still going on in this town, but one can imagine what it is like.

The attacks from the so-called Serb autonomous province of Krajina have continued on the Cazin, that is, Bosanska Krupa front. While the international community is bickering, the Bihac region is slowly disappearing from the face of the earth, and the drama experienced by its population, the wounded, has exceeded all civilizational norms.

Bosnian Serbs Reportedly Capture Bosanska Krupa

LD0412234194 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2230 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After several days of fierce fighting, units of the Srpska republic army have encircled Bosanska Krupa on three sides, and it can be said now that the town has been completely liberated on both sides of the Una River. Una will not separate the people any more and we hope that bridges will be rebuilt soon. Serb units achieved this major victory after fierce clashes of the former, now decimated, 5th Corps of the so-called Muslim army. The most responsible for seizing the dominant hills around Krupa are the soldiers of the Bosnian Serb Krupa and Novigrad Brigades, as well as members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Fleeing in the face of the Serb advance, Muslim extremists have been burning down everything in their wake. Shortly before noon today, the Una wood-processing plant on the right bank of the river was also set on fire. [passage omitted]

'Significant' B-H Army Success on Lukavac Front

AU0512103894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 Dec 94

[Report by Izudin Durakovic from Gracanica]

[FBIS Translated Text] The units of the 2d Operations Group have scored another significant success on the Lukavac front. In a well-prepared and quick operation—the aim of which was to engage the enemy forces in order to pull them away from the Bihac region—significant territory has been liberated and considerable amounts of weapons captured. Large losses have been inflicted on the aggressor's troops, and one enemy soldier surrendered to the units of our army.

Important points have been captured—Points (TP329) and 359—and the villages of Mujagici, Alvadzije, and (Potoci) have been liberated. It is important to stress that these were Muslim villages before the war, but the people were expelled. Now after 30 months, they have a chance to return to their homes, and some have already done so.

As for the captured weapons, let us just mention two Broving guns, Osa portable rocket launcher with containers, lots of ammunition and small arms. The captured weapons are still being sorted out and registered, and we will let you know more about this in our subsequent reports.

In talks with the captured enemy soldier we have found out about the demoralized state of affairs in the aggressor's ranks. [Words indistinct] are irregular and can go on for about four weeks, while desertions are on the rise despite [word indistinct] penalties. The civilian population on Mt. Ozren is greatly dissatisfied because of the indifference of the political leadership toward this region, which they have already given up to the Bosniak-Croatian federation.

This latest success by the units of the 2d Operations Group is the best way to help the army and the people of the Bihac region in the goal to liberate these regions from the merciless enemy aggression.

Contact Group Ready To Change Partition Plan

AU0212215494 Paris AFP in English 2143 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Brussels, Dec 2 (AFP)—The five-nation Contact Group said Friday [2 December] it was prepared to amend its proposals for the partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina if it would help to secure the agreement of the Bosnian Serbs for the plan.

The five nations in the group—the United States, Russia, Germany, France and Britain—emerged from a three hour meeting saying they was ready to reopen negotiations on the plan, originally presented as a take-it-or-leave-it offer. [passage omitted]

The Contact Group also called for an immediate ceasefire in the Bihac enclave in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a truce in the rest of Bosnia.

Butrus-Ghali: Serbs Agree To Bihac Withdrawal

AU0312160894 Paris AFP in English 1408 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Geneva, Dec 3 (AFP)—Separatist Serb forces from Croatia's Krajina region have agreed to pull out from the besieged UN-declared safe area of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia, UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali said here Saturday.

He said he had been informed that "the Krajina Serbs authorities had agreed yesterday (Friday) to withdraw their military personnel from the Bihac Pocket." [passage omitted]

Speaking in Geneva, Butrus-Ghali said that he had been informed of the Krajina Serbs' decision to pull out by Thorvald Stoltenberg, the UN co-chairman of the international conference on Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

The overall humanitarian situation in the pocket and in the UN-mandated safe area was deteriorating, and there was as yet no sign of Bosnian Serbs easing restrictions on the movement of relief convoys, he said.

The Bosnian Serbs and their Croatian Serb allies are thought to have control of around one third of the enclave.

Butrus-Ghali, who is to attend a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Budapest Monday, said that he would be ready to accept the idea of a confederation of the Serbians and Bosnian Serbs. "Whatever proposition which can activate the peace process will have my personal support," he said.

UN, Serbs 'Deadlocked' on NATO Aircraft Safety

AU0412142694 Paris AFP in English 1340 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Dec 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs were deadlocked with UN Protection Force authorities Sunday, refusing to guarantee the safety of NATO warplanes overflying their territory and maintaining their non-cooperation with the peacekeeping force.

Spokesman Lt.-Col. Jamie Daniel said UNPROFOR's Bosnia command had been engaged in three days of "on-going discussions" with Serb leaders "regarding the recent upsurge of activation of anti-aircraft systems and our requirement to have NATO continue in its role over the skies of Bosnia."

The alliance was maintaining its operations over Bosnia in the UN-mandated Deny Flight, officials said Sunday, countering statements by UN spokesmen here Thursday that the mission had been suspended during the present phase of diplomatic activity.

Daniel dismissed information obtained by AFP from a UN source earlier Sunday that UNPROFOR command had received a letter from the Serbs with the implicit threat that "no planes are safe" over Bosnia, saying that none of the "flurry of letters" in recent days from the Serbs had contained a threat. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile UNPROFOR spokesman Lt.-Col. Jan-Dirk von Merveldt said that plans to send a UN convoy north from Sarajevo to the embattled Bihac pocket were "stalled" despite assurances given to UN envoy Yasushi Akashi in Pale Friday that Serb relations with the peacekeeping force would be normalised.

Serb leader Radovan Karadzic told Akashi that UN convoys would be authorised, detained UN personnel released, and relations normalised. There was however "no sign of a broader release" despite "piecemeal" gestures in previous days, Merveldt said.

Some 400 UN personnel, including peacekeepers and military observers, are detained at various points in Serb-controlled territory.

A UN source said that food stocks in Sarajevo were sufficient to maintain present levels of supply until December 13. A UN convoy from Zagreb brought food supplies to 1,200 Bangladeshi troops in the Bihac pocket earlier Sunday just when the Bangladeshis had been close to exhausting their reserves. A Bangladeshi peacekeeper, who was not named, died of a heart attack early Saturday, he added. [passage omitted]

Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, responding to warnings by London and Paris that they could withdraw their troops from Bosnia, said he hoped that UNPROFOR would remain. "However if they insist on leaving they could be replaced by NATO troops or by countries which want to contribute," he added.

Speaking as British and French ministers headed for Belgrade to relaunch diplomatic efforts on Bosnia, Silajdzic said there could be no changes in the "definitive" peace plan presented by the contact group comprising the United States, Russia, France, Britain and Germany.

The plan was "presented on a take it or leave it basis, so we took it," he said. "We have already offered half of Bosnia on a silver plate to a fascist regime."

Spokesman 'Gloomy' on Airport Reopening Prospects

AU0312155394 Paris AFP in English 1512 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Dec 3 (AFP)—UN officials in Sarajevo expressed serious concern Saturday at the continuing closure of the airport here following the refusal by Bosnian Serbs to give assurances on the safety of incoming aircraft.

The delivery of humanitarian aid to the besieged city has been stalled for two weeks since flights were halted during a build-up of tension, as the Bosnian Serbs rolled back government forces to capture large swathes of the northwestern Bihac region. [passage omitted]

The Serb policy of locking surface-to-air missile radar on to NATO and UN aircraft as they conduct their missions over Bosnia, led UN officials to conclude the safety of incoming aircraft could not be ensured.

UN envoy Yasushi Akashi failed to obtain an assurance from Serb leader Radovan Karadzic that the Serbs would end this "unacceptable" practice that was creating a new level of tension on the ground, UN Protection Force spokesman Thant Myint-U said. "We asked for assurances and none was forthcoming," he said of the envoy's talks in Pale on Friday. "I don't think that until we get them there will be any flights."

The official was gloomy about the prospects for a reopening of the airport. "It is difficult to see how we can go back to business as usual," he said. "We are asking ourselves right now about this situation. The situation cannot be allowed to go on."

Until recently Serb officials had responded positively to routine UN notification of incoming flights sent to both sides, but now the Serb side has ceased responding, said UN spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Jan-Derk von Merveldt. That meant flights could not go ahead, he said, adding that the UN-controlled airport lies within range of Serb surface-to-air missiles.

Myint-U said the missile site threat and the Serbs saying they "cannot guarantee the security" of incoming flights, had forced the decision to keep the airport closed, he said. "It was our assessment that there was a serious threat that something could happen, that because of the missiles planes could be locked on to, leading to a massive escalation on the ground that could spin out of control," he said. "With diplomacy active, we wanted to avoid that kind of incident."

On Friday [2 December] UN officials in Sarajevo said NATO had scaled down its Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia to avoid provoking missile attacks by the Serbs which could derail attempts to end the fighting.

UN officer Wing Commander Timothy Hewlett said the Serbs had at least three surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), passed on to them from the former Yugoslav army at the outset of the Bosnian conflict. Of these the SAM-6 missiles, with a range of 24 kilometres (15 miles), were the most effective, though track-mounted and easily visible. None were within the 20-kilometre (12.5-mile) total exclusion area around Sarajevo, he said, but their range and mobility meant they still posed a threat. Similarly, Serb SAM-7 missiles, shoulder-mounted and portable, could be smuggled into the exclusion zone and represented a threat even with their limited four-kilometre (2.5-mile) range.

The presence of the missiles has been known since the start of the conflict. The difference now, Hewlett said, is the practice of locking their radar on to aircraft to track them in flight, technically a hostile act.

Merveldt said the threat to the airport "comes more from ill-disciplined forces firing small-arms." This practice had been "on-going all the time," he said, noting the frequent airport closures of the past. "Aircraft often arrive with a bullet in them."

The airport's closure leaves a makeshift road over Mount Igman southwest of the Bosnian capital as the only way into the city.

Serbs Refuse Evacuation of Injured UN Observer

AU0312174994 Paris AFP in English 1716 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec 3 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs are refusing to allow the evacuation of an injured UN observer in the Serb-held northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka, a senior UN military observer said here Saturday.

Two other UN observers have been under virtual house arrest for the past week near a Banja Luka airstrip following NATO airstrikes against Serb positions in Serb-held Croatia and Bosnia, said Colonel Stephen Ashworth, who heads the UN military observers' team in the former Yugoslavia.

The three observers, whose names were not disclosed, are from Bangladesh, the Czech Republic and Jordan.

One of them has "serious heart problems" and a doctor who examined him has recommended he be evacuated, but the Bosnian Serbs have refused to allow him out, Ashworth said. His health problems have been exacerbated by the stress linked to the situation in which he finds himself, Ashworth continued. He added the Serbs had not responded to a second demand for the observer's evacuation Saturday.

Ashworth noted that the Bosnian Serb authorities had previously said they would accept his evacuation on condition he was replaced by another observer. But because of the movement restrictions imposed on the UN personnel there has been no chance to decide on sending another observer, he added. He expressed the hope that Bosnian Serb authorities would accept the evacuation but refused to describe the observers as hostages, saying merely that their movement was being restricted.

However, a UN source who asked not to be identified said there was little chance of the Serbs agreeing to an evacuation.

Serbs Allow British, Dutch Convoys To Proceed

AU0412155894 Paris AFP in English 1523 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 4 (AFP)—A British convoy detained by Bosnian Serbs for almost a week was allowed Sunday to proceed to its destination in eastern Bosnia, a UN Protection Force spokesman said.

The 20 peacekeepers in four vehicles reached the town of Gorazde shortly after 4:00 p.m. (1500 GMT), Major Herve Gourmelon said.

A Dutch convoy with 33 UN troops detained near Zvornik, in northeastern Bosnia, was also allowed to proceed, he said. However, some 380 other UN soldiers remain trapped in sites around Sarajevo, the spokesman added.

On Friday, UN special representative Yasushi Akashi said he had received promises from the Serb authorities that all the UN troops currently detained by the Serbs would be freed.

Ganic, Akashi Report on Progress of Talks

LD0312173094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, Ejup Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and deputy president of the Federation, had another meeting with UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi, who also visited Pale yesterday. Today's meeting focused on humanitarian air drops for Bihac, the reopening of Sarajevo airport, a cease-fire, and the cessation of hostilities. Senada Cumurovic reports:

[Cumurovic] After the talks yesterday in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and a visit to Pale in the afternoon, Yasushi Akashi could not say anything new to move things forward:

[Begin Akashi recording, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Ganic, his colleagues in the government, and I talked about peace efforts, a cease-fire proposal, and the cessation of hostilities through political negotiations. The talks in Pale yesterday achieved certain results, and the Bosnian Serbs agreed to cooperate with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], for example, in connection with the freedom of movement for convoys and for the UN soldiers who are now imprisoned. [passage omitted including indistinct portion] [end recording]

[Cumurovic] Opening a news conference, Ganic said:

[Begin Ganic recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] [Words indistinct] Karadzic's Serbs rejected a cease-fire for Bihac and for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They refused to allow planes to land at Sarajevo airport. They are refusing to allow humanitarian deliveries for Bihac by air. They are not allowing humanitarian convoys to access Bihac and other areas. They have also installed missile launchers around Sarajevo and other cities so that humanitarian aid cannot be delivered by air. [passage omitted including indistinct portion] [end recording]

[Cumurovic] Finally, Ganic said:

[Begin Ganic recording, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] UNPROFOR would like to withdraw its troops from Velika Kladusa and northern Bihac. This would increase the level of fighting in the area, and we said we are against it. [passage indistinct] [end recording] [passage omitted including indistinct portion]

UN Official Deplores Serb 'Calculated Insult'

AU0512111394 Paris AFP in English 1100 GMT 5 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Dec 5 (AFP)—Serb non-cooperation and harassment of UN personnel in Bosnia is a deliberate and calculated insult which the international community will tolerate only "at great cost," a UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman said here Monday [5 December].

The international community "should understand clearly that the Bosnian Serbs are not only waging war against the Bosnian Government ... but that they are targetting UNPROFOR, detaining its personnel and denying others essential supplies," UNPROFOR civil affairs spokesman Thant Myint-U said.

"This is a deliberately designed, carefully calculated insult against the United Nations which can only be allowed to pass at great cost," he warned.

Myint-U accused the Serbs of using food as a weapon of war which was, he noted, "a violation of the most basic principles of international humanitarian law."

Owen: No Conditions for Bosnian Serb Independence

LD0412210394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2049 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] London, Dec. 4 (TANJUG)—International mediator David Owen said Sunday there were no conditions for the Bosnian Serb republic to get independence and receive international recognition.

In an interwiev with the British Independent Television network, ITV, Owen said the best Bosnian Serbs could get was a high degree of autocomy within the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina' and a confederate link with the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

He said the renewed fighting in Bosnia in the last few months been caused by Muslim offensives. He said the Muslim government in Sarajevo wanted, by launching the offensives, to achieve the involvement of NATO and foreign countries in the civil war.

However, he said NATO could carry out actions in Bosnia solely at the request of the United Nations. He said its role was not to side with anyone in the conflict.

Owen said the Bosnian crisis was threatening to turn into a disaster and large-scale war, but that he trusted Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his acceptance of the internatitnal 'Contact group' plan for Bosnia would play a major role in preventing this.

Karadzic Urges Equal Treatment of Serbs by UN

LD0212230394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2229 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, today sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, says a report carried by SRNA. In the letter Karadzic expresses his regret that a meeting between the Srpska republic presidency and the UN secretary general did not take place as it would have offered him the opportunity to assure himself of the Serb side's readiness for an immediate end to the civil war on the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"We would have presented you with the facts from which you would have seen very clearly that the biggest victims of the forceful destruction of Yugoslavia are the Serbs from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. We would have likewise offered you evidence that there can be no progress until all three warring sides receive equal treatment."

The letter from the Srpska republic president to the UN secretary general says it is regrettable that the United Nations does not consider the Serbs an equal party. "We too have a democratic public, and it is not possible for us to accept unequal treatment, even more so because the Sarajevo leadership does not represent the whole of Bosnia, but only the Muslim community," Karadzic says, adding that "the United Nations made a mistake when it recognized Bosnia and irregularly granted it UN membership; hence, they should not prolong the illusion that Bosnia still exists as a single state."

"Maintaining that illusion in a forceful way has already cost us hundreds of thousands of human lives," the letter says, adding that "the Serb side, confirming its readiness for peace, again expresses regret because of the missed meeting and hopes that it will nevertheless take place in the near future," SRNA has reported.

Izetbegovic: Serbs Deploy SAM's Near Safe Areas

AU0212192194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic has sent an urgent message to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali:

We have reliable information that Karadzic's Serbs have deployed surface-to-air missile systems not only around Sarajevo but also around Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. UNHCR confirmed this piece of information this morning. This way Karadzic's Serbs wish to isolate completely the besieged areas and prevent food and medicine from reaching them. These systems also threaten NATO aircraft that enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Informing you about this, I appeal to you to give urgent consideration to this new situation, which brings the UN and NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina into question and leads to further escalation of the war, says the message from President Izetbegovic to Butrus-Ghali. An identical message has been sent to NATO Secretary General Willy Claes.

Ljubijankic on Peace Process Resumption Conditions

LD0212222394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Ifran Ljubijankic, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, held talks in Brussels today with his French counterpart Alain Juppe and German counterpart Klaus Kinkel.

In his talks today Minister Ljubijankic stressed that preconditions for the continuation of any sort of a peace process and its progress are: withdrawal of all the Serb forces from the protected area of Bihac, primarily those who come from UN protected areas in the Republic of Croatia; acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan by Karadzic's Serbs; and mutual recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Everything else, Ljubijankic said, will lead to prolonging the war or to a diktat in negotiations, which the Bosnia-Herzegovina side cannot accept.

His counterparts stressed that the July Contact Group peace plan remains the basis for possible new negotiations on the final peace solution for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Prime Minister, U.S. Envoy Discuss Situation

LD0412183294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Boznia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic met U.S. President Clinton's special envoy, Charles Redman, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, in Sarajevo again today. Following their talks that lasted for approximately an hour, Redman and Silajdzic briefed domestic and foreign journalists about their talks today. Mladen Bosnjak has a report:

[Bosnjak] Prime Minister Silajdzic first read out parts of a letter that Bill Clinton had sent to Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] President Clinton speaks about the aggression against our people, he knows that this is aggression against our people, and he wants us to know that he admires the heroism of the (?Bosnian) people who are facing grave difficulties. In order to make it completely clear, as the letter says, the United States is resolute in the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its present borders. Of course, President Clinton prefers, if possible, that a peaceful solution of the problem is attained; but it is important to stress that the United States, according to President Clinton, is resolute in preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its present borders. We have clarified some dilemmas that as regards [words indistinct] were obviously not true.

With Mr. Redman we also spoke about the humanitarian situation. I have just received the news that a convoy has reached Coralici in the Bosnian Krajina. We are not completely sure. I spoke about it with Mr. (?Velagic) who does not know anything about it, but says that Velika Kladusa and Bihac are still exposed to fierce attacks and they are being defended.

With Mr. Redman I spoke about yet another thing: Our borders with Serbia. Reports on the closure of the borders with Serbia are either untrue, or it has failed to produce the necessary result. We know that weapons and troops are still coming from Serbia. In our mind the sanctions ought to reintroduced, because [words indistinct] this is what we think plus one more thing: Serbia will not pay war reparations to Bosnia unless Serbia is under the sanctions. The sanctions should not be lifted, this is what we will demand in the United Nations until war reparations are paid out to Bosnia-Herzegovina. [end recording]

[Bosnjak] Mr. Charles Redman brought a letter from President Clinton to Sarajevo today, and this was the immediate reason for his visit. Otherwise, the four visits in two days to Sarajevo and to Pale, were made at the request of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Charles Redman stressed. The aim of his visit is to gain insight into the real situation, or rather to define the assistance to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and steps that the U.S. Administration will take in the future. After four visits in two days to Sarajevo, the talks with President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic, Charles Redman will travel to Budapest to meet Secretary of State Warren Christopher and other U.S. State Department officials to inform them about the talks he had. Charles Redman said that he could not comment today on the possible next steps by U.S. diplomacy. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic highlighted another question that he discussed with the senior U.S. officials.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] We tried to clarify something else here. We are not clear about who is doing what here, what the UN mandate is here, what the Contact Group is doing, and so on. While in Sarajevo, as you know, there is no gas, in Bihac people have nothing to eat. We have here.... [pauses] The government and the city have secured large amounts of food, but what we have we cannot get to Bihac. So one might ask what UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] is doing here, what is its role, and what its mandate is here? It seems everybody is playing politics. So currently, as you know, the situation in Sarajevo is very difficult, in Bihac it is very difficult, and this is not to mention Srebrenica where it is more than difficult; then there is Gorazde, Zepa, and we have UNPROFOR concentrating on politics. I do not know what the Contact Group is doing. It seems that roles here are being mixed up or no one wants to do their job and fulfill its mandate. [end recording]

[Bosnjak] Charles Redman, replying to what Silajdzic said, stressed that the humanitarian situation is difficult, that there are very many problems, and that many steps are being considered that could lead to peace by diplomatic means. Mr. Charles Redman did not comment on Russia's veto on the last resolution prepared by the UN Security Council, but he confirmed again, in reply to a journalist's question, that the talks that he had with the highest- ranking representatives of the state and Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina were constructive and (?productive).

Replying to a journalist's question, Mr. Silajdzic stressed that we want UNPROFOR to stay, but if there is a withdrawal of the current units then it is necessary for them to be replaced by others, or for their role to be taken over by NATO. Assessing the announced visit to Belgrade today by Hurd and Juppe, the Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister believes that any talks that could lead to the resolution of the crisis were welcome, but this meeting would be meaningless if it were yet another of those meetings that draws out the peace process, the implementation of UN resolutions, and NATO ultimatums.

Silajdzic on U.S. Position

NC0412191894 London MBC Television in Arabic 1820 GMT 4 Dec 94

[Telephone interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in Sarajevo by correspondent 'Abdallah Hamzah on 4 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Silajdzic] The five-member committee has not come forward with anything new. However, it tried to talk about a confederation between Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia. In other words, they want to establish a greater Serbia. After our categorical rejection of this, they did not mention confederation in the present memorandum.

[Hamzah] How would you describe the military situation right now?

[Silajdzic] Aggression continues in the city of Bihac. The Serbs continue their attacks with tank cannon and mortars. The United Nations and the UN Protection Forces are acting as bystanders. Sarajevo is totally cut off from the outside world; no humanitarian aid is arriving, there is no gas, only a small supply of electricity is available. The weather is very cold. Unfortunately, the situation is that the world community has been defeated by Serbian fascism.

[Hamzah] Mr. Prime Minister, what is the nature of the talks U.S. envoy Charles Redman held in Sarajevo today; and, how do you assess the U.S. position on the Bosnian crisis?

[Silajdzic] Mr. Clinton sent a message today through Ambassador Charles Redman. The message says that America stands behind the state of Bosnia [words indistinct] its present borders. It also says that there is aggression by Serbia against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Hamzah] This is the position they adopt on paper. But what is the actual American position in practice?

[Silajdzic] The actual American position is indeed a little less than what is said, first because there are no U.S. soldiers on the ground, and second because there still is an arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is very odd, since this is a battle between democracy and fascism. Instead of supporting democracy, democratic governments in Europe are supporting fascism.

Silajdzic: Europe Accepting 'Fascist' Regime

BR0212124994 Madrid EL MUNDO in Spanish 2 Dec 94 p 20

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic by Miguel Gil; place and date not given: "Silajdzic: 'UN Resolutions Only Taken To Ease Conscience"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has been sleeping just four hours a day for the last two weeks. During this time he has never been without his blue sports jacket and his gray pants.*

[Gil] You have always complained about the lack of any international political will to resolve the Bosnian conflict, but the French [foreign] minister is in favor of the use of force and the United Nations has launched a number of attacks.

[Silajdzic] I think that is quite normal because it is still clear to everyone that this war is nothing short of fascist aggression. I often wonder whether communism had to fall only to be replaced by ethnic fundamentalism. Five years ago it was inconceivable that a fascist project anywhere in the world would be supported by the international community. That is exactly what is happening here.

[Gil] How do you explain this connivance of the western governments?

[Silajdzic] Europe has no leadership. The European politicians do not understand the danger Europe is in.

[Gil] Can you explain?

[Silajdzic] In Bosnia we are facing a fascist project, a genocidal plan of ethnic cleansing. It is obvious that in Germany, the UK, and France nobody approves of what is happening here and their governments know that full well. That is why we have all these UN resolutions, to ease people's consciences. These resolutions are just worthless pieces of paper. They have never been carried out and they bear all the marks of the "establishment." Therefore, the United Nations is no longer an alter ego for this "establishment" and is forming a real ego of its own. UN bureaucracy acts as a filter, blocking positive individual initiatives by single countries. The legally elected governments have lost control of their own policies. Each positive initiative is being lost in this so-called collectivism. Consensus rule means that the unacceptable is being accepted. At the same time, the blame for what is happening in Bosnia is being diluted in this collectivism.

The prime minister fiddles with his watch, and plays with his tie, rolling it up, his eyes closed as he tries to concentrate. Each sentence is a strain, as if he is building his whole political philosophy as he talks.

[Gil] How does the United Nations operate to balance the political pressure on Bosnia?

[Silajdzic] It is a bureaucracy without body or soul. It is inert. I do not want to open the debate on whether or not Bosnia is a vital interest for the rest of the world, because if you ask that question you have to have a certain vision of the future which, as I say, is obviously absent. However, we can look at it in its Islamic dimension. The eyes of 100 million young Muslims are on Bosnia. They are planning their own future with the West. They are drawing their conclusions from the Bosnian crisis. With regard to their own future they are asking themselves:

"Do we cooperate with the West or do we oppose it? The Bosnian Muslims have shown that despite the primitive war situation they are in, they are civilized people. They have never destroyed a Catholic or Orthodox church. These are the same Bosnian Muslims who took in the Jews five centuries ago when they had nowhere else to go in Europe. If these Muslims cannot survive today, then the message that the young Muslims all over the world will hear is that of opposition instead of cooperation.

[Gil] What do you conclude from all this?

[Silajdzic] Europe does not want to see its own fundamentalism, which is genetic and biological. As fascism was the "enfant terrible" of Europe, so this new class of fascism is tolerated by Europe.

[Gil] When you speak of genetic fundamentalism, do you mean that fascism is an intrinsic feature of Europe?

[Silajdzic] Yes, that is exactly what I mean, and the aggression we had 50 years ago changed nothing. We are still at the primitive level of human relations. We have to learn how to live together. Therefore we need education and we need models of success. Bosnia was a very successful model. This Bosnia survived for hundreds of years and survived Hitler's regime, but now it cannot survive at the hands of a small fascist regime that Europe is accepting. I think Europe is dealing with the Bosnian problem as if it were both a humanitarian problem and a natural disaster. It is not a natural disaster but planned genocide. The United Nations is not the Red Cross.

[Gil] What are you referring to?

[Silajdzic] Chapter 7 of the UN Charter states that an aggressor must be punished and the victims helped. In Bosnia we are seeing exactly the opposite. The governments that oppose the lifting of the arms embargo are in violation of this chapter of the UN Charter. That does not make them neutral—they are aiding the aggressor by doing this.

It is true that the Blue Helmets have been very helpful in Bosnia and we very much appreciate their contribution, but we cannot be captives of this situation. The presence of these soldiers should not influence the politics, as it is doing at the moment. NATO does not want to act because these troops are on the ground, because the British Government considers that all of its soldiers are under threat here. Of course they are, for the time being, because they are being held hostage. That does not mean that we have to lose our country because of it.

[Gil] The Spanish Government was one of the first to announce that it would withdraw its forces if the embargo were ever lifted.

[Silajdzic] If they want to pull out there is nothing we can do to stop them. And if they leave, we will have to replace them by NATO troops or soldiers from countries that do want to stay in Bosnia.

[Gil] Have your diplomatic relations with the United States been thrown into question?

[Silajdzic] The pressure in the United Sates comes from the man in the street who is much more capable of putting his government under pressure than his European counterpart.

Throughout the interview, the prime minister was not so much sitting as slumped in an armchair. As we were leaving he asked us for a copy of the tape we had just recorded, explaining: "I have just told you things I have never said before."

Fikret Abdic Cited on Relations With Serbs

LD0212154194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0942 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Velika Kladusa, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—All attempts at finding a political solution to the question of the autonomous province of western Bosnia [APZB] have been exhausted and the only way out is a military showdown in this area, APZB president Fikret Abdic told TANJUG correspondent Milos Solaja.

Abdic believes that the political and state leadership of the Muslim republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the "Sarajevo authorities", as he calls them, facing two options—war or peace—opted for war.

In his words, the "Sarajevo authorities" evidently attempted, in cooperation with international organizations, to return the refugee population from the reception centers of Turanj and Batnoga because they would like very much to return the 70,000 people who fled their terror, taking away a large fortune and capital.

"As all the attempts at finding a peaceful solution have been exhausted, the only way to enable the refugees to return home is with the force of weapons, something they have accepted," the APZB president said, explaining the mood among his supporters.

He said that last year's referendum demonstrated a great deal of support for the APZB because 80 percent of the population were his supporters. True, the Sarajevo authorities became slightly more "flexible" following the collapse of their offensive from the protected zone of Bihac and the counteroffensive launched by the army of the Srpska republic. They [the Bosnian government] nevertheless continue to stress their refusal of "Fikret Abdic's option."

"My way of resolving the problem of the APZB is the only option left, because the war option turned out to be a failure. Everything we anticipated and what made us sign the declaration on cooperation with the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the declaration of peace with the Srpska republic in October 1993 is still in effect," Fikret Abdic said. Recalling the time when the APZB was created, he noted that the declaration with the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna was signed in the presence of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman while the declaration with the Srpska Republic was signed in the presence of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic—it featured his cosignature and his obligation to fight for its implementation.

He added that the declaration on relations with Herceg-Bosna was successfully implemented until the signing of the "Washington Agreement", whereupon Croatia's policy took a sharp turn.

"I have to say that since it was signed the declaration on peace with the Srpska republic has been implemented 100 percent and I want to refute all the accusations from the Sarajevo authorities that this document was treacherous for the Muslim people," he said. This was enough for international organizations to describe the whole situation as an inter-Muslim clash and to maintain an allegedly impartial position."

"The international organizations are not even remotely aware that we in the APZB leadership can contribute most to the restoration of peace in this area. Our policy draws on the continuity of relations and cooperation with the Srpska republic, something that was demonstrated in the latest events.

According to Abdic, it is now up to Yasushi Akashi and other officials of the United Nations and other international organizations to find a solution to the crisis in the APZB territory on the basis of the declaration of peace signed by the Srpska republic and the APZB.

Speaking about the latest offensive by the 5th Corps of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina army in the Bihac area, Abdic said that the 5th Corps' unrealistic assessment of its own strength was the basis of their attempt to solve the crisis in western Bosnia by military means.

"The overestimated strength of the 5th Corps blocked the interests of those people in western Bosnia who believe that the crisis in the area can be solved through negotiations," he said.

According to Abdic, that assessment showed no consideration for either the interests or the victims of its own people.

"They (the 5th Corps) publicly announced the offensive toward Bosanska Krupa and then Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, and Banja Luka, and eventually the intention to link up with the 7th Corps (of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army) via Ripac."

He recalled that 5th Corps Commander Atif Dudakovic's intentions to launch an offensive were publicly announced in the media, and the campaign was stepped up when the Sarajevo authorities believed that a military solution was possible.

"That was a wrong approach to solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Abdic stressed. "While their (the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's) campaign was successful, they were handing out awards and recommendations, but now when the Srpska republic army has repelled the 5th Corps in a counteroffensive, they are calling on international organizations to help them."

The APZB president said that in their military actions the Srpska republic showed restraint toward the territory of western Bosnia, bearing in mind that the area which under the declaration [of peace] belongs to the province is in fact larger than the area held so far by the 5th Corps.

"They (5th Corps) tried to enforce what the APZB already obtained with the declaration [of peace] signed with the Srpska republic," he said.

If there had been no offensive, there would have been no counteroffensive; it would have not become obvious how important western Bosnia is for overall peace, not only in this area but throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, Abdic believes.

"They (the 5th Corps) hate, of course, the fact that the Srpska republic army is not calling Alija Izetbegovic's soldiers to surrender only to them, but also to the People's Defense of the APZB," he said. "But they and everyone else must accept the fact that both we and the Srpska republic are invoking the same declaration and that our relations are based on the declaration."

He said that despite the changed relations with the Croats after "the Washington Agreement" the interests of the Croats in the APZB were still respected.

"We have recently reviewed the position of the Croat people in our territory because we want to prevent any attempt at undermining relations between the Muslim and the Croat nations. We have the Serb side's full support for this."

In his latest letter to Akashi, Abdic categorically claimed that the autonomous status of western Bosnia is a reality and that "neither the APZB nor Fikret Abdic as its president and the unconstitutionally ousted member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency can be ignored."

"I suggested a draft solution to the crisis in the APZB area based on the Declaration on Peace signed by our region and the Srpska republic in October 1993," he said. "The fact that we, both in the APZB and the Srpska republic, invoke this declaration is a real element in our relations, hence this is also the basis for a solution for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina."

He claims that everything he has done and all that is included in the declaration is a way to protect the Muslim people. "It is a fact that in this way a larger area can be secured and that war as a solution is ruled out, while facilitating production and work in this area."

Citing the constitutional principles, he said that the APZB will regulate everything the moment the clash with the 5th Corps is resolved and the region demilitarized.

Abdic says in conclusion that the constitutional principles of the APZB, the declaration signed with the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, and the declaration on peace with the Srpska republic, must be revived in order to restore peace in western Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mostar EU Administrator on Resolving Differences

LD0212230894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2237 GMT 2 Dec 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 2 (TANJUG)—E.U. Administrator for Mostar Hans Koschnik said Friday the E.U. administration could not resolve the Muslim-Croat dispute over the forming of a joint city police force.

Croatian radio quoted Koschnik as telling a press conference in Mostar that it was also impossible to resolve the problem of setting up municipal organs and organizing lessons in schools before the top Croat and Muslim representatives agreed on these issues. Koschik said the European Union administration would deal with matters concerning the reconstruction of Mostar's infrastructure until the federation officials agreed on these other issues.

Koschnik confirmed that representatives of Mostar Croats and Muslims have been invited to Brussels for talks with top E.U. officials. The Croat and Muslim officials will not attend any new negotiations, but will be asked to explain what is happening concerning the realization of the memorandum on understanding which specified the procedure for normalizing life in Mostar, he said.

Mostar is one of the cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina over which Croat and Muslim forces fought bitterly before the two sides agreed to form a binational federation in Bosnia in March this year, under strong pressure from the United States.

Mostar was placed under E.U. administration this summer. The administration was entrusted with normalizing life in the city and organizing joint Muslim-Croat institutions.

Tudjman on Chile Visit, Bihac, Serb Accord

LD0312220394 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1908 GMT 3 Dec 94

[News conference by President Franjo Tudjman with unidentified foreign and domestic correspondents at Zagreb airport on 3 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Mr. President, at the beginning I would like to ask you to comment on and assess your visits to Chile and Argentina.

[Tudjman] Our state delegation's visit to Chile and Argentina was very successful and fruitful for the future development of overall relations with the two republics, where we have friends, allies, who are ready to support Croatian views in the United Nations; both countries are ready for cooperation in economic, political, scientific, technological, cultural, and sports spheres.

Talks with Presidents Frei and Menem and top Chilean and Argentinian officials have shown their surprising familiarity with our problems and readiness in every respect for the development of cooperation in the most delicate areas. As you know, agreements have been signed; it is not necessary to repeat that, as our public already knows about it.

Of particular importance was our meeting with the numerous Croatian expatriots both in Chile and Argentina, who enjoy great respect both in Chile and Argentina. As you know, nowhere else are Croatian emigrants so involved in political, business, scientific, and cultural life as in Chile. As we know, the richest Croat lives in Chile, one of the 100 richest persons in the world; two Croats in Chile were presidential candidates; at the moment, we have two ministers and two deputy ministers of Croatian ancestry. I would also like to mention a surprising fact about Chile: 102 writers in Chile are of Croatian origin.

As you can see, Croats are present in the overall life of Chile, Chileans respect them, and they are a link with Croatia and influence our relations with that republic, which is now resolutely pursuing the democratic path, a path of developing democracy; our relations will in every case be fruitful.

The same goes for the important influence of the Croatian emigrants in Argentina. There they are not so active in political life, but are likewise respected. Croats used to emigrate there even some 200 years ago, but particularly after World War II. Those who are well-known are: Mihanovic, who initiated the development of navigation; a number of Croats who were there before, such as Buratovic, who developed telegraph connections; Vucetic, who made a contribution to international dactyloscopy; and the Bencic brothers are prominent architects there. But also now, we have two admirals in the Argentinian army, Supisic and Barbic, who are Croat descendents and who in that way facilitate understanding of Croatian problems in a way that we can only wish for. In both countries we have friends, allies; we can count on them and they expect an initiative from us for concrete relations.

Our meeting with the expatriates was particularly important because, I would say, the visit to Chile and Argentina, our meetings in many places with many of our expatriates, cemented the reconciliation between Croatia and its diaspora, which had enabled and facilitated the establishment of a democratic Croatia and unselfishly helped us in the patriotic war. We met many people who had been on the front, who are ready to return to the land of their ancestors. Therefore, our delegation's visit to friendly Chile and Argentina was certainly successful and fruitful.

It is now up to our authorities and representatives both here and there to implement what we had agreed upon politically, as well as the talks conducted by our Industry Minister Nadan Vidosevic with businessmen of Croatian extraction and the Chileans and Argentinians.

The existing interest should not only remain on paper, but should be implemented for the sake of bilateral relations between Croatia and Chile, Croatia and Argentina. We also pointed out that Croatia, owing to its geostrategic position, the stability of its economy, and its democratic system, can be used by these countries as their gateway to central and eastern Europe.

We expressed our gratitude to these countries for accepting and giving refuge to many Croatian expatriates, since the last century, and also told them we are proud of the fact that sons of the Croatian nation have made such a great contribution to the comprehensive political, economic, and cultural development of these countries.

Presidents Frei and Menem accepted our invitations to pay official visits to Croatia, and this will be fixed through regular diplomatic channels.

Deputy Prime Minister Granic held separate talks with the foreign ministers; in all, this was a very interesting but strenuous week with a rich program. It was very interesting to learn about these countries and meet our people, and to realize how officialdom in faraway Latin America knows about Croatia, respects Croatia, and extends absolute support to it in the sense of Croatia's territorial integrity. Argentina will be taking over the chairmanship of the UN Security Council in the new year, and they are ready, diplomatically and otherwise, to cooperate closely with Croatia. Croatia—this was evident wherever we went—has a reputation; this was also obvious in our meetings with the representatives of other countries—Europe, America, the world in general—we realized that Croatia has an excellent reputation because of its principled policies, the stability of its democratic system, and the results of its economic revival.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, the reports that we are receiving from Bihac indicate that the situation in this town is still very difficult. In your assessment, will the Serbs take this town, and what does Croatia intend to do if this happens? Thank you.

[Tudjman] I have not been informed about the details regarding the current situation over there, but I would like our public to realize that the problem of Bihac and the problem of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the problem of how to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and resolve the crisis, are not the problems of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All this is not a problem of Croatian-Serb, Croatian-Muslim relations, but it is an international problem. We shall continue to conduct the kind of policy which led to the creation of Croatia and which secured its international status, and we shall take no hasty or adventurous steps which would go against the international policy, such as it is, or against the principle international players.

Of course, we shall defend our national and state interests, but will not allow ourselves to be misled. As soon as the main international players reached some sort of accord—it is well- known that the Serb aggressors used the situation in which there was no accord and that the world powers were not unanimous in their proposals for ending the crisis—now when for the first time some sort of accord has been reached between European countries, the United States, and Russia irrespective of differences that still exist—there is a program being proposed in order to end the war and solve the political crisis, in this and that sort of situation Croatia will for its part do everything for this program of the world powers and the international community to be put into practice.

Naturally, within that framework, one should view the signing of the agreement signed in my absence here by Hrvoje Sarinic, the head of my office, as the second step in the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for the reintegration of occupied areas in a peaceful way: first, by opening roads and the oil pipeline, water supply systems, power transmission lines, et cetera, which will be done in a gradual way; a definitive solution will then be attained in phase three—reintegration of the occupied areas in Croatia's constitutional and legal system.

Evidently, the Serbs signed it under pressure from international powers and Belgrade; if they are ready to implement that agreement, it will lead toward a peaceful political solution in normalizing relations with the Serbs in Croatia and Serbia and Yugoslavia as a whole; if not, Croatia will have the entire world behind it and will be free to take the steps necessary in order to return the occupied areas to Croatia.

We shall not take any hasty moves in connection with Bihac and any other cases. We shall do what is necessary and is in the interests of the Croatian nation and the Croatian state as a whole.

Tudjman on Importance of Agreement With Serbs

LD0212195894 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Report by correspondent Ljiljana Bunjevac-Filipovic from Buenos Aires]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the last day of his official visit to Argentina, President Tudjman held a news conference for numerous journalists. Most questions referred to the current political situation in Croatia and the latest agreement signed with the local Serbs:

[Begin Tudjman recording] I consider this agreement an important step, the second step in the reintegration of the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia into Croatia's constitutional and legal system. The first step was the signing of the cease-fire agreement, the second is this one on transport and economic integration, and the third step will encompass overall reintegration. The united international community—all important international players—stand behind this agreement. This should be proof that the Serbs, by signing this agreement, including those who sponsor them in Belgrade, accept the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas into Croatia. This is what is of great importance and benefit for Croatia, that we will not have to make sacrifices for the liberation of these areas, but we will achieve the reintegration of these areas in a peaceful way. [end recording]

Asked why the Croatian Government felt sure that it would not be swindled, as the Bosnian Government was, President Tudjman replied:

[Begin Tudjman recording] Croatia is positive it can achieve the reintegration of the occupied areas into Croatia's constitutional and legal system for two reasons: First of all, Croatia has been internationally recognized by all the countries in the world within its internationally recognized borders. The second reason: Croatia today already has the armed forces capable of returning these areas, if the Serbs put up resistance, with all the means at its disposal, like every other sovereign country. [end recording]

Despite the fact that they are abroad, representatives of the Croatian state delegation are conducting a lively diplomatic activity:

[Begin Foreign Minister Granic recording] We have been in permanent touch with Brussels, Geneva, New York, and Budapest regarding this Contact Group meeting, but also in connection with the forthcoming summit in Budapest. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Cited on Talk With Christopher

LD0212200794 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At the initiative of the president of the Republic, [Foreign Minister] Dr. Mate Granic has had a telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Minister Granic requested of Warren Christopher that, in offering a peaceful solution, he take into account the protection of the Croatian border and its territorial integrity and also the protection of Bihac, stressing that the plan for local autonomy in Croatian areas under UN protection can only be a plan for autonomy in the broadest sense and in no way a solution that might contain within it any elements of a state within a state.

On the U.S. side it was stressed that the basic interests of the Republic of Croatia on questions of territorial integrity and the peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas will be respected.

The United States shares Croatia's concern over the situation in Bihac, in view of the fact that its fall would lead to a fresh, large-scale influx of refugees that would destabilize Croatia, Minister Granic stated, adding that the U.S. side again confirmed that it is against the proposed suspension of sanctions against Belgrade.

Krajina's Mikelic: Economic Deal Unsatisfactory

LD0212203694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2000 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Knin, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic said Friday that neither Krajina nor Croatia got what they sought or wanted from the agreement on economic links.

Mikelic said there was no special reason for expressing extreme satisfaction with the agreement.

Mikelic said all that was accomplished through the agreement 'could have been accomplished in the second stage of negotations,' and said the most difficult task, the implementation of the agreement, was yet to be tackled.

Mikelic said that having signed the agreement, which he said had no political connotations or dimensions, Serb Krajina wanted to show that it was committed to a negotiated resolution of outstanding issues with Croatia.

Mikelic said he believed negotiations on economic issues with Croatia would nevertheless continue, because he said there were many issues that were yet to be solved. The issues in question are routes, railway, humanitarian issues, pensions and other issues, he said.

Mikelic said in order to continue negotiations it was necessary to implement all provisions in the previously reached agreements, just as to observe the Zagreb ceasefire agreement signed March 29.

At a press conference following the signing of the agreement, Mikelic reiterated Krajina's stand that the time had not yet come to negotiate the political settlement of the Krajina-Croatia conflict and that 'Krajina does not want to reintegrate into Croatia.'

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian Constitution.

Croatia was placed under U.N. protection in the spring of 1992.

Mikelic on Ending 'Matters' 'Peacefully'

AU0312200694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Dec 94

[Interview with Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina, by Petko Koprivica; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Koprivica] What will the next steps in Krajina's policy toward Croatia be?

[Mikelic] They will be in the following spirit: We have decided to demonstrate in these very difficult and complicated times—and as you can see the times are highly charged and abundant with war options—to the international community and the world that we are cooperative and that we truly wish to bring matters to an end peacefully. [end recording]

Rules Out Integration With Croatia

AU0312164694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] An economic agreement between the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] and Croatia continues to attract a great deal of the domestic and international public's attention, primarily because it is anticipated that currently existing tensions in relations between Knin and Zagreb will be reduced through its consistent implementation. In expectation of the start to implementation of the agreements reached, various parties are trying to impose political solutions, the debate on which should only take place in the third phase, that is, after the realization of the economic agreement.

RSK Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic stated for domestic and foreign reporters immediately after the signing of the agreement that the time is not yet ripe for negotiations on political solutions. When he was asked, in connection with this, to comment on a statement by U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Galbraith that the so-called mini-Contact Group had compiled a draft political agreement between the RSK and Croatia, Borislav Mikelic stated the following for Radio Belgrade:

[Begin Mikelic recording] When I was making a statement after the conclusion of the first round of economic negotiations in Knin today, at the end I said among other things—when I was told that Mr. Sarinic had said that the economic agreement would be realized with difficulty if political issues were not realized—that RSK integration with Croatia is out of the question, regardless of whether Galbraith, Kerestedzhiyants, or any other ambassadors who have worked on any of the political solutions thought so. Actually, I do not have this document yet, I have not received it yet to see what their line of thinking regarding a possible political solution might be. However, this will probably only be a document for discussion, for debate.

The resolve of the RSK leadership and people is known. The fact that we made concessions regarding the peace agreement on cease-fire and economic issues does not mean that we will accept political solutions, too. It goes without saying that the existing encirclement is definitely a problem for the RSK as well as the Contact Group which is working on the problem of finding a solution for the RSK. Regarding this, it will greatly depend on the kind of joint future that Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, and naturally the RSK has tomorrow.

What I can say is the following: Croatia has won international recognition within its borders and this is the only thing it has, but this is just a formality on paper. Everything else is actually in the hands of the RSK people, starting with the territory and the fact that this is their ethnic territory. They have not occupied anything here because they have never had a reason to occupy it because it was their property. Nobody came here from Vojvodina, Kosovo, Serbia, or other regions. The people who live here have lived here in the past and this fact must become manifest in Europe and the world.

On the other hand, it goes without saying that the problem they are trying to impose is one that the RSK has been realizing since about 1991, also in a peaceful manner. [sentence as heard]. The RSK carried out no aggression. However, the opposite was true for the other side. This means that resolution of issues that are only now arriving on the agenda is definitely a complex process during which the leadership, parliament, and all RSK factors will have the chance to address people and the international community with their arguments. [end recording]

Serb Krajina Mobilizes Additional Forces

LD0312125494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1151 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—The information service of the president of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] announced today that a session of the supreme defense council was held in Knin last night at which the military and security situation in the republic was reviewed.

It was established that the current situation has been aggravated by the general mobilization in Croatia and the concentration of their troops along the border, as well as by Croatia's open threats and attempts to find any pretext to launch an attack against the RSK.

Croatia has amassed troops and military equipment in the region of Biograd na moru and Crvena Luka.

As the statement says, this has prompted the Krajina security bodies to carry out the additional mobilization in the RSK for preventive purposes and to create conditions for an effective response to a possible attack.

The supreme defense council has denied all speculations about other reasons for the mobilization and described them as destabilizing. As was said, some mistakes made during the mobilization are only isolated incidents and they will soon be examined and adequate measures will be taken.

The RSK's internal situation was described as satisfactory, considering the exceptionally complex external circumstances the state is facing.

The supreme defense council members welcomed yesterday's signing of the agreement on economic relations with Croatia and gave their full support to its implementation. They assessed that it will be impossible to make progress in the implementation of the economic agreement unless the Zagreb cease-fire agreement is strictly observed.

Analyzing the inter-Muslim clashes in the Bihac region, the supreme defense council assessed that forces loyal to Fikret Abdic are trying to return to their homes, and in that context the Serb army of Krajina has only one task—to protect the state borders and prevent the spreading of the war into RSK territory.

'Powerful' Explosion Reported at Zagreb Heliport

LD0312233394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 3 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Republic's Information Center has announced that an explosion took place in Lucko at 2200. The fire brigade and ambulance have been sent to the scene.

The powerful blast southwest of Zagreb was heard in most parts of the city. Reporters assembled at the heliport in Lucko could not get any official information on the explosion. The windows of the building across the street from the main entrance to the heliport were shattered, while a fire engine and two ambulances came out of the heliport itself.

The military police and members of the Interior Ministry are deployed at the entrances, securing the scene and barring access to the heliport. Interior Minister Ivan Jarnjak has also arrived on the scene.

Four Cooperation Agreements Signed With Albania

LD0212210294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatia and Albania share views on all problems in this part of Europe and stress that political and economic relations between the two countries are very good. This was stated by the prime ministers of Croatia and Albania, Nikica Valentic and Aleksander Meksi, during their final talks at the end of the Albanian delegation's two-day visit to Zagreb.

The two countries condemned the Serbian aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the occupation and maltreatment of the Albanians in Kosovo. They suggested to the international community that it should help solve the problems in the territory of the former Yugoslavia—according to the principles of the inviolability of borders and the protection of minorities in line with the world standards. The two delegations condemned ethnic cleansing and the destruction of towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially Bihac. It was reiterated that Croatia should restore its pre-war borders only through peaceful means.

After the talks, they signed four inter-state agreements: the agreements on sea and road traffic; on avoiding double taxation; and on cooperation in the field of science and technology. The prime ministers agreed that the signed agreements would contribute to better cooperation.

INA [Croatian oil company] is already engaged in big business deals in Albania, and Koncar's factories are working there from an earlier period. Albania has now offered to Croatian firms to build its infrastructure, agriculture, hydroelectric plants, tourist facilities, roads, and railway lines.

This afternoon the Albanian delegation had a meeting with their compatriots from Croatia. They also opened the building of the Albanian embassy in Zagreb.

The Albanian delegation left Zagreb aboard a special plane. Croatian Prime Minster Nikica Valentic saw them off.

Commentary Views U.S. Ambassador's Behavior

AU0512105294 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 29 Nov 94 pp 20-21

[Commentary by Gordan Nuhanovic: "Welcome Visitor's Flirting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the Croatian and the Serbian delegation were studying the proposed agreement on economic issues point by point, one of the sponsors of the negotiating mission, Mr. Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, hurriedly left the room in which the talks were held at the Zagreb airport of Pleso. Several minutes later a part of the curious negotiators saw the U.S. ambassador jogging slowly toward the exit door of the airport, dressed in a white T-shirt and sports pants and accompanied by several bodyguards, who, driving a black limousine, kept a decent distance from the ambassador.

An hour and a half later the ambassador, after taking a shower, came to the negotiating table again, the only thing that attracted attention was his somewhat disorderly knotted tie. Some of the exhausted negotiators cast a confused glance at him.

Galbraith completed his "out-of-schedule" jogging and the negotiations were no closer to ending than at the moment he left. Galbraith's recreation at the height of negotiations over the agreement, which has in the meantime been rejected by the Serbian side, provoke somewhat bizarre connotations. A part of the Croatian negotiating team claimed that this was as bizarre as Galbraith's latest initiative for a secret meeting with the Croatian opposition in his residence, which was organized ad hoc and which surprised even the Croatian opposition leaders.

In the view of some of the negotiators, the seemingly benign jogging of the U.S. ambassador very transparently marked his style and the type of his engagement in the peace process in Croatia. He is said to be not only an "insatiable consumer" of amateur jogging but—if we follow these still very shy opinions—he is becoming an increasingly important consumer of power as his term of office in Croatia progresses. "The consumption of power" also includes the fact that Mr. Galbraith has made a selection of the parliamentary opposition.

Last week's "party for the opposition" at Galbraith's residence was commented on by those opposition leaders who were not invited. Racan's SDP [Party of Democratic Changes] and HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] leaders simply could not believe that they were not invited. Racan, convinced that he was invited, decided to check whether the invitation was lost somewhere at the U.S. Embassy or in the administration office of the Parliament. There was no invitation, however. Some of the HND members, sharing the opinion of their colleagues from the SDP, lamented the "sad situation in which ambassadors influence public opinion about the opposition."

What went on behind the closed doors of Galbraith's residence? Whereas Savka [Dabcevic-Kucar] and Budisa gave a highly mysterious impression, Mrs. Mira Ljubic-Lorger was somewhat more talkative about the three-hour conversation with Galbraith. Mrs. Lorger said that it was an informal exchange of views, and not, as a part of the Croatian public tried to interpret it, a "session" in which the U.S. ambassador gave instructions. The topics under discussion included details of the Croatian-Serbian negotiations, from the opening of roads toward Dalmatia and the Zagreb-Belgrade highway to the political solution to the UN Protected Areas [UNPA's] problem in Croatia. Mrs. Lorger did not conceal the talks with Galbraith concerning the opposition's already well-known stand on the negotiations with the Serbs, namely that this represented a subtle "stabbing of the Bosniak partner in the back."

Testing of the Opposition

Mrs. Lorger, the chairman of the Dalmatian Action, also claimed that Galbraith agreed with the assessment that the negotiations at the Zagreb airport of Pleso were organized at the wrong moment because of the Krajina Serbs' invasion of the Bihac pocket. And all this allegedly without any kind of persuasive ambitions (!).

A somewhat more experienced politician than Mira Ljubic-Lorger, Mrs. Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, who was recently elected life chairman of the HNS [Croatian National Party], was not convinced that the aim of this hastily organized "party" at Galbraith's was only "an exchange of opinions." The urgency of the meeting, on which the U.S. ambassador's administration insisted, implied some "intriguing thoughts." The impression was created that the well-informed Galbraith was trying to test the opposition views in connection with the NATO air strikes against the Udbina airport.

Budisa telegraphically stated that Galbraith actually made what the Croatian president should have done—he called for the "consolidation of the Croatian political body." Speculation went even further, though. The NATO intervention was in the view of some politicians "an announcement that a green light would come soon for Croatia to start military operations [against Krajina]." And this from the United States! The same sources even dared to state that Galbraith's "taking the opposition's pulse" followed a sign given by Tudjman. The fact that the HND and the SDP were not invited, although they are despite everything still a part of the Croatian opposition, is explained with their allegedly hard attitude toward both the Croatian-Bosnian alliance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and toward the resuming of the talks with Serbia and the Serbs from the UNPA's.

In other words, if there was really some kind of connection to Tudjman's office, Galbraith made the selection according to the principle of whether a certain Croatian opposition party is cooperative or not. According to this logic, the SDP and the HND were not welcome. The selection should, allegedly, at the same time have enabled Tripalo's Social Democrats to participate in the meeting at the expense of Racan's SDP.

High Degree of Consensus

The current confusion in the Croatian opposition, caused by the informal meeting in Galbraith's residence, has resulted in quite concrete political repercussions on the Croatian political [illegible]....

"Galbraith's mission," as his meeting with the opposition is called, was yet another action of the U.S. Embassy in Croatia by which the ambitious Galbraith has been trying to establish personal relations in Croatia. Galbraith's report to the State Department on the results of his secret talks with the Croatian opposition leaders could contain the information that there is a high degree of consensus between the opposition parties, the information on the present negotiations with the Serbs from the UNPA's, and the information on some issues concerning the Croatian-Muslim federation and the confederation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we neglect the fact that Galbraith received incomplete information because the HND and the SDP chairmen were not present at the meeting, there remains the question whether he wanted full information at all. As an experienced politician, who "made his first steps" in the esteemed Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate, Galbraith knows very well where the real limits of the Croatian opposition are, since it has a considerably smaller number of members than the ruling party and, apart from that, consists of various political colors.

When Mr. Weisel, the German ambassador to Croatia, tried to assess some official Croatian moves in an interview some time ago, there followed a series of negative reactions. The question now is whether Galbraith is too free in interpreting his mission to Croatia. A part of the "unhappy" members of the opposition are ready to criticize his behavior as the U.S. ambassador to Croatia. Just like Weisel some time ago, Galbraith, too, has not held back from judging the power of the Croatian Army lately. This power is in his view too small for a victory over the army of the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Galbraith in other words suggests to the Croatian public that Croatia can only "try to reintegrate its regions with political means."

Both a part of the opposition and circles close to the government share the opinion today that such public statements issued by legitimate representatives of foreign authorities are a step toward a subtle involvement into internal matters and thus a violation of their powers, even if the states in question are those with which Croatia has relations that are more than only procedural. We would, however, say that sovereignty is one and relations between partners another matter....

Three Times in Vukovar

After U.S.-Croatian relations were established and Peter Galbraith appointed U.S. ambassador to Croatia, this Harvard and Oxford graduate succeeded in creating the image of a very active diplomat in the Croatian diplomatic corps. Galbraith made the effort to confirm the deep-rooted picture the average Croatian citizen has about "the U.S. omnipresence." He visited Vukovar as many as three times, where he did not restrain from visiting several refugee camps. He travelled to Zadar, Dubrovnik and Prevlaka, showing special interest in the Croatian villages in Konavle burnt down during the war.

Wherever he went he adhered to his good diplomatic style and confirmed that he was a welcome visitor, an attribute he earned by talking to ordinary people. Peter Galbraith soon became somewhat more than only a foreign diplomat. Therefore there are only a few people who would not forgive him even more serious "escapades" than jogging at an inconvenient moment, or "flirting" with the opposition. A weekly commented that Galbraith's service in Croatia is the best testing ground for taking a run for a leap into the White House. Still, Galbraith's career is one thing, and the interests of the state in which he promotes them is another.

Reorganization Within Ruling Party Analyzed

95BA0028A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 1 Nov 94 pp 16-17

[Article by Cedo Buzancic: "Tectonic Upheavals on the Political Map"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Although it is unrealistic to expect that the opposition could threaten the primacy of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] anytime soon, certain internal party reorganizations nevertheless demonstrate that this time, the ruling party is planning seriously on a possible tough game.*

Although there is no doubt at all that a sort of two-party system has been set up on the Croatian political scene (with only two truly respectable parties, the HDZ and to some extent the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party]), nevertheless, contrary to some expectations, an "internal formula" for the parliamentary game has not yet been found.

On the left wing, Tripalo and Degen are showing that their attempts to get the newly founded Action of Social Democrats [AS] into parliament could be achieved quite easily, just as easily as the fact that that entry could mean the collapse of the left on the Croatian political scene for a rather long period. Specifically, the AS's entry through a transfer of the former deputies of other parties by no means implies the simultaneous transfer of support by the electorate, which undoubtedly does not favor that kind of manipulation of their elections "above the voters' ballots." A "commando" entry into the Assembly by such a "strange company" that would bring in through the front door of Croatian political life, along with some former SDP [Party of Democratic Changes] members like Ivan Matija, Ivan Siber, or Stjepan Ivanisevic, some like the "incorrigible ultraleftist" Lino Veljak, and Bogdan Denic, Dragutin Palasek, Ivo Druzic, or Vjeran Zuppe, could hardly cushion the national image of Mika Tripalo, who, by the way, is increasingly thinner and paler, against the rage of the electorate. That sort of entry by Tripalo's party into the Assembly hall could mean not an indication of imminent unification for the left, as Tripalo and Degen so self-confidently announced, but rather a "stagnation" of the left to the point that it would lose any political significance. Several percent of the voters' support, as well as the established identity of the Croatian left, which is now maintained by Racan's and Tomic's SDP combined with Vujic's SDH [Social Democrats of Croatia], could easily be further "dissolved" as a sort of "en bloc" reaction by the Croatian electorate to certain AS names which arouse unpleasant associations with political corpses.

On the right wing, the "death throes" have already lasted so long that when the "right" is mentioned in a serious political conversation, as a rule the "right-wing conservative faction within the HDZ" is meant, since no one considers the fragmented and mostly nonparliamentary parties of Rightist [HSP, Croatian Rights Party] provenance to be a serious political factor any longer, especially since the appointment of Bosiljko Misetic, since recently a leader of the nonparliamentary right wing coalition, to the Croatian Foreign Ministry has clearly shown that in the future as well, one should not expect the right wing to be able to represent any sort of incubator any longer for possibly reinforcing the HDZ's personnel lists, and especially since the right wing, without concealing its disagreement with some measures by the current Croatian authorities, has nevertheless avoided entering into a clash with the entire HDZ, i.e., without touching upon the national leadership strategy per se and the very summit of political power. Although according to most polls the HSP is technically the third largest party in terms of the number of potential voters, things are virtually no better for the oldest Rightist party on the Croatian political scene. By joining an "ad hoc coalition" with the HDZ, the HSP confirmed more that the HDZ had no problem finding a partner whenever it wanted than it thereby proved its own political importance.

Rivals' Plans Shaken

The HND [Croatian Independent Democrats], HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], IDS [Istrian Democratic Alliance], and the HNS [Croatian People's Party], which in the best of cases could jointly win the support of a fifth of the electorate, constitute only a marginal part of the center at which the HDZ and the HSLS consequently reign supreme. After the turmoil in Pankretic's HSS, which after the past two years has definitely shown that tradition cannot compensate for a lack of proclaimed and recognizable political ideas, from all indications, a period of redefining political strategy awaits the HNS. Specifically, after Mika Tripalo's departure as leader, Savka is also withdrawing, and the internal party battle among the four candidates for the position of party president, of course, does not benefit its current political strength.

At the level of the short-term balance of power, that means that the HDZ has succeeded in avoiding the collapse of the current system of a division of party authority in parliament, and in preventing the transfer of its more important state and party duties to the rival HSLS (or to the HND); at the same time, in doing so, by coexisting with some opposition parties, or even coopting members of some other parties, as was recently the case with three leaders of the Croatian Christian Democratic Union, it has undoubtedly succeeded in shaking up the political plans of all its other political rivals. Nevertheless, although it is unrealistic to expect that the opposition, in view of its strength, could (again) threaten the HDZ's current primacy, certain internal party reorganizations still show that this time, the ruling party is seriously planning for a possible tough game....

Specifically, although the end of the boycott of the Assembly by the opposition parties, and the HSP's departure from the opposition bloc, have substantially injured the credibility and political strength of the entire opposition "coalition," the departure of Stipe Mesic and Josip Manolic, in spite of the successfully halted "exodus," seems to have nevertheless seriously disrupted the internal party balance within the ruling party, opening up some deep tectonic disturbances, which itself has contributed to the fact that the party rotations that began back in the summer are assuming unstoppable dimensions. The reason for this is obviously that the marginalization of the minor "satellite parties," some of which are even holding seats in the present parliament, is threatening to create room precisely for the HDZ's strongest political rival, the HSLS. Specifically, in the first elections in 1990 the HDZ defeated not only what was then the SDP [Party of Democratic Reform], which at that time was still saturated to a considerable extent with personnel from the former regime, but also the centrist civil stratum which mainly voted for the Coalition of National Agreement, i.e., parties which either gradually disappeared from the political scene or transferred their voters to the centrist parties, and whose votes the HSLS might get today.

Opening Room for the Government

Consequently, it seems, the general situation is slowly maturing to a level at which an evolutionary gap over the modus operandi to date can be perceived in both the ruling party and the opposition parties.

Specifically, obviously not even the HDZ can be satisfied with its current superiority, because as a result of the schism within the party and the public discrediting of several actions by the ruling party, the erosion of political distrust is seriously threatening to have an impact on even the top leadership, in which case the burden of guilt would also have to borne by the "untouchable" levels, which have so far been protected with great difficulty. Specifically, if one accepts that fear has been spread among the public about an unfavorable solution from the so-called Z-4 mini-contact group, which was supposed to prepare a plan for including the UN Protected Areas in the Croatian legal system; if one accepts that the negotiations to date, from the Zagreb agreement, through Sarinic's trip to Knin, to these latest ones a few days ago in Zagreb, have been greeted by the public with extreme animosity; and if one adds to this the latent social dissatisfaction that culminated in the teachers' strike—of the several strong arguments on which optimistic electoral assessments could be based, the HDZ is left with the most important one: There is no inflation. Consequently, the period of relative social peace, which has not yet been disrupted—while waiting for strategic solutions for Croatian everyday reality, i.e., the expiration of the deadline given to the UN Protection Force and the international community's adoption of a new plan—should be used as "timing" for radical measures in the structure of the state administration. Vladimir Seks' assumption of the position of vice president of the Assembly and some of his actions show that not only will nothing come of the expected clash between the "right-wing faction" and the "technomanagers," but instead Seks's transfer could be a successful move aimed precisely at disciplining the HDZ's own party factions, calming the internal HDZ turmoil, and to the extent possible creating room and ensuring the unhindered implementation of the government's program, as currently the strongest levers for state policy on the internal level. It is hard to say whether Seks has received strict instructions, but it seems that his role is primarily to open up the entire available space for maneuvers which should ensure the most flexible approach possible to conducting party policy within the Assembly, and allowing his party to avoid serious breaches, at least from that side, before the elections.

Closure of the Internal Conflict

The demand by 40 HDZ deputies that the Assembly begin a public discussion of illegalities "in transformation and privatization" can therefore be considered the "dot on the I" for the conflict within the HDZ, but also a possible indication that the HDZ views the issues related to solving this problem, which is shaking Croatia all the way up to the very top leadership, as a crucial situation whose possible postponement again would almost certainly mean an additional exacerbation of the possible problem, and thus also moving away from the program of national economic consolidation. Specifically, after halting inflation, according to the government's plans the next stage was supposed to be an attempt to straighten out financial discipline and the situation in the financial market and among public enterprises, and to increase the growth in production; this is also stated in the letter of intent that the government sent to the International Monetary Fund. Since the confidence of international financial circles cannot be encouraged with possible social upheavals, which is why the government reacted so harshly to the recent strikes, this kind of development of the situation, of course, requires that it be fully prepared for possible upheavals in the sphere of social-welfare policy.

Of course, it remains to be seen whether this also means, at the same time, new methods in the parliamentary game, characterized by less reliance upon mere numerical superiority and the naked strength of the voting machine, and more upon the issue of who will have how much political strength and maintain his credibility in articulating the question "What kind of Croatia?" The first one to confront this was apparently Prime Minister Valentic himself, at the beginning of the fall session, when his threat that the entire cabinet would resign if the Chamber of Deputies refused the request to confirm the government's authority to issue decrees with the force of law for another year, or over the controversial pension for ministers, turned into a conciliatory "briefing" before the Croatian parliament's deputies.

What Kind of Croatia?

If the last two years in Croatian political life were marked by the issue of neither war nor peace—and accordingly even half of the Assembly deputies mostly consented to the role of an impotent and often even resigned observer of the actions and measures of the executive branch, and the other half consented to the role of a voting machine—then, judging by the beginning of the fall, the upcoming period could also mean not only the end of the period of the marginalization of the Assembly (which has yielded its legislative functions not only to the government but also to some extra-constitutional bodies), but also a gradual strengthening of its hitherto minor role in articulating and conducting national policy.

The question "What kind of Croatia?", which has been heard for a long time now from virtually all sides, represents a point which will apparently be the framework of the future political competition. Of course, the ruling party is asking the question primarily from the standpoint of a lever for the legislative, political, and executive authorities, i.e., from the standpoint of creating the most secure prerequisites possible for harmonious functioning among the Assembly, the state president, and the government, whereas the opposition is raising the question from the standpoint of its own ability to create a credible program that, in a little more than a year and a half, could become the deciding motive in front of an electoral ballot.

Gligorov Tells EU No Negotiations on Name

LD0212173094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1638 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov today said The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] was ready to continue negotiations in its dispute with Greece, but not about the name of the new Macedonian state.

Gligorov said this in his talks with the state secretary in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helmut Schaefer, and the deputy secretary general of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of European issues, Claude Martin, who are paying a one-day visit to Skopje.

It was announced this afternoon that the talks were devoted to "current relations between FYROM and the European Union [EU], cooperation, and security in the region" of the Balkans.

Gligorov expressed his hope that the EU could assist FYROM, which is incurring huge losses due to the international economic embargo against Yugoslavia and the trade blockade imposed by Greece. [passage omitted]

Economic Situation 'Drastic'; Production Falls

LD0212184694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 2 Dec (TANJUG) Production in the metal and electrical engineering industry in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] has fallen by a third in the past nine months of 1994. At times only 10 percent of capacity is used, Skopje papers write today.

The drastic fall in production and exports (by 28 percent) has led to 7,500 workers being laid off and six companies with around 2,500 employees going bankrupt.

The main reason for this dire situation is the transport and trade blockade of FYROM, the loss of the traditional market in the former Yugoslavia, and reduced investment.

There are 184,000 unemployed and around 70,000 workers whose companies have gone bankrupt in FYROM and their number is constantly on the increase.

A total of 450,000 people are employed.

Report Views Changes in Administrative Bodies

AU0212122694 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 1 Dec 94 pp 1,3

[Report by K. Cangova: "The Laws on Government and State Administration Are Changed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yesterday the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] held its fourth session and adopted changes and amendments to the laws on government and state administration, as well as a decision for submitting a request for the country's membership to the World Trade Organization, proposed by the government as urgent. The changes in both legal projects that were adopted by the parliament aim at greater efficiency in the executive power, and an improvement in the speed and quality of work in the state administration, in terms of the constitution of the new government. The reason for these changes was to conform with some constitutional requirements.

The changes in the Law on the government, among other things, define one or more deputy prime ministers that will be elected among the ministers. The Ministry of Information becomes a secretariat. The changes in the administrative bodies mainly consist of a formal renaming of some ministries so as to adapt them to the terminology used internationally, and the Ministry for Urban Planning, Construction Communications, Transportation and Ecology is divided into two ministries.

A long parliamentary discussion preceded the adoption of the changes in the Law on administrative bodies initiated by the Albanian members of parliament. Their discussions referred to some changes that were not proposed by the government in connection with the use of the languages of the nationalities. [passage omitted]

Albanian Leader Threatens 'Hell' if Obstructed

LD0212220394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1916 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Dec. 2 (TANJUG)—An ethnic Albanian leader in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] has threatened the government with "hell" if it obstructs work of a future ethnic Albanian university. FYROM officials said, however, it would be extra-legal to open such a university in the FYROM city of Tetovo.

Ethnic Albanian leader Fadilj Sulejmani said in an interview carried Friday by the NOVA MAKEDONIJA newspaper that ethnic Albanians in FYROM, their parties, and intellectuals, wanted a university in their mother tongue. Sulejmani said that, if necessary, they would all defend it. He said if republican authorities banned the opening of the university, the move would end "in hell, and the parties responsible for it would be the FYROM Government and head of state, Kiro Gligorov.

The university in Tetovo, about 30 km south of the FYROM capital of Skopje, has been scheduled to open 17 December and lectures to start in January.

Tetovo, like a large part of western FYROM, is predominantly populated by ethnic Albanians.

FYROM officials say the initiative is illegal and contrary to the constitution. The officials say ethnic Albanians hold a special, more favorable status in enrolling to FYROM's two universities in Skopje and the town of Bitolj.

The Association of FYROM Ethnologists has recently said the setting up of the university is a perfidious step in bringing about the ethnic Albanian separatist goal in the western part of the republic.

Ethnic Albanian parties in the republic insist that their ethnic community be granted the status of a constituent nation and their language proclaimed an official language, next to the Macedonian.

Ethnic Albanian leaders say their community contributes 40 percent of FYROM population, or double the official census figure published this year.

Ethnic Serbs Want Equal Rights; Census 'Staged'

AU0212152694 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 25 Nov 94 p 2

[Report by Goran Opacic: "New Reasons for Dissatisfaction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 24 November—The national question of the Serbs is looming large again on the political stage of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], after the local Serb leaders announced that they consider the recently disclosed results of this summer's census to be unrealistic and invalid. Last weekend, the head of the state, Kiro Gligorov, stated before the new Assembly that the census had put an end to various arbitrary assessments regarding the ethnic makeup of the local population.

The Constitution of FYROM does not even mention the Serbian people, although there was space in its preamble for Turks and Gypsies, and even for Vlachs, who are, according to the official statistics, considerably fewer by number than the Serbs. So the essence of the problem is not only in those contradictory figures, but also in the feeling of the local Serbs that the authorities are treating them as a socially marginal group.

According to the census, only 39,000 Serbs live in FYROM, while their own estimate is that there are some 250,000 of them. The general explanation given by some local Serbian sources for such a great difference is that the census was staged, as well as that tens of thousands of Serbs were not able to obtain citizenship certificates at the time of the census, because of which they were passed over in this controversial population tally.

The former Assembly ignored the Serbian demands, not only the political ones, but also those regarding education, information, culture, religion, and so forth. After the October elections, the ruling coalition has a two-third majority in the new Assembly, which also means it has the power to correct the constitutional flaws regarding the Serbian question without delay. The government promised the international community as early as in 1993 that it would fulfill some of the Serbian demands.

Although the Democratic Party of Serbs [DPS] and other associations rejected that document, the so-called Minutes of Agreement, as inadequate, it meant an obligation that Skopje took on in front of the CSCE and the International Conference in former Yugoslavia. Skopje also promised that it would ensure rights for the Serbs equal to those of other ethnic communities within 18 months, so there still may be some hope that the promise will be kept within the short period of the next three months. The Serbian leaders doubt this, particularly after the recent assessment by Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski that their party is extremist.

Even a brief look at the demands of the DPS gives a clear insight into the position of the Serbian people, which does not allow itself to be treated as a second-class, insignificant ethnic group. Thus, among other things, the DPS demands that their constitutional status be finally solved and that the electoral law be changed in order to make it possible for Serbs to have their representatives in the parliament. They also demand secondary school education in the Serbian language, the formation of parishes and the right to church services in the Serbian language, subsidies for publishing their own weekly, the right to their own TV program (that has already been given to other nationalities), the establishment of a fund for the preservation of their historic and cultural heritage....

"The DPS demands are a reality that ought to be taken into consideration," the PULS independent weekly from Skopje pointed out recently, adding that ethnic relations are a test of democracy in FYROM.

Whether the new parliament believes in that will be seen in the next several months, when it is supposed to accept (or not) the assessment of its Council for Interethnic Relations that the Serbs' complaints about their unequal participation in that important parliamentary body are justifiable. That would be the first positive sign that the tense interethnic situation here, not only in the case of the Serbs, is beginning to assume a more favorable aspect.

Official Speaks on EU Associate Membership

AU0312193994 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 3 Dec 94

[Report by Sonja Znidarsic]

[FBIS Translated Text] As far as cooperation with the European Union [EU] is concerned, it must be said that we are not waiting completely emptyhanded to become an EU associate member. Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, which had a special economic agreement with what, at that time, was the EEC, Slovenia signed a separate agreement with the EU.

Ivan Majcen from the Slovene Economic Chamber tells us what the privileges gained from this agreement are:

[Begin recording] We must say that these privileges are actually quite extensive because they in many cases exceed those of some states that are already associate members. You know that nearly all exports of industrial production are tariff-free and we actually encounter restrictions only in the export of agricultural production and some restrictions in ferrous metallurgy and textiles. [end recording]

I also asked Ivan Majcen what benefits and disadvantages EU associate membership would bring to our economy:

[Begin ecording] At this time EU associate membership would actually safeguard the continuation of benefits that we enjoy under the present agreement. At the same time this is a mandatory step that all East and Central European countries must go through in order to become full fledged members. However, membership would not bring any revolutionary or new advantages to the economic sector. In principle, it would mean more the opening of our market than our gaining any further privileges. [end recording]

Associate membership or, as some call it, the anteroom, would therefore not bring about any revolutionary benefits. These would only come with full fledged status. We must already be aware that now maximal efforts will be needed, primarily in the sense that our economy would have to become prepared for stiff competition. We must also know that the economy would have to relinquish relatively high protectionist measures and thus the state would lose a lot of its present revenue.

Federal

Jovanovic Views Chances of Bosnian Peace Plan

MS0312094394 London BBC Television Network in English 2230 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Interview with Zivadin Jovanovic, deputy foreign minister of Yugoslavia, by presenter Peter Snow; Jovanovic in Belgrade, Snow in the London studio; from the "Newsnight" program—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] What chance do you think there is of progress on this peace plan when Douglas Hurd and Monsieur Juppe come to Belgrade on Sunday?

[Jovanovic] We are optimistic that the peace process has no alternative. As you know the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has endorsed the Contact Group peace plan which still continues to be a basis for a final peaceful solution. We hope that from a methodical point of view it will be a clear cut position from Brussels that negotiations, dialogue and political means are the only way of solving civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and that sides in the civil war should be absolutely, equally treated. On these presumptions we are optimistic and we hope for a clear cut position from Contact Group in Brussels.

[Snow] But do you think like Mr. Gavriolovic [spokesman for Bosnian Serbs] here in London that the talk of confederal links between Bosnia, Serbia, and Republic of Serbia could be enough to swing Mr. Karadzic behind the peace plan?

[Jovanovic] We certainly think it is essential to give the same rights to Bosnian-Serb entity regarding right of confederation with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as it has been previously given to the Moslem-Croat federation vis-a-vis Croatia. This is absolutely essential and certainly will be stepped forward in the whole peace process.

Committee To Publicize War Crimes Against Serbs

LD0212200094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1649 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG) - A chairman of the Yugoslav committee for collecting data about war crimes said Friday that Yugoslavia must inform the international public about war crimes against the Serbs.

Speaking at a press conference in Belgrade, Zoran Stojanovic, who chairs the committee for collecting information about crimes against humanity and international law, said that war crimes committed against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia in the 1991-1994 period must be disclosed to the world.

The Yugoslav Government on Thursday adopted the fourth report on war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1994 with 156 new and documented cases of war crimes against the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.

The report would be sent to the UN Secretary-General and would be placed at the disposal of the prosecutor of the Hague-based international war crimes tribunal.

Stojanovic said that "in all cases, listed hearings of witnesses, and nurses, including medical documentation and other material evidence provide sufficient grounds for prosecution."

Reporters on Friday received annexes of the report containing a list of detention camps for Serbs, proof of which are being kept in the committee's archives.

According to the annexes, there are 152 detention camps for Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 47 in Croatia, and 15 in Slovenia.

An annex on foreign mercenaries lists names of foreigners suspected of having been involved in the war in the former Yugoslavia.

Stojanovic said the committee had long been working on cases for the fifth report on war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

The first Yugoslav Government war crimes report contained 130 documented cases and the following two had been supplemented with documents on new war crimes.

Article Views New Overhaul Technology Strategies

95BA0035B Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Sep 94 pp 6-7

[Article by I. Markovic: "In Two Years Instead of Six"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *With last week's signing of a contract, the Technical Administration of the VJ [Army of Yugoslavia] GS [General Staff] entrusted to Pobeda-Remont in Novi Sad the series repair of the OTM-60P armored personnel carrier and infantry combat vehicles. The employees of that Novi Sad repair organization have succeeded in mastering the traditional repair of extremely important military combat vehicles in just two years, which means three times as fast as usual.*

It is probably not necessary to waste too many words on how difficult it is in the present by no means enviable socioeconomic circumstances to find a repair organization that could completely equip itself in a short time to repair complex technical equipment like armored combat vehicles. Nevertheless, the fact that even in these unfavorable times there are people and firms who see every crisis primarily as a great challenge to achieve a new quality has been confirmed by last week's signing of a contract for the series repair of the OTM-60P armored personnel carrier and the BVP M 80 and BVP M 80A infantry combat vehicles between representatives of the VJ GS Technical Administration and Pobeda-Remont from Novi Sad. On behalf of the customer, the VJ GS Technical Administration, the contract was signed by Col. Dr. Sinisa Borovic, the deputy chief, a graduate engineer, and on behalf of the contractor, the one who will do that complex technical job, by Goran Micovic, a graduate machinery engineer, the director of Pobeda-Remont in Novi Sad.

The signing of that extremely significant contract was also attended by Major General Ratomir Milovanovic, assistant chief of the VJ General Staff for rear services, who said on that occasion that Pobeda-Remont had started its business dealings with the Army by cooperation with the First Army, and that soon gave rise to the idea of mastering the repair of the two above-mentioned models of armored combat vehicles. General Milovanovic emphasized that it was extremely significant that this very extensive job had been done with investments that were truly minor, and so virtually could not be called investments. The army had simply provided some technical resources, and Pobeda-Remont provided the facilities, people, and intelligence. In conclusion, congratulating the people from Novi Sad on mastering this important job in such a short time, General Milovanovic added that now one should not just dwell on repairs, but instead the experience acquired to date should be used for further work on technical improvements and modifications.

Lt. Colonel Slobodan Vasilic talked to us about the course of the cooperation between the VJ GS Technical Directorate and the Pobeda-Remont firm from Novi Sad:

"Two years ago the army needed someone to be equipped in a short time for general repairs of the two types of armored combat vehicles. After talks with several firms, the VJ GS Technical Administration felt that Pobeda-Remont in Novi Sad could handle that kind of complex repair. And we really were not wrong. The people at that Novi Sad repair firm succeeded in just two years in mastering the traditional repair of extremely important armored combat vehicles. When someone has the fact in his head that abroad, at least five or six years are needed to master such complex repairs, then it is clearer what kind of success is involved."

Lt. Colonel Vasilic added that the results to date of Pobeda-Remont's work have passed all the extremely rigorous inspections of the Technical Testing Center, and that they meet all international quality standards.

We asked its director, graduate machinery engineer Goran Micovic, for the basic information about Pobeda-Remont.

"Our firm Pobeda-Remont is a separate element of our parent firm, Pobeda-Holding. We are thus a separate organization formed for special-purpose programs, i.e., for the Army's needs. We have 80 employees, of whom 20 are highly skilled. Some of the personnel have graduated from the Military Technical Academy. We accepted the general repair of armored transport vehicles in 1992, and in an extremely short time we managed to master the methodology of the traditional repair of these complex machines. It should be emphasized that the traditional repair is the more difficult option, since in contrast to industrial repair, which entails replacing destroyed or worn-out parts, it means saving or regenerating the existing material. That means that we have breathed new life into old, worn-out, or seriously damaged equipment. At any rate, we had the opportunity to make one new personnel carrier out of two seriously damaged ones. What is most important, of course, is that during these two years there were no complaints about what we did in our shops, even though the inspections were more than rigorous.

"Pobeda-Remont also has its own mobile teams of mechanics whom it sends out to the field, i.e., to the units, where they repair breakdowns of armored combat vehicles on the spot. That eliminates expensive transportation to Novi Sad. Naturally, this only applies to breakdowns that can be repaired in the field, and Pobeda-Remont's employees have to take care of the more serious ones in their shops. In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the Novi Sad repair firm is the only one that is doing this kind of repair, not just on the territory of the present Yugoslavia, but also the former one."

Training of Air Defense Command Detailed

95BA0035C Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Sep 94 p 17

[Article by Ceda Milenovic: "A Marksman's Dream"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The artillerymen in Radomir Gordic's unit, headed by Captain Rade Mraovic, achieved the best result in a recent test of combat training—combat fire at targets in the air. The most valuable success was a direct hit on the target from a 40-mm antiaircraft cannon.*

The members of Radomir Gordic's unit brought the aura of being the best out of a recent combat exercise firing at targets on the ground and in the air, competing at Pasuljanske Livade with similar units from Kraljevo, Batajnica, Ponikavo, Nis, and Pristina. They made a direct hit on the target and thus confirmed last year's success—first place among the air defense personnel in the Air Force and Air Defense.

The head of the battery, Captain Rade Mraovic, told us about the unit's life—the goals of training, equipment, the crews' level of training, and other values.

Training is tested at several levels—by the division and brigade commands, and at the end of the year, combat firing is tested by the Air Force and Air Defense command. The unit mostly scored the highest marks in this regard. This year at Pasuljanske Livade combat firing was carried out with 20-mm and 40-mm cannons. Excellent results were achieved, and the crew made a direct hit on the target with a Bofors cannon.

"Hitting a target is far more complicated than hitting a real aircraft," officer Mraovic said "The target is a much less reflective surface, which makes it more difficult for a marksman to track and get an echo from the target; it is far more unstable in comparison with the linear movement of an aircraft, and it is thereby harder to hit."

Success was sensed after the first volleys. The shots rang out. When the turn of marksman Bojan Milenkovic came, all eyes were on him: He made a direct hit on the target.

"We achieved this kind of success primarily due to the good level of training of every individual, and the cohesion of all the crews, which means the entire unit," Capt. Mladen Sljivic told us. "That is because if a single crew member had missed, we would not have scored worthwhile results."

In order to achieve high results—and keep up the tradition, since these young men were also the best in the Air Force and Air Defense last year—thorough training is necessary. The training of marksmen is complex, and requires persistent drilling and a large number of "shots" on a firing trainer. Training is conducted using a target simulator, an Utva aircraft, and modern combat aircraft. The title of marksman is difficult to achieve. The candidates for that position first of all prove themselves as good shots with infantry weapons, and then try their abilities on the trainer, and only then acquire the right to prove themselves as marksmen.

At the end of the firing, the unit commander rewarded the best ones, who will depart on well-deserved leaves in a few days.

"In contrast to previous years, this year a much shorter time was allocated for the entire test, i.e., for combat firing," officer Dusan Dzunic said. "In one swoop we shifted from marching to the arrangement of the camp and to the firing itself, first of all targets in the air, and then on the ground as well, which required the maximum involvement of every individual."

The work paid off, and the victors' "trophy" (an aircraft target) is again in the hands of the air defense personnel from Nis. They kept their promise, given before leaving for the firing, that they would come back with a removed and pierced target.

Serbia

Milosevic Holds Talks With Hurd, Juppe

LD0412195394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1840 GMT 4 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Dec (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe, the British and French ministers of foreign affairs, who arrived in Belgrade this afternoon accompanied by their associates, a statement forwarded to TANJUG says.

In the course of their meeting that lasted for several hours and passed in an atmosphere of mutual openness and understanding, views were exchanged on the most important issues regarding the current political situation on the territory of former Yugoslavia and the course of the peace process.

The importance of principled policy pursued and peace efforts made by Serbia, i.e. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was emphasized, and a joint conclusion reached regarding the progress that came as a result of continuous efforts aimed at creating conditions for the continuation of the negotiating process in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The stances taken by the foreign ministers of the Contact Group—especially with regard to the firm orientation of the international community that the crisis on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina be resolved in political negotiations and not by military means, something that implies the urgent cessation of all hostilities in this area, the prevention of armed provocations, and the abandonment of any military interference and the involvement of NATO, which can only encourage those who favor war and are provoking the escalation of armed clashes—were assessed positively.

The peace plan put forward by the international community is, according to the joint assessment, a basis on which the sides in the conflict should enter into final negotiations on action to divide up territory, including the possibility of exchanges of territory in keeping with bilateral agreements.

Ministers Hurd and Juppe confirmed the positive stance of the international community concerning the equal rights of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Srpska republic to enter into confederal relations with the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], which would be defined in the constitutional arrangement for the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Drawn up in such a way, the comprehensive peace package would represent a reliable vehicle for the equal protection of the rights and interests of all three peoples on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the only way to find a just solution and reestablish peace in the region—something Serbia and the FRY have been advocating since the outbreak of the crisis.

Serbia and the FRY expect the policies of peace and equitable cooperation among states and peoples to be affirmed in the equal position of the FRY in the work of international organizations and institutions, and that the imposed limitations in this respect—including the sanctions—be removed in the nearest future.

The talks between President Milosevic, British Minister Hurd, and French Minister Juppe were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic.

Milosevic Comments

AU0412204294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Dec 94

[Statement by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, after talks with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe; in Belgrade on 4 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Permit me first of all to greet our guests—British and French Foreign Ministers, Douglas Hurd and Alain Juppe.

I would like to say that we have held long and very frank talks and exchanges of opinion on all major issues that concern the crisis on the territory of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. I must first put forward my observation that Ministers Hurd and Juppe share completely identical views and approaches to the solution for the Yugoslav crisis. If they allow me, I would also say that their approach, although not quite identical, is very similar to the Russian approach. I am saying this because recently I have had the opportunity to discuss these topical issues with the Russian minister also.

First of all, and most important, what I would like to emphasize and something on which complete agreement exists: Namely, the position of the international community, which is absolutely clear that a military solution to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not exist and that a peaceful solution through negotiations is actually the only alternative, is very good and seems to me to be a major step, For this reason, I believe that regarding the positions of the warring sides and the international community alike, the first and foremost task should be to accomplish a general end to hostilities over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina territory as quickly as possible. I believe that a safe and lasting cease-fire cannot take place if all the forces presently fighting on the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory do not take part in it and in talks about it. This means the forces of the Croatia-Muslim federation, the Croatian forces, the forces of the Croatian Defense Council, Fikret Abdic's forces of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, and naturally, the forces of the Srpska republic. Therefore, I believe that the only effective way of achieving a safe end to hostilities, one that is lasting and sufficiently long to facilitate a peaceful solution and reaffirmation of the peace process, is a solution that will safeguard consensus and certainty of adherence to whatever is agreed by all the military commanders.

If this is accomplished, and I hope that there will be sufficient reason to accomplish this as soon as possible, the conditions for true reaffirmation of the peace process will be created.

In this respect I would say that the Contact Group positions espoused at the Brussels meeting the day before yesterday gave new impetus to the continuation of talks. I would simultaneously like to express my satisfaction with the fact that these explanations and elaboration of the peace plan elements have completely confirmed our interpretation and approach to June's peace plan, when we supported this peace plan. It is evident not merely that the possibility exists of achieving a final territorial division through bilateral changes to the plan, but that the international community qualifies this possibility as favorable. Also, it is undisputable that parallel to this we must immediately undertake to devise a constitutional solution, where the fact that the Contact Group at its highest level confirmed the equal rights of the Croatian-Muslim Federation and the Srpska republic in terms of the possibility of linking up with Croatia and the FRY, respectively, is of great assistance.

I personally believe that the Contact Group needs to link the realization of the entire plan with the devising of a constitutional solution and a solution for the final territorial division, whereupon the plan should actually begin to be implemented once it has been made complete and all-encompassing—when the constitutional solution is known, and when the territorial division on the basis of bilateral talks has been completed.

I believe that in this way and with such a position by the international community there would be leeway for a reaffirmation of the peace process and the continuation of talks. I believe that the international community, in particular, plays a crucial role in this respect.

To conclude, it is evident that the fundamental approach, which is fifty-fifty, as you know, is not one that could be called either pro-Serbian or pro-Muslim; neither can it be said that it is anti-Serbian or anti-Muslim. I believe that each side should embrace this fifty-fifty approach that the Contact Group has offered as its basis, as the basis for the continuation of the peace process and, it seems to me, the basis for the successful completion of the peace process. In this sense, Serbia and the FRY will strive to continue to give their full support to the continuation of the peace process and resolution of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina in a peaceful way rather than to the escalation of war. I believe that a few days ago we were on the brink of the escalation of war, that this danger is to an extent behind us now, and that all sides should now make use of this leeway to escalate the peace process as quickly as possible and reach an overall solution. In this sense our country will give its full support to such a policy of peace.

'No War Solution'

AU0412213994 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Dec 94

[News conference by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, with unidentified correspondents in Belgrade on 2 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Juppe] President Milosevic, Mr. Hurd, and myself have held very long talks, and I believe that these were very useful talks because we had the opportunity to expound and explain our views. First, we confirmed very explicitly our belief that there is no war solution on the battlefield in Bosnia, but only a solution at the negotiating table. Second, Mr. Hurd and I insisted on urgent, and I emphasize this, urgent cease-fire and end to hostilities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The present situation can no longer continue, either as regards the population or as regards the blue berets—the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR], whose position is truly endangered.

[Hurd] Alain Juppe and myself are here because of the tragedy and danger of Bosnia that is looming over us all, especially over the heads of those who live there and whose sufferings we witness daily, but also throughout the Former Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. The people of the FRY are not fully a part of the currents in Europe, they do not and cannot take part in all the activities and thrills that are possible in modern Europe because this tragedy is not resolved yet. There is also a danger to peace, friendship, and cooperation between Russia and the West, among the Balkan countries, and even of misunderstandings and discord in some ways within the North Atlantic organization itself. For all these reasons we must be tenacious in the pursuit of peace.

In Brussels on 2 December all those involved in Contact Group work, and I would say even all those who attended the NATO meeting, agreed on something that is questioned from time to time: We all agreed that there could be no military solution and that the only answer was a negotiated peace settlement. It is crucial to reaffirm that. Then, in the Contact Group we reaffirmed and restated the plan that Alain Juppe and myself examined with President Milosevic when we were last in this building. We are grateful that he receives us now the way he received us then. Between our June meeting and today's, Milosevic accepted very bravely and wisely the Contact Group plan and we acknowledge that. For this reason we are here to brief him and ask him to continue with this acceptance, as he has done today, and to do everything within his power to bring this plan to fruition.

[Correspondent] Mr. Hurd, how do you view Serbia's role in current diplomatic and political attitudes toward peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially President Milosevic's role? Also, how do you see the position of Serbia in the present situation, bearing in mind the issue of sanctions?

[Hurd] As I said, we have acknowledged the role of President Milosevic. He has accepted the Contact Group peace plan, which was not easy to do. He is doing what he can to gain general support for it. I hope, actually, I am sure that this will continue.

Regarding sanctions, they have been alleviated on the basis of what has been accomplished. We are looking forward and expect further progress and then sanctions will be eased further.

[Correspondent] [Question indistinct]

[Milosevic] You know very well that we cannot decide on behalf of the Srpska republic. However, I am convinced that the forces of peace are growing stronger there. I am sure that an even-handed approach that will form the basis for a general peace agreement will benefit all sides. I hope that the arguments will be judged objectively. The arguments in favor of peace, development, and normal life will triumph, I am convinced.

The basis of the proposed plan, with the possibility of all sides agreeing on a constitutional solution as quickly as possible, which will eliminate any fear of being tricked by anyone as concerns a confederation or other specifics of their republic, will be the main argument. In addition to this, there is also the possibility of amending borders on the basis of bilateral negotiations. This will be an adequate argument for the acceptance of the peace process and successful accomplishment of a peace agreement. I hope that these arguments will be understood and that they will form the true basis that will lead to the success of the peace process. Thank you, gentlemen! [end recording]

More on News Conference

AU0412220694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 4 Dec 94

[Report by Jelena Vidic on news conference by French Foreign Minister Juppe, British Foreign Secretary Hurd, and Serbian President Milosevic in Belgrade on 4 December—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] We believe that President Milosevic can play an active role in establishing cease-fire and end of hostilities, Juppe assessed. He pointed out that the basic characteristics of the Geneva peace plan, which President Milosevic had accepted and supported in a principled fashion, continue to remain in force. Juppe explained that this refers to the internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina borders and the agreed division of the territory on the basis 49 versus 51 percent. When the plan is accepted, an opportunity will emerge for the sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina to agree on two issues—the exchange of territories and the constitutional provisions that will treat all sides equally and recognize their right to maintain special relations with neighboring countries, Juppe said.

He added there was also some talk about the situation in Krajina and also that the recently reached agreement on economic cooperation between Knin and Zagreb—which is encouraging as regards the possibilities for the continuation of the peace negotiations—was hailed.

Finally, Juppe said he expected the talks in Bosnia-Herzegovina to resume as quickly as possible, immediately after reaching an agreement on a cease-fire and end to hostilities. [passage omitted]

Douglas Hurd also explained how the Contact Group members envisage further development of the situation. Most importantly, there should be a cessation of hostilities and cease-fire. We also discussed, Hurd said, the situation in Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo, the obstructed movement of UN Protection Force units, and the risks that have become intolerable for the members of the peace forces. We concluded that the peace process cannot be continued while such a situation prevails on the ground.

The second step in the development of the situation, Douglas Hurd stressed, is the acceptance of the peace plan by all three sides, primarily the Bosnian Serbs. The third is the exchange of territories within the new constitutional provisions. The last, fourth step is full implementation of the peace plan. All this, Douglas Hurd said, was the subject of our talks with President Milosevic. He emphasized that this was not the only meeting that ministers would have in connection to this issue.

Bearing in mind also the meetings with other ministers in Budapest, Hurd concluded that the overall conclusion was that there was not much time and that resolution of these problems could not be delayed as the Contact Group members would make efforts to accelerate the peace process. [passage omitted]

Hurd's assessment was that if the Srpska republic again rejects the offered peace plan, it would run the risk of finding itself in a very difficult situation for some time, which is not an encouraging prospect, especially not for the children. If they do not accept the plan, the pressure on them will remain and their situation will grow dangerous, Douglas Hurd said. [passage omitted]

Milosevic Meets With Balkan Representatives

LD0212200294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1727 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Dec. 2 (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic Friday said Balkan countries should set up a joint market and create conditions to appear as equal partners in Europe. Milosevic met with the representatives of the Association of Balkan Chambers of Commerce who ended a two-day meeting in Belgrade on Friday. Milosevic said it was important to establish economic cooperation in the region, strengthen stablility and independence and develop good-neighborly relations, mutual trust and equality between states and peoples.

The representatives of the Association of Balkan Chambers of Commerce informed Milosevic about their activities and plans. The association was founded in September 1994 in the town of Mangalia in Romania. The first president with a one-year mandate is Mihailo Milojevic, Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce president, who hosted the Belgrade meeting. The Cyprus Chamber of Commerce received full membership in the association.

The association of Balkan Chambers of Commerce includes the chambers of commerce of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece, and Romania.

The Belgrade meeting agreed to set up seven working teams—for information and marketing, trade and industrial cooperation, banking, finance and insurance, economic and legal regulations in the Balkan countries, transport, tourism and a special team to investigate the possibilities for linking up the information systems of the Balkan chambers of commerce.

The meeting also agreed to issue a revue which would be published every three months by the current president-country of the association.

Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce President Bozidar Bozinov said that the Balkans had always been called a 'powder keg' and that the association's task was to 'empty the keg of the powder and fill it with gold.'

Romanian Chamber of Commerce President Auriel Chibutiu said the association's most important task was to make every effort to introduce a free market and include the Balkans into Europe.

Greek Chamber of Commerce President Paris Kyriakopoulos said Greece was willing to invest into the Balkan economy and said the establishing of a peace in the Balkans was of utmost importance.

Cyprus Chamber of Commerce President Phanos Epihaniou said that the Balkan countries should develop mutual cooperation and act together on third countries' markets.

Kosovo

Serbs Arrest 156 Ethnic Albanian Ex-Policemen

AU0212213894 Paris AFP in English 2105 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pristina, Serbia, Dec 2 (AFP)—Authorities in the Kosovo province of Serbia said Friday [2 December] that they had arrested 156 former policemen from the Albanian community on suspicion that they were involved in plans for the province to secede and join Albania.

The Kosovo Democratic League (LDK), the largest of the Albanian political parties opposing the government in Belgrade, confirmed that several dozen policeman had been arrested but failed to give an exact figure.

At a news conference in Pristina Miodrag Brkljaca, the chief public prosecutor, said that of the 156 people arrested 133 were under investigation.

He said they were accused either of having created "an interior ministry" for the "Republic of Kosovo" which was clandestinely proclaimed in September 1992 or of belonging to "illegal militias" set up by the clandestine "ministry."

The aim, he said, was to undermine constitutional order in the rump Yugoslavia (comprised of Serbia and Montenegro) with the purpose of creating an independent state of Kosovo which would join Albania.

Brkljaca said the policemen had resigned their jobs in 1990 to show their rejection of Serbia's laws and constitution. The LDK said they had been dismissed.

The news agency TANJUG quoted Serbian police Friday of accusing "illegal militias" in Kosovo of receiving "financial, technical and other" aid from the Albanian intelligence services.

Official Speaks on Arrests

AU0212214994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1735 GMT 2 Dec 94

[Qani Mehmeti telephone report from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] After cataloguing all the forms of Serbian police violence against Albanians in Kosova, Hydajet Hyseni, deputy chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK], at a news conference today, particularly stressed the Serbian regime's campaign of imprisoning former police officers in Kosova.

Regarding these arrests of Albanians, whose number has exceeded 130 with over 100 still held in custody, he said that the Belgrade regime has come up with an official explanation that they have allegedly formed a parallel Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Kosova. However, we have no such information, he said. In the long run, Hyseni added, even if they had acted in the way in which the Serbian bodies claim, at a time when throughout former Yugoslavia there are military formations committing crimes and genocide against other nations with no one even considering imprisoning these formations, let alone destroying them, the Albanians arrested would have committed no crime at all against anyone, and that is why their imprisonment is unprecedented.

Hyseni drew attention to the 14th Albanian victim of the Serbian regime this year, the case of the death of Ismail Haka, which he said was the consequence of Serbian police violence and terror in Kosova.

At today's news conference, Hyseni particularly stressed the increasing interest shown by the international community in resolving the Kosova question. He mentioned the talks that President Rugova held with European dignitaries and U.S. officials during his tour, which, he said, offered cause for hope.

He particularly underlined the statement by U.S. Senator Bob Dole that Kosova belongs to the area of U.S. interests. Hyseni said that Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, the Republic of Kosova's Prime Minister, was also expected to hold important meetings with international figures.

The LDK deputy chairman greeted the initiative of the Swiss Government to postpone the return of Kosova refugees to Kosova, not because this is not wanted, but because the appropriate circumstances have not yet been created for such an act.

Asked by a reporter whether the latest arrests in Kosova might be linked to the demand of the Serbs of Fushe-Kosova that Albanians should not be allowed to have parallel authorities, Hyseni answered that such an operation by the Belgrade regime suits the [word indistinct] of Fushe-Kosova. Despite this, this campaign belongs to the general arsenal of violence of the Serbian regime against Albanians in Kosova.

Asked whether he expected that killers of Albanians to face the International Court in The Hague, Hyseni answered that the Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Prishtina has presented a file of 120 cases of violent deaths of Albanians caused by Serbian police terror. That is why it would be reasonable for not only the criminals but also those giving the orders to bear responsibility in the Hague Court.

Magistrate Fatmir Sejdiu, LDK secretary general, also attended the party's news conference.

Serbian Leader Calls For Troop Deployment

AU0412182194 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Dec 94 p 13

[Report by Z. Miladinovic: "1st and 2d Krajina Corps Must Come to Kosmet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Serbian people in Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija] were distributed insufficient quantities of arms, and it is not at all important right now who handed them out." With these words Miroslav Solevic, one of the leaders of the Serbian Resistance Movement, explains his statement on the arming of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija after a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic. To recap, Solevic stated this recently at a public discussion of the Pan-Serbian National Movement in Novi Sad:

"The fact is that the Serbian national question in Kosmet can only be resolved in two ways, peacefully or through war," Miroslav Solevic says. "For a peaceful resolution of this question, for coexistence of the Shiptars and the Serbs it is necessary for the Shiptars to accept the last normal situation in Kosmet, which was in March 1941. What followed afterward was occupation, fascism, and then communism. During this time the Shiptars, with a biological explosion, settled the Serbian ethnic and historic territory because the Serbs were cleverly displaced during the occupation, and after the war the communist authorities would not allow the return of exiles to their homes."

"If the Shiptars do not want to accept this situation because of the biological explosion that they refuse to halt then a resolution of this question through war will occur sooner or later," Solevic goes on.

"The people in Kosmet, the Serbian people, and Serbia as a state must be ready for it. The Serbian people in Kosmet should be well armed, like the Israelis on their territory. Although certain quantities of arms have been distributed among Serbs in Kosmet these are still insufficient. Parallel to this, we must increase our military resources and have a special police force capable of combat in any condition. Finally, the 1st and 2d Krajina Corps, as the elite Serbian units trained for this type of warfare, should come to Kosmet. Only then can one say that the state of Serbia and the Serbian people are ready to defend Kosmet under any circumstances," Solevic concludes.

Criminal Charges Filed Against Albanians Noted

LD0212184594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1544 GMT 2 Dec 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—Between 17 November and today the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia submitted to the district public prosecutors in Pristina, Prizren, and Gnjilane [in Kosovo] criminal charges against 125 people because of well-founded suspicions that they committed the criminal act of association in order to carry out hostile activity under Article 136, and threatened territorial integrity under Article 116 of the criminal law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The persons against whom the charges were filed are mainly former employees of the former provincial Secretariat for Internal Affairs [SUP]—Albanians who resigned from active service in 1990 for ideological reason, a statement from the Interior Ministry says.

On orders from the so-called government of the Republic of Kosovo, invoking their "decree on the organization of the republic's administration" signed by self-styled Prime Minister Bujar Bukosi, these persons started setting up illegal formations of the services of public and state security of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Kosovo. They tried to conceal their activity behind the so-called independent trade union of the former employees of the provincial Secretariat of Internal Affairs.

Jonuz Trstena, former head of the police in the Provincial SUP, was appointed as the main coordinator. Together with Avdi Mehmedovic, his deputy, likewise a former head of police in the Provincial SUP, he formed a six-member leading body whose duty was to work out an organizational system for the "Ministry of Internal Affairs" and recruitment to it.

The basic work on which members of the so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo have been engaged hitherto, was the taking of action to prevent insights from being gained into their work and the countering of measures and actions of the legal authorities of the Republic of Serbia. A special task was the monitoring of the activities of members of the Yugoslav Army and Ministry of Internal Affairs units in the Republic of Serbia.

Their priority goals also included preparations for activity in the conditions of war, something which was otherwise harmonized with the activities of the so-called Ministry of Defense of the so-called Republic of Kosovo, the activity of which was neutralized in 1993 by measures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs authorities in the Republic of Serbia, something the public was informed about in good time.

Investigations so far have established that members of the illegal Ministry of Internal Affairs formations of the Republic of Kosovo obtained financial, technical, and other assistance from the intelligence service of the Republic of Albania. During searches which were carried out a large amount of source documentation of the so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo, technical equipment and arms were found.

In cooperation with the competent public prosecutors' offices and judicial organs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia is taking further measures to suppress and eliminate these illegal activities, the statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia says in conclusion.

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